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Introduction: Rethinking value chains 
in times of crisis
Florence Palpacuer and Alistair Smith
The need to rethink value chains has gained momentum in 
public debates during the COVID- 19 pandemic, highlighting 
the vulnerability of transnational production systems to 
unexpected shocks that could suddenly deprive import- based, 
consumption countries from access to very basic goods (Gereffi, 
2020), while raising poverty levels to alarming thresholds in 
export- based producing countries where vast numbers of 
unprotected workers were left without work or a basic income 
(Kabir et al, 2020; Morton, 2020). The unsustainability of 
global capitalism has likewise come to the fore with the 
establishment of a link between deforestation and the decline 
of biodiversity on the one hand, and the vulnerability of our 
societies to disease pandemics on the other (for instance, see 
Tollefson, 2020).
Social inequalities, precarious development and ecological 
destruction have been longstanding issues surrounding the rise of 
global value chains (GVCs), but their magnitude and acuteness 





and core dynamics has become unescapable. Such an endeavour 
should concern not just GVC experts, academics and students 
but also a broad array of actors involved in and around these 
chains, including policy makers, corporate managers, labour 
unions, civil society activists and the diverse stakeholders with 
whom they interact, from consumers to workers, indigenous 
people and non- human living beings on this planet.
Our short book contributes to such a collective effort by 
combining academic and activist perspectives to offer some 
informed analysis of key GVC issues such as the generation 
of greater inequalities within and between countries, the rise 
of state authoritarianism to discipline activists and workers, 
and the challenges involved in enforcing greater sustainability 
measures within these chains. The book further highlights 
the transformative capacity of civil society initiatives through 
concrete cases and opportunities for collective action. In the 
rest of this introduction, we offer a brief overview of the 
features of GVCs and current challenges, before highlighting 
the core contributions made by the chapters that follow.
In the age of global value chains, to paraphrase the title of the 
last World Development Report (World Bank, 2020), about half 
of world trade is estimated to be linked to this now widespread 
form of organisation of productive activities, whereby the 
sequence of inter- related tasks involved from the design to 
the production and sale of a wide range of goods and services 
is scattered across firms and countries. The seminal work of 
Gary Gereffi and colleagues drew attention to the rise of this 
new pattern of work and production in the 1990s, stirring the 
development of a broad literature on the merits, contributions 
and risks of the changing configurations of value chains and 
firms in the global economy. Beyond academic spheres, the 
concept of GVCs gained growing popularity in international 
organisations where it guided and promoted development 
policies based on greater trade and economic openness among 
nations over the following decades, particularly geared towards 
Southern countries (for an overview, see Gereffi, 2018).
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By the time GVCs had fully established themselves as the 
new ‘doxa’ for thinking about the world economy, their 
growth cycle seemed to have come to a halt or, at least, had 
reached a new phase of maturity. The turning point occurred 
with the financial crisis of 2008, when GVCs channelled 
the ensuing economic crisis of the US to their suppliers 
worldwide, principally Asian- based. The steep decline in world 
trade experienced at the time did not lead to a recovery – a 
return to the pre- crisis growth rate. Indeed, as shown in 
Figure 0.1, global trade ceased to grow faster than the rest of 
the economy. Another, perhaps more powerful blow was to 
come in 2020 with the COVID- 19 crisis, leading the World 
Trade Organization to envision a drop in the volume of trade of 
9.2 per cent in 2020 (also shown in Figure 0.1), while foreign 
direct investment is set to contract by 30 per cent to 40 per 
cent in 2020– 21 (UNCTAD, 2020).
Figure 0.1: World trade volume, 2000– 22
Note: Figures for 2020 and 2021 are projections
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If the controversies that surrounded the 2008 crisis were largely 
focused on the need to regulate financial markets, GVCs 
found themselves at the forefront of the heated debates stirred 
by the COVID- 19 crisis. The dependencies that decades of 
de- industrialisation had created in many Northern countries 
became blatant when the worldwide ‘lockdowns’ induced a 
shortage of imported goods that catered to elementary needs, 
such as medical supplies and drugs. Meanwhile, many workers 
in Southern factories were abruptly sent home, triggering 
civil society campaigns to obtain some form of compensation 
from Northern buyers who had stopped or cancelled orders, as 
seen for instance in garment GVCs.1 These shocks shone the 
spotlight on structural trends that increasingly weakened the 
capacity of GVCs to act as vehicles for sustainable economic 
growth and social progress throughout the world. Trends 
coming to the fore include the rise of inequalities that GVCs 
were shown to generate among firms and workers, mounting 
popular discontent among disadvantaged populations, and 
the ensuing tensions and conflicts among trading blocs and 
countries (Dür et al, 2020; World Bank, 2020).
The time therefore seems ripe for rethinking value chains, 
as envisioned in this short book where we take stock of 
longstanding controversies and mounting critical perspectives 
on GVCs to highlight and discuss a number of pressing issues 
and innovative responses that civil society organisations have 
started to develop.
Indeed, there is a long- running ‘battle of ideas’ in GVC 
circles over the merits and limitations of this global form of 
agro- industrial/ industrial organisation. Bair (2005) published 
an influential assessment of the main transformations 
undergone by this stream of research initially rooted in 
world- system theory, highlighting the patterns of power and 
dependency that global forms of production had created 
between Northern and Southern economies through the 
unequal value- capture capacity of the different ‘nodes’ of the 





concern with inequalities in the world economy, Bair (2005) 
recalled, the perspective has evolved towards an increasingly 
firm- centric, economistic view of ‘value chains’ – a term 
borrowed from management sciences – that vaunts the capacity 
of those firms and countries entering at the bottom, low- value 
parts of the chains – typically the labour- intensive stages of 
production – to climb up the ladder via ‘industrial upgrading’ 
towards higher value activities that typically involve product 
development, design and marketing, rather than production 
or manufacturing.
The following decades saw a burgeoning literature – often 
but not systematically referring to global ‘production networks’ 
rather than ‘value chains’ – which sought to highlight the 
political dimensions of these global forms of industrial 
organisation, their social and institutional context (Coe et al, 
2008), as well as the role of ideology and power struggles 
unfolding among firms, workers, civil society and governments 
(Levy, 2008), to shape and contest the distribution of value 
within the chains and their broader societal outcomes (Phillips, 
2011; Bair and Werner, 2011).
Environmental critics also emerged, focusing attention on 
agro- industrial and extractive activities and the unsustainable 
relationship that GVCs maintained with nature in feeding 
the world economy (Ciccantell and Smith, 2009). This 
unsustainability was also shown through a ‘financialisation’ 
lens, notably the tight inter- connection that the so- called 
lead firms – those firms governing the chains and capturing a 
lion’s share of the value created within them – had developed 
to financial markets, generating a short- termist, profit- driven 
focus in the governance of the whole chain (Milberg, 2008; 
Palpacuer, 2008) and a ‘supplier squeeze’ that results in 
‘immiserising growth’ in producing countries (Kaplinsky et al, 
2002; Marslev, 2019).
Over the same period, following the early deployment 
of GVCs in the 1980s and 1990s, civil society organisations 
drew on pre- existing transnational connections among labour 
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unions, feminist movements, or development and faith- based 
organisations to start tackling issues around working conditions 
in Southern fields and factories, progressively giving rise to 
a new form of GVC- based activism that targeted lead firms 
mainly based in the Global North. The aim was to re- establish 
some form of social responsibility towards workers’ conditions 
in the factories and plantations of the Global South where 
these firms’ goods were being produced.
Over the course of the following decades, GVC- focused 
campaigns broadened the spectrum of societal issues addressed, 
from labour conditions to fair trade, low pay, gender 
inequalities and the environment. These campaigns extended 
the coverage of GVCs concerned by social and environmental 
abuses from manufacturing to farming and mining activities. 
The campaigns also increased the variety of lead firms 
being targeted, from clothing and sportswear brands to food 
producers and firms driving other consumer goods sectors 
such as toys and electronics (Palpacuer, 2019).
In recent years, these two streams of critical approaches 
have been combined in several hybrid spaces or initiatives 
involving both academics and activists in sharing knowledge 
and experiences on GVC- related social/ environmental 
concerns and activism. Among them is the Responsible 
Global Value Chains (RGVC) initiative launched in 2015 
as an internet platform designed to share research, reports 
and teaching material on social and environmental issues 
in GVCs, gathering over 90 academics and 30 members 
of non- governmental organisations (NGOs), labour union 
federations and think- tanks based mostly, but not exclusively, 
in Europe, primarily in France and the UK where the 
initiative was founded. A year later, the Rethinking Value 
Chains (RVC) collective was formed, with some overlapping 
membership but with a predominance of activist groups, in 
order to share information on ongoing campaigns, evolving 





This book is an outcome of the encounter of these two 
networks during a seminar held at the Charles Léopold Mayer 
Foundation for the Progress of Humankind in Paris in February 
2019. It is based on voluntary contributions by several RGVC 
and RVC members who highlighted key emerging issues 
in GVCs as well as original civil society initiatives to tackle 
them. The reflections developed in the following chapters are 
far from exhaustive in terms of the issues and initiatives being 
discussed: important topics, such as the specific conditions of 
women in GVCs, the scope and magnitude of environmental 
destruction caused by their continuous development, the peculiar 
challenges faced by fair trade initiatives, and the perspectives and 
means of action characterising labour unions, do not receive the 
attention they deserve. There is therefore a need to continue this 
collective work. Similarly, the civil society strategies explored 
here do not exhaust the range of perspectives and tools developed 
over recent decades in GVC- focused activism.
Nonetheless, the challenges being tackled here are among 
the most pressing and daunting in light of recent trends, 
including the rise of new forms of state authoritarianism in 
GVC governance (Chapter 1), the hidden circuits of finance 
by which the value created by productive activities within 
chains is extracted and appropriated by capital owners at the 
expense of states and workers (Chapter 2), and the reabsorption 
of ‘sustainability’ into GVC governance as a tool for powerful 
actors to exert enhanced pressures and extract rents from the 
chain (Chapter 3). Our collection also includes chapters that 
address activist perspectives and experiences that have received 
little attention in the growing literature devoted to transnational 
campaign networks, such as new opportunities for civil society 
groups to shape the political agenda of governments on GVCs, 
particularly via trade regulation in Europe (Chapter 4), the 
role of activists in the emergence of recent national regulations 
tackling the social and environmental conditions of GVC- 
focused activities (Chapter 5), the strategic use of data and 




to GVC issues (Chapter 6) and the possibilities for bottom- 
up, South- driven activism to be effectively supported by 
transnational campaigns (Chapters 7 and 8).
While GVC analysis typically focused on corporations as 
the architects of the globalisation of production, our critical 
perspective emphasises the role of the state in shaping and 
regulating global production, and reassesses its role in the 
light of recent GVC transformations, along a common thread 
running through the four chapters contributed by academic 
writers that form the first part of this book. In the first 
contribution, Martin Hess reviews the ways in which the state 
has traditionally been perceived in GVC analysis, highlighting 
its assignation to a supportive, facilitative role for economic 
development that overlooked the use of violence and other 
modes of coercion. Not only have authoritarian forms of state 
action always been present in GVC regulation, Hess argues, 
but new forms of ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ are actually on 
the rise, and he calls for much greater attention to be devoted 
to the exercise of coercion on populations contributing to 
GVC activities in both Northern and Southern countries.
Liam Campling and Clair Quentin tackle another widely 
overlooked role of the state in GVCs: its redistributive capacity 
as a central institution to garner and reinject some of the wealth 
generated by productive activities into core services for society, 
such as health and education. Their innovative framework, the 
global inequality chain, articulates GVCs with global wealth 
chains (GWCs) formed of financial flows that span networks of 
tax havens, diverting wealth from public taxation into private 
forms of accumulation. Hence, in their view, not only are 
workers deprived of an important part of the value they create 
through production via the rent- capture capacities of lead firms 
and other powerful intermediaries in GVCs, but also states are 
robbed of their redistributive role and capacity to sustain the 
public needs of societies.
Stefano Ponte has also chosen to emphasise the role of the 
state as ‘orchestrator’ of a variety of policy instruments to 
INTRODUCTION
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promote environmental sustainability in GVCs. Ponte takes 
stock of the limitations of private initiatives that have mainly 
reabsorbed issues of sustainability into their economic rationale. 
He reflects on the diverse ways in which sustainability could 
be tackled by public actors, comparing two GVCs that have 
highly dissimilar characteristics in terms of power structures, 
technological constraints and regulatory initiatives. While 
coffee GVCs, where economic power is highly concentrated 
at particular nodes, offered little room for manoeuvre for 
public players, in the case of the more recently formed biofuel 
GVCs dominant positions were less strongly established and 
public action had more chance of shaping the environmental 
sustainability agenda. Ponte emphasises the need to target 
public action via appropriate instruments – and at appropriate 
geographical levels – according to the specificities of various 
GVC configurations.
Louise Curran and Jappe Eckhardt in turn investigate public 
policy options at the level of the EU, focusing on how trade 
regulation could promote greater social and environmental 
protection in GVCs. Their chapter points out some key 
institutional constraints that need to be worked through 
when it comes to the proposals that activists could advocate, 
and explores the options offered by the EU’s bilateral free 
trade agreements and the clauses they include on trade and 
sustainable development. A first advocacy option pertains 
to the ratification and application of conventions related 
to environmental sustainability, such as the Paris Climate 
Accord, that the EU requires of its trading partners. Parallel 
pressure would have to be exerted in order to strengthen the 
effectiveness of monitoring mechanisms attached to such 
commitments, and to ensure the adoption of dispute settlement 
systems and sanctions that would be as effective as those laid 
out in other chapters of the FTAs. Other options discussed 
relate to the Generalized System of Preferences Plus (GSP+) 
regime, citing concrete cases of civil society mobilisation that 
underscore the feasibility and effectiveness of such initiatives.
RETHINKING VALUE CHAINS
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The second part of the book gives voice to activists who 
reflect on the initiatives launched by their own civil society 
organisations in recent years. Marilyn Croser highlights 
the seminal work of CORE, the corporate responsibility 
coalition formed by civil society groups in the UK in 1998, 
in pushing for the adoption of legislation that would require 
companies to identify and mitigate human rights risks and 
impacts in their value chains. Her chapter offers an overview 
of major European legislative initiatives designed either to 
promote greater corporate supply chain transparency, such 
as the EU Non- Financial Reporting Directive and the 
UK Modern Slavery Act, or to establish specific duties and 
sanctions for human rights abuses resulting from corporate 
negligence, such as the French Duty of Vigilance law and 
a similar initiative under consideration in Switzerland. At 
various stages of designing a regulatory framework, Croser 
explores the complex stakes of coalition building, the choice 
of campaigning options, and the ways to counteract business 
attempts to circumvent new rules that CORE had to work 
through. She also highlights the levers which could be used 
in future advocacy work, such as strengthening monitoring 
processes in existing legal frameworks, and scaling up coalition 
work at the European level.
Another type of civil society strategy is explored by 
Christophe Alliot in the chapter devoted to the French 
initiative BASIC, the Bureau of Societal Analysis for Citizens’ 
Information, established in 2013 with the specific aim 
of producing objectivised information on the social and 
environmental costs generated by the GVCs. Alliot lays out the 
specific challenges faced by BASIC in accessing and modelling 
the data needed to evidence the highly unequal distribution of 
value within a variety of GVCs such as cocoa and coffee, on 
which the small research- oriented activist group has produced 
several reports. These include the growing paucity of the kind 
of aggregate data needed to assess the actual economic power 
and profit margins of powerful players such as lead firms and 
INTRODUCTION
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transnational traders in the GVCs under study; at the other 
end of the chain, another challenge consists in assessing the 
resources required for small- scale producers to survive at the 
beginning of GVCs. BASIC thus tackles the classic ‘framing’ 
issue highlighted by social movement theory in original 
ways, by calculating and demonstrating specific distributional 
issues and inequalities generated by GVCs governance along 
the chain.
In the following chapter, Alistair Smith analyses the pivotal 
role of another small civil society group, the UK- based Banana 
Link (BL), in structuring strategic actions in the GVCs of one of 
the most widely consumed food products worldwide – dessert 
bananas. The initiative launched in 1996 developed an original 
approach by supporting two traditionally weak stakeholder 
groups at the production stage of banana GVCs to join forces 
and build up scale for obtaining a more equitable share of 
the value created along the chain. The key players are small 
independent producer organisations located in the Caribbean 
and South America on the one hand, and independent 
workers’ unions representing men and women employed in 
the large plantations of eight Latin American countries on the 
other, all exporting to the European market. BL facilitated 
the emergence of a ‘South– South– North’ advocacy network 
involving a number of other European- based civil society 
and fair trade groups to support and channel the demands of 
Southern workers and producers towards the large European 
buyers. Smith analyses the processes of coalition building that 
allowed for the activist voices to be amplified while remaining 
Southern- driven, as well as the specific conditions under which 
concrete gains could be obtained from retailers in the context 
of an activist- founded multi- stakeholder initiative, the World 
Banana Forum (WBF). As a result of the long civil society- led 
preparatory process, the WBF tackles the sensitive issues of 
distribution of value along the chain, as well as labour standards, 
gender equity, labour relations, environmental impacts and 
how to develop climate- resilient agroecological production 
RETHINKING VALUE CHAINS
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systems, under the all- encompassing umbrella of ‘sustainable 
production and trade’.
The last chapter uncovers the main intervention methodology 
of small France- based civil society network ReAct (Réseaux 
pour l’Action collective internationale), established in 2010 
to support and promote community organising in territories 
affected by the activities of large French multinationals, notably 
in African- based agricultural and mining chains. Eloïse Maulet 
focuses on the case of an ongoing campaign against the Bolloré 
group and its Socfin subsidiary, owner of rubber and oil palm 
plantations in nine African countries (and Cambodia) where 
living conditions are deeply affected by water pollution, 
deforestation, and the use of violence notably against women, all 
linked to the multinational’s implantation. The chapter unveils 
the specific steps by which ReAct supported the emergence 
of organised movements in the affected communities and 
helped to convey, through transnational network- building, 
local demands to the corporate headquarters. Acknowledging 
the difficulties involved in rebalancing highly unequal power 
relations in GVCs, Maulet highlights the importance of 
building movements for empowerment and emancipation in 
the most affected communities.
The significant contributions presented in this set of case 
studies are analysed in our concluding chapter, where we adopt 
a Gramscian lens to reflect on the changing forms of hegemony 
in GVCs, the pivotal role of the state, and the innovative 
approaches of civil society organisations to maintaining and 
consolidating a counter- hegemonic front in the contemporary 
world economy.
Notes
 1 See for instance, the #PayYourWorkers campaign at https:// cleanclothes.
org/ campaigns/ covid- 19
 2 See www.responsibleglobalvaluechains.org/ and www.bananalink.org.uk/ 
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It has become almost a truism that global value chains (GVCs) 
and global production networks (GPNs) have become a central 
feature of the contemporary global economy. Powerful lead 
firms such as Glencore, Apple (the first US company in the 
world to be valued at US$2 trillion on Wall Street, and only 
the second in the world after oil giant Saudi Aramco), Airbus 
or Zara orchestrate the configurations and geographies of 
these value chains and networks – from extractive industries 
to software development, aircraft production to garment 
manufacturing. As GVCs and GPNs have become ever 
more prevalent phenomena over the last four decades, their 
importance has been recognised by global institutions such 
as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and the International Labour Organization (ILO) to formulate 
economic and social policies and initiatives. In the same 






frameworks and theories to explain their development, 
governance and impact on the global economy (Coe and 
Yeung, 2015; Gereffi, 2018).1 However, recent major events 
and more gradual global shifts have cast some doubt on the 
future of GPNs, their organisation and geographies, among 
the public, policy makers and academics alike.
Since the global expansion of neoliberalism from the 1980s 
onwards, the world economy faced its first major shock in 
the form of the global financial crisis of 2007/ 08. This crisis 
was followed by a second inflection point when the COVID- 
19 pandemic hit the world in 2020, temporarily shutting 
down many national economies first in Asia, then Europe, 
the Americas and Africa leading to recessions in many 
countries not seen since the Great Depression of the 20th 
century. Both crises highlighted not only the problems and 
perils of neoliberalism but also brought into sharp relief the 
vulnerabilities of a globally interconnected economic system 
which had seemingly eschewed oversight and regulation by 
the state and global institutions. In between these two global 
crisis moments, there were related yet more incremental 
political- economic developments which added to creating 
potential new trends and clearly accelerating existing ones 
affecting GPNs, for instance widespread austerity policies 
adopted by many nation states in Europe and beyond 
adding to growing inequality. Taken together, this arguably 
led to a new wave of right- wing populism and increasing 
nationalism in various parts of the world, epitomised by 
the 2016 referendum decision of the UK to leave the EU 
(Brexit) and the 2016 election of Donald Trump as President 
of the United States, both aimed at reasserting a perceived 
(and reactionary) nation- state sovereignty (under the slogans 
‘Take Back Control’ and ‘America First’, respectively). To 
this, the current trade disputes between the US and China 
can be added as the latest manifestation of political and 





While the Sino- US trade war and Brexit tend to dominate 
the headlines in public discourse and academic analysis, and 
have far-reaching potential and real consequences for the 
architectures and geographies of GPNs, they are by no means 
the only signs of a growing trend towards political and forceful 
state involvement in the global economy. Looking at states like 
India, Turkey or Brazil, among other examples, a trend to a 
renewed state involvement in economic governance – which 
had been assumed to be substantially relegated under global 
neoliberalism – is emerging that also exhibits increasingly 
authoritarian forms of politics. The developments outlined 
may help to illustrate the state as fundamental and integral to 
the workings of GPNs, not only since the crises and austerity 
policies of the 21st century, but also in previous periods. As 
recent literature has demonstrated (Horner, 2017; Horner and 
Alford, 2019; Werner, 2020), the state as an actor in GPNs has 
always assumed various important roles and functions; however, 
there still remains a need to reflect more on the nature of the 
state, politics and power as increasingly authoritarian, including 
a new emphasis on coercive governance versus networked 
forms which were assumed to be largely the norm in the past.
The following discussion builds on and tries to synthesise 
insights from existing work on state– GPN relations, and to 
contextualise it in light of the recent political and economic 
crises and transformations. More specifically, the chapter aims 
to achieve three goals, namely: a) revisiting the regulatory role 
of the state and how it penetrates other state roles in value 
chains and production networks; b) exploring the nature of 
the state and its relation to GPNs through existing concepts 
and the lens of Antonio Gramsci’s concept of the integral state; 
and c) highlighting increasing state authoritarianism and related 
forms of coercive governance, including the mechanisms 
through which this is achieved. These three points will then 
be illustrated using examples of labour governance in GPNs, 
as labour is arguably the most important and also the most 
politically contested element of global production.
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Reconsidering state roles in GPNs
GPNs and GVCs have been broadly defined as organisational 
arrangements, coordinated by powerful lead firms, and linking 
suppliers, producers, consumers and states in the world 
economy. While the role of the state has long been recognised, 
albeit to varying degrees, the by now extensive conceptual 
and empirical literature on GVCs nevertheless has usually 
placed the firms as actors centre stage, with comparatively little 
attention to the state as a major player and inextricable part of 
GPNs and value chains. Rather, it is treated as an institutional 
environment, structural feature or external power that firms 
in GVCs have to deal with. As Horner (2017: 4) argued, the 
GPN framework addresses the state as an actor more explicitly:
To date, and for the most part, the state has not been 
fully incorporated into the most widely regarded 
conceptualisations of GVCs and economic development. 
Greater consideration is warranted of the variety of 
roles that states can play within GVCs. … With greater 
attention to non- firm actors and by seeing the state as 
an integral part of a network, rather than an external 
influence, the GPN approach has the potential to 
address not just how the state influences GPNs but also 
how participation in GPNs influences the state and its 
policy choices.
Based on this observation, Horner fleshed out the various 
roles states play, in the form of facilitator and regulator of 
GPNs, as well as including the state as producer (in the 
form of state- owned companies) and buyer (through public 
procurement). While the recognition of the various state roles 
in GPNs usefully expands the prevailing focus on the state as 
facilitator and regulator, I want to argue that state regulatory 
policies – rather than sitting alongside other roles – permeate 




an overarching element of the state being part of GPNs (see 
Table 1.1). The distinction made by Horner between facilitator 
and regulator is based on the argument that the former entails 
enabling policies whereas the latter is aimed at preventing or 
curtailing negative outcomes. Yet, facilitating also requires 
rules to be followed by both foreign and domestic firms, and 
labour to be regulated in a way that attracts investment, for 
instance, which both Horner (2017) and Horner and Alford 
(2019) acknowledge but do not further elaborate.
In this context, facilitating trade has long been at the 
forefront of state agency, most prominently through free trade 
arrangements reducing tariff and non- tariff barriers; in recent 
years, such trade arrangements have become increasingly 
unilateral in their configuration, negotiated either between 
individual nation states or between individual states and 
economic blocs such as the EU. Trade deals also have become 
increasingly conditional, including for instance labour rights 
clauses imposed by one party on the other (World Trade 
Organization, 2020; see also Curran and Eckhardt, this 
volume). At the intra- national level, a proliferation of Special 
Economic Zones, Export Processing Zones and Free Ports 
as a territorial form of ‘regulation for facilitation’ has also 
been observed (UNCTAD, 2019), while the latest World 
Table 1.1: State roles and state– global production network relations
State regulation and politics
State as facilitator State as producer State as buyer
Examples:
Special Economic 
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Development Report (World Bank, 2020) – aptly titled ‘Trading 
for Development in the Age of Global Value Chains’ – calls 
for developing economies to ‘flexibilise’ their labour markets 
in order to more deeply integrate in GVCs.
State power as a regulator and (geo- )politics are also 
increasingly visible in state agencies’ roles as producer and buyer 
(see Horner and Alford, 2019). Recent examples illustrating this 
include current and ongoing struggles over countries’ access to 
personal protective equipment, medicines to treat COVID- 19, 
and future vaccines, with ramifications for GPNs producing 
these; and telecoms equipment manufacturer Huawei from 
China being banned from involvement in the future rollout 
of mobile phone networks in the UK for ‘national security’ 
reasons, as there are fears of problematic Chinese state influence 
on the privately owned company. In other words, while 
Huawei legally is a private company, geo- politically it is seen 
as akin to a state- owned enterprise.
There is no doubt that Horner’s elaboration on the roles 
of the state in GPNs provides a first major conceptual step 
towards a more inclusive and explicit consideration of the 
state, for the GVC framework in particular. Yet, as with 
much of the existing literature on GVCs, there remains one 
largely unresolved issue, that is, how to think about the state 
in GPNs beyond its obvious and powerful roles as an actor in a 
‘functional’ way. According to Glassman (2011), who has called 
for more recognition of the importance of geopolitics for the 
formation of GPNs, what underpins most work on GPNs is 
a neo- Weberian view of the state as a community holding (or 
claiming) the territorial monopoly of violence and the state 
being distinct from capital and markets. In his influential paper, 
Horner (2017) is not explicitly addressing this theoretical issue, 
but has made a move in the right direction by including state 
buyer and producer roles which clearly show a much more 
intricate state- capital relationship which is networked rather 
than merely territorial. A look at part state- owned companies 
such as Germany’s car maker Volkswagen or France’s utilities 
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provider EDF, as well as the state purchasing formerly state- 
owned but outsourced and privatised goods and services, may 
suffice to illustrate this point. In a similar vein, recent work 
on the state in GPNs has moved towards a strategic- relational 
approach, as developed by sociologist Bob Jessop, that defines 
the state as a social formation as opposed to a more instrumental 
reading of state policy. More specifically, ‘a strategic- relational 
reading of the state requires attention to the configuration of 
social forces underpinning state support for particular policy 
directions, and how state hegemonic projects provide the 
basis for accumulation strategies, of which GPNs form one 
important component’ (Smith, 2015: 299).
A strategic- relational approach represents a further important 
step forward to stronger recognition of state and governance 
beyond territorial regulation and state- market dualisms as 
often assumed in neo- Weberian approaches, but some scholars 
have argued that the theoretical pendulum has swung too far 
towards a network governance bias, at the expense of more 
hierarchical and coercive forms of state governance. As Fawcett 
(2009, cited in Davies 2013) pointed out when reflecting on 
prevailing governance theories: ‘Metagovernance … not only 
indicates a continued role for the state in the regulation of self- 
regulating governance networks, but it also casts doubt on the 
view that the vertical hierarchies of the old social structures of 
the state have been replaced or subsumed by such networks.’ 
In the more specific context of GPNs, the argument that 
states have shifted from an active role in deregulation policies 
towards a more authoritarian interventionist role has also been 
put forward (Meyer and Phillips, 2017).
Most recently, Werner (2021) has provided a more 
comprehensive overview of the extant literature on the state 
and global production, including the seminal work of Glassman 
(2011), Horner (2017) and Smith (2015). In her review, she 
points towards a range of existing work on the role of the state 
beyond facilitator, inspired by different concepts including 
neo- Marxian and neo- Gramscian approaches to highlight the 
RETHINKING VALUE CHAINS
24
political nature of systems of global production. A useful way 
to do this as well as to emphasise the intricate connections 
between state and civil society more specifically lies in applying 
the Gramscian lens of the integral state, an idea to which I will 
now turn.
GPNs and the integral state
As I have argued in the previous section, looking at the 
different roles of the state and its relative power is an important 
advance in rethinking GVCs and GPNs, but often rests on the 
idea of a neo- Weberian state that works through its various 
agencies to facilitate and regulate. While this includes the 
possibility of coercion it nevertheless has a focus chiefly on 
one dimension: coercion through administration. According 
to thinkers such as Friedrich Engels, writing as early as the 
19th century, states have both inward and outward facing 
coercive functions (Davies, 2013) and both are relevant for the 
formation of GPNs. Again, the US– China trade war provides 
a convincing example of this, and I will illustrate this further 
in the next section. Defining the state as a configuration of 
social forces – as in the strategic- relational approach adopted 
by Smith (2015) and others – has opened up space for a wider 
understanding that recognises the power and agency of the 
state, comprised of social and class relations, and thus aligns 
more closely with Antonio Gramsci’s concept of the ‘integral 
state’. According to Gramsci (1980), the integral state works 
through both consent and coercion, where the former operates 
through political society and the latter through civil society, 
in a dialectical relationship. Building consensus is necessary 
to afford the state (or political society) legitimacy, whereas 
coercion is necessary to maintain state hegemony, both inwards 
and outwards. In this view, therefore, coercion is and always has 
been present, rather than being the exception. In recent years, 
however, it seems that state coercion has become increasingly 




Along with the rise of GPNs as a predominant form of global 
economic organisation under neoliberalism, there also has been 
a concomitant proliferation of corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) and multi- stakeholder initiatives (MSIs) involving firms 
and civil society with the aim of effecting positive social and 
environmental change and mitigating the negative outcomes 
of GPN operations including poor working conditions and 
environmental destruction. Indeed, MSIs have become a 
widespread form of private GPN governance to compensate 
for what has been identified as a global regulatory gap in which 
private governance through CSR has increasingly replaced 
public governance through state regulation (see Arnold and 
Hess, 2017, for this and the following arguments). However, 
the GPN and GVC literature examining CSR and MSIs tends 
to rest on the same assumption of a state- market separation 
evident in neo- Weberian state concepts. Consequently, it has 
been argued that centralised state power to govern GPNs has 
been declining and was replaced by a more diffused private 
power of corporations and civil society organisations. Using 
Gramsci’s concept of the integral state avoids such dualisms 
and conceives of state power as both centralised and diffuse, 
rather than either/ or.
In a similar vein, governance scholar Jonathan Davies 
(2013: 24– 6) distinguished five indirect and direct modalities 
of coercion a state might use and enact. The first, and closest 
to consensual rather than antagonistic politics and network 
relations, is hegemony, or the enrolment of civil society where 
citizens (including civil society actors in GPNs) internalise the 
‘rules of the game’. A second modality is political threat, where 
more consensual and networked forms of governance may fail. 
Among the direct modalities of coercion, Davies considers 
violence (through the police, military or paramilitary forces 
for instance), administrative domination in the form of ‘juridical 
government’, legislation and bureaucracy, and finally laissez 
faire, or according to Gramsci, a ‘ “deliberate policy, conscious 
of its own ends … a political programme … to change the 
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economic programme of the state itself ”. The repertoire of 
state coercion in Gramsci therefore encompasses “violence + 
economic compulsion + administrative domination” ’ (Davies, 
2013: 26; see also Davies, 2014). Table 1.2 provides a summary 
and integration of the conceptual discussion in this chapter 
and includes some general examples of the various state roles 
and forms of coercion.2
Many of the issues discussed so far may at first glance seem 
unrelated to or not specific of the inner workings of GPNs, 
and thus not strictly relevant or even appropriate to consider, 
but a closer look reveals important connections between the 
horizontal and vertical dimensions of GPNs and should be 
conceptualised as such. For instance, there have been numerous 
examples of civil society activism (see Palpacuer 2019 for a 
neo- Gramscian analysis of activism in GVCs) and actions 
to achieve the goal of judiciary changes in the regulation of 
GPNs and of land dispossession for accumulation by GPN 
actors. The concession of large swathes of land in rural areas 
to foreign investors by the Cambodian Government led to 
additional struggles for livelihood among many families in the 
countryside, with large numbers of (mostly female) workers 
migrating to urban areas and providing cheap labour for the 
Table 1.2: State– global production network relations and 
coercive regulation
The integral state, regulation and politics through coercion
Repertoire of state coercion
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garment industry (see also the chapters by Maulet and Croser 
respectively in this volume for more examples of land and rights 
struggles in GPNs and campaigns for legal change).
To sum up, then, I have argued that it is useful and more fully 
captures the states’ exercise of coercive power in GPNs when 
seen through the conceptual lens of Gramsci’s integral state 
as political- cum- civil society, and taking into account forms 
of coercion other than administrative domination. While this 
conceptual lens does not explain the apparent resurfacing of and 
increasing (symbolic) violence of state coercion, it nevertheless 
enables a more nuanced understanding of the ways in which 
GPN governance and GPN territorialities are shaped in the 
context of wider political and societal struggles. The following 
section will illustrate this for the fundamental element of labour 
in GPNs, using examples from Cambodia and South Korea to 
illustrate both intra- and international coercive state strategies.
‘States of discipline’: GPNs, the integral state and labour control
In a world of fragmented GPNs it has become increasingly 
difficult to attribute responsibility for workers’ rights violations 
to lead firms in GVCs. It would therefore be necessary to 
rely on state regulation to protect labour in GPNs. Yet states 
aiming to secure the conditions of capital accumulation and 
integration into GVCs often are either hesitant or unwilling 
to develop the necessary legislation and enforcement for 
labour protection to be effective, especially in times when 
forms of authoritarian neoliberalism seem to be on the ascent. 
According to Bruff (2014: 116), authoritarian neoliberalisms 
‘operate through a preemptive discipline which simultaneously 
insulates neoliberal policies through a set of administrative, 
legal and coercive mechanisms and limits the spaces of popular 
resistance against neoliberalism’.
It is of course not new and does not come as a surprise that 
there exists a continued trend to discipline workers in GPNs, 




state authoritarianism and even violence in response to worker 
activism. This includes for instance government interventions 
suppressing wildcat strikes through military and police force, 
enforcing or limiting the movement of workers across space 
(internationally and domestically), and tightening unionisation 
law. Firm strategies to discipline workers, meanwhile, seem to 
aim at increasing the fragmentation of their workforce through 
the ramping up of temporary contracts, new forms of ‘self- 
employment’ in the emerging gig economy, and ‘gamification’ 
as a new governmentality tool; all of these tactics undermine 
worker solidarity in the workplace, locality and across GPNs 
globally. Such disciplining strategies are of course fundamental 
to maintain the accumulation of wealth in GPNs, or what 
has been labelled ‘global wealth chains’ (see Campling and 
Quentin, this volume). As a consequence, a ‘race to the 
bottom’ still clearly exists and states are often complicit in its 
continuation, with many countries in the Global South as well 
in the Global North facing serious violations of workers’ rights 
(see Figure 1.1). The challenges for labour include new legal 
strategies of labour control, the intensification of control over 
organised labour and state violence in what has been labelled 
a ‘post- democracy’ world (Doucette and Kang, 2018).
To be clear, there has been progress in some arenas such as 
health and safety, and working conditions, due not least to 
public– private governance initiatives, MSIs and labour activism. 
But enabling rights are still most under threat of erosion by the 
integral state, despite concessions made in many countries such 
as the introduction and lifting of the minimum wage. Figure 1.2 
shows that in more than 80 per cent of countries the right 
to strike is increasingly criminalised and suppressed, and the 
right to collective bargaining severely curtailed. There is also 
a worryingly high number of countries where workers have 
been exposed to physical violence, among them the Philippines, 
Egypt, Colombia and Honduras. But even in formal democracies 
such as the US and the UK, which the International Trade 











regularly violating workers’ rights, disciplining labour through 
administrative and legal means is rife.
South Korea and Cambodia are just two examples of coercive 
state- firm- society relations and labour- democracy struggles 
in advanced and less developed economies. For Cambodia 
to maintain its position as an important producer within 
global garment networks, the government has – along with 
consensus- building strategies such as raising the minimum 
wage – in recent years also deployed physically violent tactics 
to supress strikes by mobilising the military to break them up. 
According to observers, this came about because of pressure 
by South Korean multinational companies whose factories 
in Cambodia faced labour unrest, and mediated through the 
South Korean embassy in Phnom Penh lobbying the military to 
intervene (see Arnold and Hess, 2017, for a detailed analysis). In 
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the context of South Korea, state coercion relies less on physical 
violence but nevertheless is present in various forms including 
legislative means. For instance, South Korean laws introduced 
to pave the way for labour ‘flexibilisation’ led to increasing 
numbers of employees being reclassified by companies 
including electronics giant Samsung as self- employed. This 
enabled firms to sue individual workers and trade unions for 
what they framed as obstruction of business when they tried 
to assert their rights by going on strike, and thus effectively 
criminalising engagement in collective action by legally treating 
it as ‘threats of force’ (for an in- depth analysis of this case, see 
Doucette and Kang, 2018). Elsewhere, the ongoing struggles 
about the employment status of workers in global wealth chains 
of platform economy transnational companies such as Uber 
are further evidence of states being complicit in undermining 
the rights of workers.
Both the cases of Cambodia and South Korea – as well as 
many more examples of state coercion as described in ITUC’s 
(2020) report and elsewhere – may illustrate the role of the 
integral state as political society- cum- civil society, the dialectics 
of consensus and coercion in securing a state hegemonic 
project, and the various and arguably increasing forms of state 
coercion that impact on workers in GPNs and beyond. And 
yet, the potential for labour agency and counter- hegemonic 
movements exists and collective action by labour and civil 
society is as important as ever (see also Smith in this volume). 
Within the literature, this has become the focus of a growing 
body of work investigating GPNs, labour and development, 
and the various local, national and international labour regimes 
that underpin the world of global production (Coe and Hess, 
2013; Smith et al, 2018).
Towards deglobalisation and new economic nationalism?
GPNs and value chains still constitute the backbone of the global 




untameable drivers to determine their scope, organisation and 
geographies. The roles of the state in regulating and bargaining 
with corporate giants as well as other powerful players have 
long been recognised, but the ways in which nation states as 
a fundamental part of GPNs are mobilising their power and 
politics to influence global production has arguably changed. 
While some of the most powerful states use political pressure to 
maintain their position among the world’s leading economies, 
other countries use political pressure and coercion to remain 
favourable locations for global investment and keep being 
part of GPNs. In both cases, disciplining labour is a crucial 
component, given its centrality to the production and value 
generation process in global networks.
This chapter has attempted to rethink the role of the state 
in a changing world economy made up to a large extent by 
GPNs. To this end, it has revisited existing and important 
work on state roles in GPNs, discussed the concept of the 
integral state as a useful way to theorise the nature of the state 
and how this might add to current readings of state roles and 
a strategic- relational approach. Finally, it has emphasised state 
coercive powers and politics influencing GPNs and the societies 
they connect, illustrated by looking at these issues through the 
lens of labour control. In the 21st century, two major global 
crises as well as more incremental political and economic 
changes have triggered an ongoing debate in academia and 
public circles about the future of the global economy and its 
geography. Following the global financial crisis, there have been 
voices arguing for a new global economic order characterised 
by some as ‘slowbalisation’, while others go further to call for 
de- globalisation.
Certainly, the spectre of economic nationalism has raised 
its head in recent years. However, I want to argue that it 
is too early to conclude that a return to protectionism and 
the dismantling of GPNs will become the ‘new normal’ of 
geopolitics and global economic organisation. The current 
COVID- 19 pandemic has shown that it may have the 
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potential – maybe more so than the 2007/ 08 financial crisis, 
Brexit or Trump – to transform GPNs and their geographical 
reach and configuration. At the same time, however, it also 
has highlighted that a retreat to nationalist politics – as in 
the debate about re- shoring pharmaceutical industries for 
instance – is also fraught with danger, including the possibility 
of a return to ‘beggar- thy- neighbour’ politics seen during the 
Great Depression in the 1920s and 1930s. There is still plenty 
of work left to further investigate the transformation and future 
of GPNs, and its economic and societal consequences.
Notes
 1 The concepts of global value chains (GVCs) and global production networks 
(GPNs) represent cognate yet distinctive analytical frameworks and 
theories, incorporating the state into their frameworks in different ways. 
For the purpose of simplicity, the remainder of this chapter uses the term 
GPN to cover both approaches, unless necessary for clarity.
 2 While neo- Weberian approaches as used in much of the GPN and GVC 
literature, including on the roles of the state, may arguably not be fully 
commensurable with the concept of the integral state, Gramsci nevertheless 
recognises and integrates the different views of a) the state contrasting 
with civil society, b) the state encompassing civil society, and c) the state 
being identical with civil society.
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Global inequality chains: how global 
value chains and wealth chains  
(re)produce inequalities of wealth
Liam Campling and Clair Quentin1
Introduction
Inequality within countries and between individuals globally 
are among today’s crucial development issues. These concerns 
are generally met with a policy response in the form of 
measures to enhance ‘competitiveness’ by articulating local 
firms with the world economy. The principal framing of these 
measures is by reference to GVCs, which are both the method 
and units of analysis in a framework seeking to interpret the 
fragmented muddle of global production (see, for example, 
World Bank, 2020). Broadly, a GVC is an international chain 
of market actors bringing commodities from extraction or 
production of raw materials to the point of consumer retail. 
The GVC framework has been adopted and adapted by major 
international financial and development institutions (the 







purposes of framing development aid conditionalities (Neilsen, 
2014; Werner et al, 2014).
As it is currently conceived, however, the GVC analytic is a 
poor lens through which to view wider issues such as wealth 
distribution and gender inequality, and uncritical deployment 
of it in a policy making context consequently risks expanding 
and deepening adverse equality outcomes globally, rather than 
addressing them. We analyse the key shortcoming of the GVC 
model as being its uncritical focus on ‘value added’ at each 
juncture in the chain. ‘Value added’ within a market entity means 
gross revenues minus costs other than wages, or (which is an 
accounting identity) profit plus wages. By definition, therefore, 
an uncritical focus on value added as it arises along a chain fails 
to take into account the distributional effects of the partition of 
value added into wages for workers and profit for asset owners. 
It also ignores the further distributional effects of the tax system 
of the jurisdiction in which the value added arises. This is a 
serious flaw in the model, since global inequality is increasingly 
being viewed in terms of the relative tax burdens of the majority 
of people as compared to large corporations and rich people 
(Palpacuer, 2008). In addition, an uncritical focus on ‘value 
added’ excludes any possibility that value is created elsewhere in 
the chain, and is merely captured rather than substantively ‘added’ 
by any firm in which it arises – a process which even mainstream 
economics is to some extent groping towards with a recognition 
of the decline in labour’s share of wealth (Autor et al, 2017) and 
the rising market power of multinational corporations and its use 
to capture higher mark-ups (De Loecker et al, 2020).
This paper addresses these shortcomings by (i) critiquing 
notions of work and value in mainstream GVC analysis and 
(ii) expanding the GVC analytic to accommodate the onward 
journey of ‘value added’. Specifically, we expand the GVC 
framework by integrating it with the related global wealth 
chain (GWC) framework. The unit of analysis in the GWC 
framework is chains which ‘hide, obscure and relocate wealth 
to the extent that they break loose from the location of value 
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creation and heighten inequality’ (Seabrooke and Wigan, 
2014: 257); broadly, they are the routes by which the wealth 
which arises from ‘value creation’ accrues to asset owners 
without attracting significant amounts of tax.
Our framework deploys these two existing analytics as the 
horizontal and vertical movements of a two- dimensional 
analytical framework, which we call the ‘global inequality 
chain’ (GIC). We use the terms horizontal and vertical to 
refer to (respectively) the movements of commodities towards 
consumption and money towards beneficial owners of assets.
The structure of GVCs and value capture
Considering first the horizontal component of the GIC 
analytic, the global value chain. We are necessarily sketching 
GVC analysis at the level of its most basic – and widely 
accepted – insights; for genealogies of and debate on the 
framework, see Bair (2005), Campling and Selwyn (2018) 
and Coe and Yeung (2019). Broadly, the GVC places in view 
a chain – or network – of market actors, one actor’s output 
being another’s input until a consumer product is purchased 
at the end of the chain. The pattern is one whereby (assuming 
the value chain is read from left to right) processes on the left 
are raw materials extraction, agriculture and/ or standardised 
manufacture, and towards the right are international logistics 
and finally retail (Figure 2.1).
Inherent in the idea of the global value chain is that it operates 
across national borders. As a general rule the processes of 
production on the left are seen to take place in low- to middle- 
income countries and consumer retail generally takes place 
where there is substantial purchasing power. Crucially, there is no 
presumption that any actor in the chain is under formal common 
control with any other; portions of any given chain may represent 
the internal processes of a multinational corporate group, while 
many links in the chain will be between entities which are, on 




A major strength of the GVC literature is the attention that 
it gives to the features and mechanisms of coordination and 
control of firms by other firms intersecting with but not 
necessarily requiring such formal control: what the literature 
calls ‘chain governance’. The firms exercising control through 
these governance mechanisms are referred to as lead firms. 
The principal approach to governance in GVC analysis is a 
theory of inter- firm linkages as coordination or as ‘drivenness’ 
by lead firms over other firms in the chain (Gereffi et al, 2005; 
Gibbon et al, 2008). Inter- firm relations of control tend to be 
exercised by lead firms located in nodes of a chain typified by 
concentration and centralisation and associated high barriers 
to entry (Hymer, 1979; Nolan et al, 2008). The focus of GVC 
analysis on exchange relations between firms is insightful 
because it is an important site of contestation where the capture 
of value can occur and legal arrangements affecting production 
are set. These can take the form of contracts, private standards 
and/ or other forms of control of production that cut across the 
boundaries of single firms and are used to capture the surplus 
value produced within other capitals in the chain and/ or to 
pass on risk and costs.
In GVC analysis ‘drivenness’ signifies ‘a relation of power’ 
(Daviron and Gibbon, 2002: 140), or more accurately 
market power using mechanisms of control – as opposed to 
necessitating direct ownership – that include quasi- monopoly 


















and/ or quasi- monopsony. For example, a lead firm may be able 
to quasi- monopsonistically capture a share of other players’ 
appropriation of surplus value upstream a chain through the 
centralisation of ownership of access to markets (such as the 
relationship of supermarkets to the producers of fresh food); 
a lead firm may use intellectual property over brands, design 
and/ or technology to pass on costs and risk and capture surplus 
value from firms competing bitterly to supply components 
and services in its outsourced global production network 
(such as Apple, Foxconn and its multiplicity of second- and 
third- tier suppliers); or a firm may command leadership in a 
chain through its quasi- monopoly over access to a resource 
(as in the creation of scarcity in the diamond commodity 
chain by De Beers). Identifying which enterprises in a GVC 
actually capture greater portions of surplus value is an empirical 
question, but the role of capitalist competition in determining the 
form of GVCs and the emergence of lead firms within them 
is examined, for the purposes of a critique of the concept of 
‘upgrading’ within GVCs.
The policy and mainstream academic discourse is that 
articulation with value chains is a measure of development 
success and, outside of local economies, this means procuring 
from and/or supplying lead firms, whether directly or indirectly 
(World Bank, 2020). However, this framing misses that 
these firms ‘lead’ because they are (at least for a period) the 
(temporary) winners of capitalist competition in a node (or 
more) of a GVC. Lead firms incorporate weaker firms and 
small producers in GVCs and capture value in the sphere of 
circulation by, for example, limiting the mark- up pricing power 
of suppliers by encouraging and very often inducing high levels 
of competition among them (Milberg and Winkler, 2013). The 
implication for workers in such supplier firms is that demands 
for improved wages or working conditions are more virulently 
resisted by owners (Baud and Durand, 2012).
Weaker firms and small producers can take many forms. 
An obvious source of labour- power to them is the countless 
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millions of people who are not paid at levels sufficient for their 
social reproduction, thereby allowing for the survival of small 
capitals below the average rate of profit. These include (self- 
exploiting) petty commodity producers in Africa and Asia, 
where the work of women and children in the household 
or extended families is often exploited, unpaid, by men; 
informalised, casualised and flexibilised workforces the world 
over; the women who form the majority of China’s export- 
oriented manufacturing workforce, largely rural migrants 
denied access to social policy in the regions within which they 
work, and where it is estimated that 80 per cent of even the 
formal industrial workforce is paid below the legal minimum 
(Ngai and Chan, 2012); the systematic feminisation of low- paid 
work (meaning further downward pressure on wages) in firms 
in Latin America that are articulated with GVCs, reproducing 
and reproduced by gender relations in local communities; 
armies of immiserated workers at ‘the bottom’ of the economy 
in South Asia; and the millions of people enduring slavery and 
forced labour across the planet in their adverse incorporation 
with the world economy.
GVC upgrading and the ‘smile curve’
Since the 1970s, economies in the Global South have seen 
new industries emerge and jobs created, and upgrading is the 
category used to demonstrate how GVCs offer opportunities 
for ‘development’. In its ideal– typical, linear formulation, 
upgrading and the capturing of associated ‘development’ gains 
involves linking with lead firms in a particular chain (Gereffi, 
2001: 1622), and moving ‘up’ the chain to more rewarding 
functional positions or to making products that are more 
profitable and provide better returns to producers (Gibbon 
and Ponte, 2005; Havice and Campling, 2013). This idea of 
‘value added’ processes which can be used (and in particular 
can be used, putatively, by market actors in developing 




implicitly extract more wealth out of it) is illustrated by the 
famous ‘smile curve’ which places actual production at the 
bottom of a U- bend of value capture, with other processes 
such as design, branding, marketing and after- sales service 
situated higher up the horns of the curve to reflect their 
greater ‘value added’ (Figure 2.2).
We argue from the perspective of a Marxian theory of 
value (Quentin and Campling, 2018), however, that the 
smile curve does not reflect actual production of value, and 
indeed is more or less an inversion of where value is actually 
produced. Instead, the smile curve reflects the special role that 
material processes of production play in creating the surplus 
value which is available for capture. The less well remunerated 
productive workers are, the greater the surplus available for 
capture in the system as a whole. But given that surplus value 
can be captured without ownership of productive assets, the 
downward pressure on the incomes of productive workers can 
be exerted indirectly by virtue of the downward pressure on 
the incomes of firms owning productive assets (such as the 
diversity of ‘small capitals’).
The paradigmatic form that such downward pressure takes 
may be ownership of intellectual property, such as a brand which 




















‘serves as an entry barrier and as a source of unequal distribution 
of value added in the GVC’ (Mayer and Milberg, 2013: 7). 
But all commercial efforts potentially exert this downward 
pressure to the extent that they are disaggregated on the level 
of ownership from material production and distribution. The 
immediate promise of upgrading, whether real or illusory, is 
therefore to do the dirty work of exploiting productive labour 
without being forced to relinquish maximal amounts of the 
resulting surplus to others. In the longer term, it is to leave 
behind altogether the risks attendant upon trying to make a 
profit at one of the core fault lines of capitalism: the one that 
subsists between productive workers and the owners of means 
of production. Mainstream discourse regarding smile curves 
suggests that they are ‘deepening’, meaning that the ‘value 
added’ by processes other than material production is increasing 
as a proportion of total value added (Figure 2.2; OECD, 2013).
Global wealth chains
GWCs are the routes by which surplus accrues to the beneficial 
owners of capital while attracting as little tax as possible. 
They include tax evasion and tax avoidance as traditionally 
understood, the methods used by multinational companies 
and host jurisdictions to maximise after- tax corporate profits, 
and tax- enhanced investment strategies such as private equity. 
They also include onshore subsidies for asset owners such 
as tax relief on private pensions, corporate tax incentives 
(see for example the UK’s ‘patent box’ legislation at Part 8A 
Corporation Tax Act 2010), and other forms of state complicity 
in tax- free accumulation.
Common themes in GWC analysis are (i) cross- border 
financial flows, (ii) the use of secrecy jurisdictions and/ or 
offshore banking, (iii) the use of the legal regime of one 
jurisdiction to undermine another, (iv) the use of intangible 
assets (which are highly mobile) to shift profits away from the 




(iv) financialisation. It therefore brings within its purview such 
diverse phenomena as money laundering, double tax treaty 
networks, tax competition between jurisdictions, complex 
derivative financial products, and collective investment 
schemes. As with GVCs, scholars who study GWCs are 
particularly concerned with questions of how the elements of 
the chain are brought into connection with each other, and 
how governance is articulated and distributed through the 
chain (Seabrooke and Wigan, 2014).
Capital always seeks to maximise its after- tax return, and 
GWCs are therefore potentially positioned as a pervasive 
phenomenon along the entire value chain, rather than being 
restricted to particular categories of actor. Typically, for example, 
popular tax justice arguments in the Global North will be levelled 
at multinational companies, but the owners of a successful 
small business in a low- income country are just as likely to be 
evading tax as multinational companies are to be avoiding it 
(International Monetary Fund, 2015: Appendix VI). Indeed, 
a corollary to upgrading in GVCs is what might be termed 
‘financial upgrading’ in GWCs, where enhanced participation 
in GVCs might lead to criminal tax evasion being ‘upgraded’ to 
non- criminal tax avoidance. An example might be a situation 
where a successful locally- owned enterprise whose undeclared 
profits are being unlawfully transferred to an offshore bank is 
bought by a private equity partnership, with the consequence 
that its untaxed profits are being lawfully transferred to an offshore 
bank by means of deductible interest payments (Figure 2.3).
GWC analysis deals with the specificities of how wealth is 
appropriated tax- free at identifiable junctures in the chain, but for 
the present purposes (which are to do with the overall structure 
of what we call the global inequality chain) it is only necessary to 
note five general points. First, multiple entities along the value 
chain may feed the same wealth chain, as would be the case, for 
example, where they are all subsidiaries of a single multinational 
corporate group, whereas other entities in the chain may have 






























Figure 2.3: Schematic illustration of ‘financial upgrading’ where a company is acquired by a private equity fund, reproducing 






divided into discrete cells of ownership or control and wealth 
chains are treated as arising from each cell (Figure 2.4). Second, 
it should be noted that the wealth chains arising from any such 
cell are likely to ramify towards different specific ultimate asset 
owners, and indeed where a business is both debt- financed and 
equity- financed by different persons there will be an immediate 
bifurcation into two wealth chains. Our schematic deployment 
of the GWC concept ignores these dendritic wealth chain 
morphologies for the purposes of simplicity.
Third, the relation between profitability and the percolation 
of profits up the GWC should not be assumed to take place 
in a chronological sequence of profit followed by percolation; 
owing to such pervasive GWC phenomena as financialisation 
and even just accruals- based accounting, it is possible and indeed 
common for wealth to accrue before cash profits have arisen.
Fourth, where a member of a multinational group is in a tax 
haven jurisdiction it should generally be treated analytically as 
part of the wealth chain rather than the value chain. It could 
be argued that some tax haven entities ‘add value’ insofar as 
substantive (albeit materially unproductive) economic activity 
takes place within them. In these cases the presumption should 
nonetheless be that the separation of functions which gives rise 
to that formally distinct business process is driven by the needs 
of the wealth chain rather than the needs of the value chain. 
So, for example, in the case of Amazon’s UK/ Luxembourg 
tax structuring, the Luxembourg entity had (on a formal 
level at least) substantive economic functions distinct from 
the functions being performed in the UK entity. In reality, 
however, the business operations were conducted without 
regard to which entity was formally conducting them and the 
purported separation of functions was found, in a judgment 
of the High Court, to be ‘wholly unreal and divorced from 
the commercial reality of the situation’ (Cosmetic Warriors Ltd 
& Anor v amazon.co.uk Ltd & Anor [2014] EWHC 181 [Ch]).
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, in order to analyse 




Tax avoidance, tax evasion, tax breaks for companies, interest deductibility,
transfer mispricing, briefcases full of cash, secrecy jurisdictions, tax rulings,



































take a position on the role of intangible assets vis- à- vis the 
production of value. Broadly speaking there are two positions 
which may be taken on this (see Quentin, 2020). If one were 
to adopt what might be classed as a ‘subjective’ approach to 
value, for instance in accordance with either the marginalist 
school or the ‘value- form’ school of Marxian value theory, 
one would be likely to treat business functions which give 
rise to intangible assets as value- producing, in which case 
those business functions are best characterised as GVC nodes. 
By contrast if one were to adopt what might be classed as an 
‘objective’ approach to value, for instance in accordance with 
traditional Marxian value theory or certain neo- Ricardian 
approaches, one would be likely to treat business functions 
which give rise to intangible assets as serving to originate 
instruments of value capture, in which case those functions 
are best characterised as GWC elements.
The reason it is necessary to adopt a position on this question 
is because intangible assets are de facto GWC elements, insofar 
as they are deeply and pervasively implicated in specifically 
tax- enhanced profitability (Collier and Andrus, 2017: 345– 7). 
Broadly speaking it is a matter of moving to tax havens the 
formal legal assets associated with intangibles and having tax- 
deductible payments made from other jurisdictions in respect 
of the use of those assets. In the light of the analysis set out 
with regard to value creation and value capture as manifest 
in the ‘smile curve’, this chapter adopts the approach that 
business functions which give rise to intangible assets are non- 
value- producing in any event. This position has the additional 
advantage that those functions can be treated exclusively as 
GWC elements rather than complicating composite elements.
At first blush it seems counter- intuitive to insist that no 
value is being created by the highly profitable businesses 
in the digital economy, but it is necessary to recall that the 
vast majority of today’s apparently dematerialised business 
processes are always connected to physical delivery of goods 




2017). Uber, for example, may be analysed as a GWC entity 
attaching to the automotive and petroleum GVCs. Google 
and Facebook are GWC entities in the GVCs of more or less 
anything that is advertised. Apparent overlap between wealth 
chains and value chains nonetheless occurs but it is limited to 
sectors where the value chain’s apparent end product, being 
not really a commodity but a quasi- commodity arising from 
legal regimes rather than production, is inherently outside 
the classical production boundary, such as consumer- facing 
financial services, residential rental or streaming media.
The global inequality chain
We are now in a position to combine the GVC analytic 
with the GWC analytic so as to yield the ‘global inequality 
chain’: the two- dimensional analytical model proposed in our 
introduction. The starting point is the horizontal progression 
of the GVC from raw materials to the point of consumption, 
with ‘value added’ arising at each node along the chain. Rising 
vertically, not from each node of the chain but from each 
group of nodes insofar as they are under common ownership 
or control, are GWCs which represent, as an upward path, 
the journey of ‘value added’ from business processes along 
the chain to asset owners. Value is therefore (1) created along 
the chain roughly in proportion to where the materially 
productive labour takes place, (2) captured elsewhere in the 
chain in the form of the ‘value added’ realised by materially 
unproductive business processes, and (3) distributed away from 
the node where it is so captured, as between capital, labour 
and the state, by reference to the impact of the wealth chains 
arising from the node or nodes in question.
Each jurisdiction is compelled by GWCs to shift its tax 
base disproportionately towards labour (and, which amounts 
to much the same thing, towards consumption of wage goods 
by workers resident in the jurisdiction) and away from capital. 




market actor in the value chain and consumption taxes are 
proportionally higher for those without a surplus of income 
to save, the consequence of this is a systemic tendency towards 
regressive taxation and underfunded states (Figure 2.4).
It is sometimes supposed that imposing the burden of 
tax on local labour rather than globally mobile capital is 
beneficial because of the possibility of attracting international 
investment but in practice the development outcomes have 
been adverse. This was a hypothesis laid out by Hymer (1970) 
on the efficiency contradictions of direct foreign investment, 
which has been variously elaborated since (for example, Ietto- 
Gillies, 2007), and more recently substantiated by Yamin and 
Sinkovics (2009) in a review of the literature on tax systems 
designed to attract investment in low- income countries 
which found subsequent declines in infrastructure investment. 
But the phenomenon is not limited to the development 
context: regressive taxation and the underfunding of states is 
a pervasive phenomenon along GVCs (Lahey, 2015; OECD, 
2016), and this is the reason that, when we integrate GWCs 
into the global value chain analytic, we label the resulting two- 
dimensional analytic the global inequality chain.
The global inequality chain reproduces inequality, and as an 
analytical model helps anatomise the ways in which inequality 
is reproduced, in a number of ways. First, as explained earlier, 
the general inequalities arising from regressive taxation intersect 
with specific systemic inequalities along the GVC; for example, 
the disproportionate burden placed on women in the sphere 
of social reproduction in circumstances of fiscal constraint.
Second, the global inequality chain analytic makes a 
contribution to existing critiques of ‘upgrading’ within GVCs, 
by foregrounding the risk of increased appropriation of surplus 
by a market actor in a developing country being ineffective to 
improve outcomes because it brings with it tax- abusive ‘financial 
upgrading’ as described. This might happen in any number of 
ways. We give the example of acquisition by a private equity 
partnership, but equally a locally owned firm once acquired by 
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a transnational lead firm will find itself able to take advantage 
of that lead firm’s global tax structuring (ActionAid, 2012).
Third, substantive inequalities in the wealth chain itself are 
likewise aggravated or reinforced by the tax system, such that 
wealth flowing from those disadvantaged at value chain level 
flows to those advantaged at wealth chain level. So, for example 
the tax system in a specific jurisdiction, in taxing consumption 
and subsidising private equity, might be seen to effect a transfer 
of wealth from the customer base of a pharmaceuticals retailer 
consisting predominantly of low- to middle- income women to 
the predominantly male high- income personnel of the private 
equity fund which owns it (Women for Tax Justice, 2014).
Conclusions and ways forward
We have combined analytic frameworks relating to globalised 
production and consumption and the global tax system to argue 
that – in their present form – both systems reproduce global 
inequalities between firms, countries, classes and genders. 
We argued that the smile curve and related incarnations of 
a hierarchy of ‘value added’ in the social and international 
division of labour are not based on the production of value but 
its capture, principally through legal arrangements of property 
relations (for example, class monopoly rent). We then linked 
the GVC with the GWC model so as to map how the burden 
of tax is predominantly borne by labour rather than capital 
along the chain. This two- dimensional analytic (i) highlights 
the class and gender dynamics of value production and 
appropriation, and the mechanisms by which adverse features 
of those dynamics are exacerbated and perpetuated through 
the tax system, and (ii) provides a schematic map upon which 
specific problems of that nature can be projected.
For those more familiar with the global production system 
than tax, the key message of our combined analytic is that 
simplistic ‘upgrading’ objectives which ignore capital’s drive 




balance of global inequality. Instead, reallocating the tax burden 
vertically up the wealth chain towards capital is a fundamental 
requirement if pursuing such objectives is going to materially 
(in both senses) enrich anyone other than local elites. For 
those more familiar with the tax system the key message is that 
profitability within multinational enterprises may reflect surplus 
extraction rather than wealth creation; value capture rather 
than value creation. This means that tax reforms intended to 
ameliorate global inequalities must recognise the possibility 
that the tax base constituted by corporate profitability 
may have to be reallocated for tax purposes not merely to 
jurisdictions where other group members are active (for 
example, apportioning tax from a retailer’s business activities 
to the country where products are sold rather than offshore), 
but outside the corporate group altogether, to elsewhere in the 
value chain where the value captured by ‘lead firms’ is actually 
created (Quentin, 2017). By way of illustration: pursuant to 
such reforms, taxing rights over the profits of clothing retailers 
in wealthy countries would largely find themselves reallocated 
to places like Bangladesh, Cambodia and Indonesia, where 
the clothing is made and places like China and India where 
cotton is grown, notwithstanding that the lead firms profiting 
from global apparel value chains generally have no corporate 
tax footprint at all in those jurisdictions.
Finally, the combination of the two analytics enables us to 
theorise certain key features of 21st century global capitalism 
(in particular financialisation, and the deployment of 
intellectual property as an instrument of market domination) as 
operating on two orthogonal axes of contention; the increasing 
dominance of rent- seeking over production within the private 
sector, and the increasing dominance of private sector surplus 
absorption over public sector surplus absorption.
Note
 1 Authorship is equal. This chapter draws on D. Quentin and L. Campling 





distribution into analyses of global production, Global Networks, 18(1): 33– 
56. All figures in this chapter are taken from that article.
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Sustainability considerations are becoming mainstream in 
corporate strategy and are affecting the functioning of global 
value chains (GVCs). Production is moving to locations that 
can meet basic sustainability specifications in large volumes 
and at low cost. Multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs) on 
sustainability have come to play a key role in GVCs.
Because of this new reality, public authorities cannot shape 
sustainability only through regulation and international 
agreement formation. They need to orchestrate sustainability 
through various direct and indirect, hard and soft instruments, 
and in ways that take into consideration the power dynamics 
that characterise different GVCs. In this chapter, I examine 
the different kinds of power dynamics that characterise two 






sustainability issues play in them, with particular focus on 
environmental aspects. What leverage points can be used by 
public orchestrators and with what instruments in different 
GVCs? How can various actions (applying different kinds of 
power) be used to undermine unequal bargaining positions?
Orchestration for sustainability
The concept of ‘orchestration’ can help with understanding 
the role of public actors can play in shaping sustainability 
in a GVC context – as the conductor of an orchestra seeks 
to make musicians work towards a common goal, public 
authorities seek to combine different kinds of instruments for 
the public good (Abbott and Snidal, 2009). Usually, two broad 
sets of orchestrating mechanisms are operated: ‘directive’ and 
‘facilitative’. On the one hand, directive orchestration relies 
on the authority of the state and seeks to incorporate private 
initiatives into its regulatory framework (through mandating 
principles, transparency, codes of conduct). On the other hand, 
facilitative orchestration relies on softer instruments, such as the 
provision of material and ideational assistance (financial and 
technical support, endorsement) and is used to kick- start new 
initiatives and/ or to further shape and support them. Successful 
public governors often use a combination of mechanisms in 
attempting to achieve policy goals. But outcome effectiveness is 
linked to different overlaps of these mechanisms that are GVC- 
specific, rather than to the superiority of one governance form or 
institutional setting over another. In other words, we can expect 
more successful orchestration when public authorities employ a 
combination of substantial directive and facilitative instruments.
Lister et al (2015) propose two other factors that can enable 
public orchestration in successfully addressing sustainability 
issues along GVCs: issue visibility and interest alignment. On 
issue visibility, we can expect more potential for orchestration 
if the product, industry and/ or related set of environmental 




consumers. This can occur because the environmental issue 
itself is obviously visible (such as accumulating trash on urban 
streets, or dark exhaust fumes coming from ships) or because 
it is rendered so through consumer labels, public campaigns 
or social media exposure. Therefore, orchestration is more 
likely to succeed in GVCs that handle consumer- facing and 
branded products and/ or in those that have been targeted by 
social movements and the media. When an environmental 
issue is not clearly visible to key stakeholders, orchestration 
efforts should include instruments that can enhance visibility.
On interest alignment, we can expect better orchestration 
possibilities if there is substantial overlap between public and 
private interests (Schleifer, 2013). Because different value chain 
nodes are regulated by different authorities, there may be 
different kinds of (mis)alignments between private and public 
sector interests in different GVC nodes. While it is rare for 
interests to be aligned at all nodes, alignment at key nodes can 
provide a strong entry point for orchestrators to stimulate the 
transmission of environmental improvements along the whole 
GVC. An additional complication is that alignment between 
public and private sector interests may differ in different group 
of countries (such as coffee producing countries in the Global 
South and coffee consuming countries in the Global North). 
In any case, interest alignment is not static and should be 
addressed as a specific objective of orchestration.
Governance and power in GVCs
The term GVC refers to the full range of activities that firms, 
farmers and workers carry out to bring a product or service 
from its conception to its end use, recycling or reuse. These 
activities can include design, production, processing, assembly, 
distribution, maintenance, disposal/ recycling/reuse, marketing, 
finance and consumer services. In this context, ‘lead firms’ are 
groups of firms that operate at particular functional positions 




along the chain, at what price, using what standards, to which 
specifications, and delivering in what form and at what point 
in time (Gereffi et al, 2005). GVCs can be unipolar, bipolar 
or multipolar – depending on how many groups of lead firms 
play a dominant role in shaping it and on whether civil society 
organisations, social movements, consumer groups, networks 
of experts and policy makers, and MSIs for sustainability also 
play a role in governing them.
Various levels of state action and authority have important 
structuring effects on GVCs (Horner, 2017). States can act as 
intentional orchestrators of GVCs, regulate (or deregulate) their 
functioning, and choose to redistribute (or not) the extra wealth 
generated through GVCs. States can also be important direct 
actors in GVCs, for example through state- owned enterprises 
and public procurement. This is why the concept of public 
orchestration comes handy in combination with analyses of 
governance and power in GVCs.
To further understand governance dynamics, we should also 
examine the power dynamics that underpin them. Dallas et al 
(2019) propose two dimensions of power in GVCs: a transmission 
mechanism and an arena of actors. The transmission mechanism of 
power is anchored by two ideal types: direct and diffuse. On the 
one end are circumstances where GVC actors (individually or 
collectively) seek to exert direct forms of influence over other 
actors or actor groups. On the other end are more diffuse forms 
of power where the actors or collectives and the objects of power 
may be less clearly identifiable, and actions less intentional. 
The arena of actors specifies whether power is wielded in dyads 
or by collectives. Combining these two dimensions yields a 
four- category typology that incorporates many of the types of 
power observed in GVCs: bargaining, demonstrative, institutional 
and constitutive power (Dallas et al, 2019). Bargaining power 
(dyadic, direct) operates on a one- to- one basis, exhibits different 
degrees in different kinds of value chain linkages, and is shaped 
by the relationship between lead firm requirements and supplier 
competencies, including those on sustainability. Demonstrative 
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power (dyadic, indirect) operates through informal transmission 
mechanisms along GVCs between individual actors (such as 
buyers and suppliers or aspiring suppliers) and is shaped by 
conventions and best practices, including those on sustainability 
management, that are implicitly accepted by the parties of 
a dyadic transaction. Institutional power (collective, direct) 
operates through government regulation and/ or multi- 
stakeholder sustainability initiatives or other institutionalised 
forms, and can be leveraged through collective standards 
or codified ‘best practices’. Constitutive power (collective, 
indirect) is based on broadly accepted norms, conventions, 
expectations and best practices (financialisation, just- in- time 
supply chain management, environmental stewardship) and 
shapes what is systemically acceptable and desirable (green 
capital accumulation, sustainability- based value extraction from 
suppliers) (Dallas et al, 2019).
In the rest of this chapter, I examine the intersections of 
governance and power in the GVCs for coffee and biofuels 
to highlight the possible mechanisms and strategies that public 
orchestrators can use to shape environmental outcomes for 
the public good.
Empirical insights from the coffee and biofuels GVCs
In this section, I draw from the analysis of power, governance 
and upgrading in the coffee and biofuels GVCs carried 
out in more detail elsewhere (Ponte 2019) to examine 
how governments and international organisations could 
combine a variety of orchestration instruments in different 
GVCs – depending on their governance structures and the 
power dynamics that underpin them. In order to develop 
a portfolio of strategic choices that public actors can use 
to successfully orchestrate sustainability in different GVCs, 
I address three questions in the following discussion: (1) how 
can orchestrators choose what kinds of directive and facilitative 




enhance issue visibility? And (3) how can they better align 
private and public sector interests?
Coffee
The coffee GVC was characterised by high concentration at 
the key nodes of trading and roasting for decades until the late 
1990s. However, the degree of concentration at the roaster 
level has now decreased. In 1998, the top five roaster groups 
controlled 69 per cent of roasted and instant coffee markets. 
By 2014, their share had decreased to 50 per cent (Grabs 
and Ponte, 2019). This is not surprising, given the growth of 
specialty coffee and the ongoing fragmentation of consumption 
channels and offerings. However, there have been recent signs 
of increased merger and acquisition (M&A) activity, which are 
leading to renewed concentration. In the next sub- sections, 
I examine the dynamics of different kinds of power in the 
coffee GVC (drawing from Ponte, 2019) to then return to the 
issues of GVC governance and orchestration.
Bargaining power
Historically, bargaining power in the coffee GVC had been 
heavily shaped by institutional power dynamics under an 
international regulatory regime that lasted from 1962 to 1989. 
Under the International Coffee Agreement (ICA) regime, 
collective power relations were relatively balanced between 
producing and consuming countries, thus strengthening the 
bilateral bargaining power of suppliers, farmers and their 
cooperatives. The end of ICA led to a general weakening of 
bargaining power by producing countries and their producers. 
In the following three decades, the increasing concentration 
in the roasting and trading functions of the coffee GVC 
compounded this dynamic. Despite the relative fragmentation 
of the roaster segment of the coffee GVC in recent decades, 
and the continuing consolidation in the international trader 





hand in terms of bargaining power over other GVC actors 
(see Figure 3.1).
Overall, sustainability content has become more important 
as major roasters now require third- party sustainability 
certifications for an important proportion of their purchases. 
But other roasters have been developing their own sustainability 
verification systems, which allow them to obtain precious 
information on suppliers’ cost structures as well, thus 
strengthening roasters’ bargaining power and ability to extract 
value in higher- margin markets. These dynamics suggest that 
the distinction between mainstream and specialty coffee markets 
is becoming less clear- cut. Thus, while specialty coffee actors 
have been taming some of the bargaining power of mainstream 
roasters, a powerful reaction by major roasting groups is under 
way, in view of regaining a better bargaining position.
Demonstrative power
Up to 1989, mainstream roasters were mainly focused on selling 
large quantities of relatively homogeneous and undifferentiated 
blends of mediocre to poor quality. But later demonstrative 
power started having an impact with the emergence of specialty 
coffee. In this context, Starbucks and other ‘pioneer’ roasters 
in the US West coast had a massive demonstrative effect in the 
industry by inspiring a large number of other smaller roasters 
and café chains. Until the early 2000s, traditional roasters 
remained slow in responding to the demonstrative power that 
was sweeping the specialty and sustainable coffee market. But 
a new phase started, when Procter and Gamble, in response 
to direct shareholder pressure, announced major purchase 
agreements to source fair trade coffee. Through a domino 
effect, Kraft and the Rainforest Alliance then announced 
a multi- year arrangement in 2004. Albert Heijn and other 
large European supermarket chains started requiring Utz 
certification for a portion of their purchases. Since then most 
of the major coffee roasters have been purchasing considerable 





Figure 3.1: Interactions of different kinds of power in the coffee global 
value chain
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own sustainability standards and verification systems. One after 
another, they have also acquired smaller specialty roasters and 
café chains.
Institutional power
Coffee was one of the first commodities for which control of 
world trade was attempted, starting in 1902 in the Brazilian state 
of São Paulo. The first ICA was signed in 1962 and included 
most producing and consuming countries as signatories. Under 
the ICA regulatory system (1962– 89), a target price (or a price 
band) for coffee was set, and export quotas were allocated to 
each producer. Although there were problems with this system, 
most analysts agree that it was successful in raising and stabilising 
coffee prices. This all changed in 1989, when the US refused 
to renew the ICA, which profoundly affected the balance of 
institutional power in the coffee GVC. In turn, this reshaped 
bargaining power between individual operators to the benefit 
of consuming country- based actors (including their agents 
based in producing countries) and to the detriment of coffee 
farmers, local traders and producing country governments.
While during the ICA period sustainability issues rarely 
featured in institutional discussions, since the mid- 1990s coffee 
has seen a proliferation of sustainability standards, certifications 
and verification systems. This has been accompanied by 
the growth of a large industry of standard developers, 
certification and accreditation agencies and related service and 
consulting outfits, which have an embedded interest in the 
continuing operation of sustainability certification initiatives. 
The emergence of these systems suggests that institutional 
power, originally exerted by governments in producing and 
consuming countries, is now partially wielded by transnational 
sustainability initiatives.
Constitutive power
Key changes in constitutive power in the coffee GVC relate 







patterns, the growing importance of single origin coffees, the 
proliferation of café chains and specialty shops, and increasing 
out of home consumption. It is against the background of 
these changes that the specialty coffee industry emerged. 
This included the proliferation of sustainability standards and 
certifications (promoted by Rainforest Alliance, Conservation 
International and Oxfam).
However, in more recent years, and particularly in the 
past decade, sustainability has become a vector of quality 
management and supply chain risk minimisation. This has 
led to a relative weakening of third- party certification and 
an increasing acceptance in the industry of basic guidelines, 
company- owned verification systems, and CSR- like projects 
in coffee producing communities. In sum, sustainability has 
found an important place in the exercise of constitutive power 
in the coffee GVC, but in forms that have moved away from 
more genuine concerns with producers and their environment 
and towards corporatised forms that are designed to ensure 
risk minimisation and profit maximisation for roasters, thus 
enhancing their bargaining power (see Figure 3.1).
Orchestration
In the coffee GVC, governance moved from being multipolar 
in 1960– 90 to being unipolar in 1990– 2018, with bargaining 
power increasing dramatically in the hands of coffee roasters 
(see Table 3.1). This transition took place through a major 
change in institutional power with the end of the ICA 
system. A more recent period of upheaval emanated from 
the demonstrative power of sustainability and specialty 
coffee industry actors, which led to a relative dampening of 
bargaining power by mainstream roasters until recently. This 
process, however, is now being reversed as mainstream roasters 
acquire smaller, specialty roasters, and as some specialty roasters 
have grown to become more mainstream in their operations 
and procurement systems. Sustainability issues have been an 












































Significant Major shock in 
institutional power (end 
of ICA) together with 
increasing concentration 
moves GVC governance 
from multipolar to 
unipolar and buyer- driven 
(by roasters);  
demonstrative and 
constitutive power 
effects of specialty and 
sustainable coffee initially 
tame buyer- drivenness; 
more recently, roasters 
re- strengthen unipolarity 
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Essential Institutional power plays 
major role in industry 
formation; major change 
in constitutive power 
recasts legitimate biofuels 
as only those that are 
certified sustainable; 
no major changes in 
overall governance, which 
remains multipolar, 
but blenders and 2nd 
generation biofuel 
producers strengthen their 
position
Multipolar n/ a n/ a
Source: Adapted from Ponte (2019: 131)





these observations entail in relation to public orchestration 
for sustainability?
Given that the ICA regulatory role is unlikely to be restored, 
it is public authorities at the national level in producing 
and consuming countries that could play a sustainability 
orchestration role in the coffee GVC by exerting their 
institutional power. Further improvements can be stimulated 
in combinatory efforts, issue visibility and interest alignment 
(see Table 3.2). In relation to combinatory efforts, both 
consuming and producing countries can further ramp up 
many of the facilitative efforts they are already carrying out 
to support producers, cooperatives and exporters that are 
seeking voluntary certifications. Producing countries could 
also include sustainability considerations in national branding 
efforts, and consuming countries could lobby to raise the low 
level of sustainability standards currently embedded in some 
of the basic standards programmes (such as the Common 
Code for the Coffee Community, 4C). In terms of directive 
efforts, producing countries could set a minimum sustainability 
standard for export, charge a sustainability export tax at times 
of high international prices, and/ or include sustainability 
standards in indications of geographic origin. Consuming 
countries could more forcefully enact demands for sustainable 
coffee certification for public procurement (for example in 
schools and hospitals) and/ or require sustainability standards 
to be imported – as the WTO has been relatively open and 
lenient in accepting the protection of the environment and 
health as legitimate policy objectives.
Improving environmental issue visibility in the coffee GVC 
is a more complex challenge. Coffee stories, labels and 
certifications are already dotting the packaging landscape 
that speaks directly to consumers. The demonstrative power 
of specialty and sustainable coffee has been key in partially 
limiting the bargaining power of mainstream roasters in recent 
decades. Thus, one idea is that orchestrators could reinvigorate 
demonstrative (and eventually constitutive) power in alliance 
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sustainability certification 
for coffee to be imported
Producing countries: require 
a minimum sustainability 
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of governance in private 
certification systems that 
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Shape demonstrative power 
by engaging with (smaller) 
specialty coffee roasters 
to include, for example, 
carbon sequestration 
as part of sustainability 
and/ or minimum farmer 
prices for meeting specific 
environmental standards; 
facilitate initiatives in 
producing countries that 
seek to frame sustainability 
as part of geographic origin 
and/ or national branding
Shape constitutive 
power to strengthen the 
framing of sustainability 
in biofuel production, for 
example, by facilitating 
a better incorporation of 
indirect land change use 
(ILUC) in calculations of 












countries: charging a 
mandatory sustainability 
export tax at the export level 
to be returned to farmers 
meeting these standards
Long- term transition 
measures to facilitate a 
smooth transition away 
from first- generation 
biofuels in order to 
better align the interests 
of different groups within 
the private sector, as 
this also improves the 
alignment of private and 
public interests
Source: Adapted from Ponte (2019: 204– 205)
Table 3.2: Overview of orchestration options in coffee and biofuel 
global value chains (continued)
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with (smaller) specialty coffee roasters in view of including, 
for example, climate change and carbon sequestration as part 
of sustainability. They could also promote efforts to pay a 
minimum price at the farmer level for coffee that meets certain 
environmental criteria. Initiatives in producing countries that 
seek to frame sustainability as part of geographic origin and/ 
or national branding can act in this direction as well. Finally, 
in relation to interest alignment, orchestrators could charge a 
mandatory sustainability export tax to be returned to farmers. 
This would provide more direct sustainability incentives at the 
farm level, as well as better align public and private interests 
in producing countries – given that many producers perceive 
sustainability as an imposition placed by buyers and abetted 
by their governments.
biofuels
Three systemically important countries/ regions are key in 
understanding the biofuels GVC: Brazil, the US and the EU. 
Together with Argentina and Indonesia, they account for 
90 per cent of global production, and together with China 
and Canada for 44 per cent of consumption. Global biofuel 
production and consumption increased nearly seven- fold 
since 2000 and doubled since 2007. National (Brazil, US) and 
regional (EU) biofuel industries have existed for decades and 
have operated fairly independently from each other, indicating 
that until recently there were a variety of loosely coupled 
biofuel value chains. In the last two decades, however, we have 
witnessed a gradual establishment of a global biofuel value chain.
Bargaining power
With the exception of Brazil, substantial developments in 
the biofuels GVC can be traced to the last two decades. 
International alliances in the private sector and an increasingly 
complex web of cross- regional investments have emerged 





and spreading dramatically during the 2010s – in terms of 
size, number and geographical spread of international joint 
ventures and the new involvement of global agro- food traders, 
oil majors, auto manufacturers and the aviation industry in 
biofuels (Ponte, 2014).
The global players involved in some of these investments 
exert dramatic bargaining power in other GVCs, but are still 
relatively new to biofuels, or had previously played only a 
marginal role in it (see Figure 3.2). Several global agro- food 
traders have developed major interests in biofuels. These 
processes have often led to increased vertical integration in the 
industry, in order to secure supply, control costs to maximise 
returns, and ensure processes and sources of supply of certified 
sustainable biofuels for the European market. This means that 
bargaining power is still fairly balanced among different kinds of 
actors in the biofuels GVC, although blenders/ distributors have 
gained some traction by being able to demand sustainability 
certification in markets where regulation requires it, and by 
passing on the implementation costs upstream to the producers 
of feedstock.
Demonstrative power
The flurry of new investments that took place in the past two 
decades suggests an important role for demonstrative power, 
as corporations that compete in other industries entered the 
biofuel craze and mimicked consortium and joint venture 
models from each other. This involved a disparate combination 
of actors in the automobile, aviation, biotechnology and energy 
industries. Demonstrative effects are also evident among major 
oil companies, which are also investing in biofuel research, in 
ethanol production facilities and/ or in integrated distribution 
of fuels. Aircraft manufacturers, major global airlines and 
the US Navy are carrying out projects for the production of 
‘drop- in’ biofuels for aviation. Developers of GM crops are 
working on feedstocks dedicated to biofuels, also through 




Figure 3.2: Interactions of different kinds of power in the biofuels 
global value chain
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demonstrative power is clearly at play in the biofuels GVC, 
but differently from coffee, it has been wielded by players in 
several different functional positions of the value chain and has 
been underpinned in no small measure by government support.
Institutional power
Institutional power is key in understanding the dynamics of the 
biofuels GVC. Since the 1990s, governments in Brazil, the US 
and the EU have been heavily promoting biofuels, often under 
pressure from industry and agricultural lobbies. These policies 
have been justified in relation to climate change mitigation 
(especially in the EU), energy security (especially in the US) 
and farmer support and rural development (in Brazil, but also 
in the US and the EU).
From the late 1990s to around 2006/ 07, government 
interventions enacted policies that effectively forged the various 
national and, in the case of the EU, regional foundations of 
an increasingly global biofuel value chain. But as criticism 
mounted on biofuels (see under ‘Constitutive power’), the EU 
enacted demands for sustainability standards for the production, 
trade and use of biofuels in member countries. The US also 
fine-tuned its subsidies and regulation to increase support for 
next- generation biofuels relative to first- generation biofuels. 
And Brazil increased its public relations effort aimed at showing 
that sugarcane- based ethanol production in the country has 
a positive impact on greenhouse gas emission reductions. 
Thus, sustainability in the biofuels GVC has become a ‘must 
have’ feature in main consumption markets. This is because 
sustainability standards play a key role in the basic definition 
of its tradability and are thus a key feature of institutional 
power dynamics.
For example, the EU promulgated the 2009 Renewable 
Energy Directive (RED) (2009/ 28/ EC), which required 20 
per cent of energy use in the EU and 10 per cent of transport 
fuels to come from renewable sources by 2020. It also set 




including minimum greenhouse gas savings in comparison 
to fossil fuels and the double counting of credits for biofuels 
produced from waste and residues to decrease the impact on 
feedstock that can be used for food. The Commission set up 
an accreditation system for private certification schemes that 
meet its RED sustainability criteria, which has led to a veritable 
scramble in getting access to the captive EU market. Much of 
this market has been captured by one particular certification 
system, ISCC – International Sustainability and Carbon 
Certification. This means that part of the strong institutional 
power wielded by public authority has been transferred to 
private certification organisations that are in charge of verifying 
compliance with the RED directive.
Constitutive power
In the early days of the biofuel industry, an unusual coalition 
of agricultural, environmental and military interests, together 
with a vibrant biofuel conference circuit, exercised constitutive 
power by establishing the idea that biofuels could achieve a 
number of collective objectives: revitalise rural areas, decrease 
CO
2
 emissions, and ensure domestic energy independence. 
This perfect storm also facilitated the institutional support that 
further stimulated the expansion of this industry. However, 
increasing food prices and the related food riots of 2006/ 07 
dramatically altered this picture in following years. Civil society 
groups and researchers started holding biofuel production as a 
major cause of increasing food prices because it takes land and 
water away from food production. Many studies highlighted 
deeply problematic aspects of land investments. Doubts also 
started to be cast on the impact of biofuel production on 
greenhouse gas emission reductions. The contours of what is 
generally seen as ‘sustainable biofuel’ have changed through 
these debates. Constitutional and institutional elements of 
power have been feeding each other in the past decade – 
with regulation tightening the conditions what is considered 




support placed on second- generation biofuels), and with 
constitutive power dynamics playing out in the global biofuel 
conference circuit (Ponte, 2014).
Orchestration
In the biofuels GVC, we did not observe major changes in the 
multipolar nature of governance in the past two decades or so 
(see Table 3.1). However, important changes took place in the 
overlap of different kinds of power, which has key implications 
for orchestration strategies. Institutional power played a major 
role in the industry formation period, and bargaining power 
remained fairly equally distributed among multiple groups 
of firms in different functional positions. It was a major shift 
in constitutive power, following the food price crisis of the 
mid- 2000s, that recast biofuels as acceptable only when they 
are certified or verified as sustainable.
Orchestrators, such as the EU and the US, have already 
carried out important combinatory efforts to seek improvements 
in sustainability, including substantial directive and facilitative 
measures (see Table 3.2). However, there is still margin for 
improvement. For instance, private certification systems that are 
recognised by the EU to meet its RED directive vary widely, 
thus calling for minimum standards on governance processes; 
and the impact of sustainability certification needs to be assessed 
in view of actual outcomes on the ground. Given that changes 
in constitutive power dynamics led to a major reshuffling of 
regulatory instruments, the same could be leveraged to improve 
issue visibility. Orchestrators could, for example, promote a 
more open debate and consideration of indirect land use change 
use in the calculations of greenhouse gas emissions abatement 
in biofuel production. Finally, orchestration measures that are 
strengthening the position of second- generation feedstock and 
biofuel producers vis- à- vis first- generation operators should 
include long- term transition measures to facilitate a smooth 





the overall interest alignment between the public sector and 
different segments of the private sector.
Conclusion
The current fragmentation of sustainability governance entails 
the need for public authorities to act as orchestrators – by 
combining directive and facilitative instruments. However, 
we still do not know the effectiveness of these actions in the 
context of the everyday practices of lead firms and other actors 
in GVCs, even though this system of economic organisation 
has become a dominant feature of the global economy in the 
past few decades. In this chapter, I proposed three possible 
enabling factors that can help orchestration to succeed in 
addressing sustainability issues along GVCs: combinatory 
efforts including both directive and facilitative instruments; 
high issue visibility; and interest alignment between public and 
private actors. While environmental improvements led by GVC 
actors are most likely to take place in unipolar GVCs (Lister 
et al, 2015), public orchestration tends to be more successful 
in multipolar GVCs.
Although improving the chances of successful orchestration 
involves appropriate combinations of directive and facilitative 
instruments, ways of enhancing issue visibility and tools 
to better align private and public sector interests, possibly 
also across jurisdictions, these choices and strategies are 
issue- and GVC- specific and cannot stem from a general 
model of orchestration. They have to be informed by the 
specific power and governance dynamics that characterise 
relevant GVCs. This entails targeting appropriate leverage 
points along a GVC with the right instruments, depending 
on the balance of bargaining power among different actors 
and on whether this balance is (or has been) underpinned or 





In conclusion, for public orchestrators regulation remains 
essential, but the scale and complexity of the problems at 
hand require governments and international organisations to 
use a combination of tools, direct and facilitative, in view of 
enhancing the visibility of the environmental issues that are 
more hidden, and of providing incentives and infrastructure to 
align private and public interests. This requires an understanding 
of how GVCs are governed and by whom – and the power 
dynamics that facilitate these processes. Orchestrators need to 
act not only through their institutional power, but also through 
shaping constitutive power through ideational change and 
demonstrative power through collaboration with key influential 
actors in view of taming the bargaining power of lead firms.
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Trade policy for fairer and more 
equitable global value chains
Louise Curran and Jappe Eckhardt
Introduction
Today’s GVCs operate in a very different context to the late 
20th century when the concept was first developed. With the 
recent rise in populism, new tariffs are changing cost structures 
and thus the geography of several GVCs. Many commentators 
link this rise in protectionism to concerns about the spread of 
GVCs and the ‘fairness’ of competition between countries with 
very different labour and environmental standards (Rodrik, 
2018). At the same time, civil society in many countries is 
increasingly critical of trade agreements and there are calls 
for the re- assessment of their governance, especially in order 
to ensure a stronger voice for labour and the environmental 
movement (see FoE, 2018, for a recent summary of some of 
the key proposals of European civil society). In this context, 
it seems indispensable to reform the system of policy making 







Achieving a ‘fairer’ global trading system will require a mix 
of measures – some national, some EU level and some subject 
to bilateral and multilateral negotiations. In this short chapter, 
it is not possible to cover all of them. Rather we will focus 
on the EU level, particularly in relation to its trading relations 
with developing countries. In the trade policy arena, the EU 
sees itself as a progressive power, favouring responsible business 
(Hogan, 2020). It is thus incumbent on it to seek progressive 
solutions that could subsequently be multilateralised. If the 
EU can more effectively leverage its trade policy to encourage 
trading partners to adopt domestic regulation that better 
protects workers and the environment, it would complement 
national and EU level regulation, which increasingly requires 
companies to pay greater attention to negative externalities 
from their corporate strategies along their supply chains 
(Hogan, 2020).
This chapter will explore the key areas of EU trade policy 
where new approaches, or more effective implementation of 
existing trade regimes, could secure meaningful change. It will 
focus on those areas where there is the potential for policy 
shifts in the relatively short timescale of this Commission (up 
to 2024), rather than more systemic radical change. We will 
explore the policy options through which trade between EU 
countries and their partners can be made ‘fairer’. Drawing 
on academic literature, civil society position papers and 
interviews, we will highlight potential trade policy reforms 
which could be mobilised to limit the potential negative 
social and environmental impacts of trade. Our focus on trade 
policy is, almost by definition, an approach which is primarily 
focused on influencing behaviour at the state level, although 
such policy change is often aimed at changing the behaviour 
of private actors within GVCs. Beyond trade policies, there 
are many complementary measures which focus on influencing 
company strategies, such as tax avoidance and due diligence. 




In any discussion on trade policy options, it is important to note 
that membership of the WTO implies certain commitments 
which shape, and indeed constrain, the policy options available 
to the EU. In the context of promoting fairer trade, countries 
are not allowed to discriminate between similar members and 
products. Specifically, they cannot provide different market 
access to countries ‘where the same conditions prevail’ or to 
‘like products’. There are exceptions to these general rules, 
including for environmental objectives and there is a wealth of 
WTO jurisprudence which informs the flexibilities on these 
issues within WTO rules.
In terms of discrimination between similar countries, 
the EU has lost several cases at the WTO which inform its 
position, most notably in relation to its banana regime for 
certain developing countries (where some countries faced 
high tariffs whereas others were duty free1), and its former 
‘Drug GSP’ special access programme. The Drug GSP ruling 
in particular is significant, in that the EU lost the case not on 
its right to provide special market access to certain developing 
countries, but on the fact that it only provided access to 
countries which were considered to be taking action to address 
the global drug trade. The subjective nature of this criteria 
was a key reason that the regime failed to pass legal scrutiny 
(Shaffer and Apea, 2005).
Thus, any future improved preferential access programme 
must ensure that it conforms to WTO requirements in that 
differentiation between countries is based on objective criteria. 
The EU has largely integrated this requirement into its current 
GSP+ programme, which uses criteria based on international 
treaties and commitments to decide eligibility. Were the EU 
to revise its market access regime to favour ‘fairer’ trade, it is 
likely to seek to avoid discrimination that would be judged 
unfair under WTO rules. It is not impossible to contravene the 





it only applies to African countries; however, the US secured 
a waiver – other WTO countries agreed not to challenge 
it. However, such waivers are politically challenging and 
historically have only been accepted if the preferences are 
provided to small peripheral exporters which pose no major 
threat to key traders.
On the question of ‘like products’, in general, WTO 
members must treat similar products originating from their 
domestic market and other members in the same way. 
However, there are exceptions. These include the right to 
ban or restrict goods made by prison labour, or which offend 
public morals, as well as the right to incorporate restrictions 
which are ‘necessary’ to protect the environment or human 
health. The latter two exceptions, in particular, are subject to 
a lot of jurisprudence including on tobacco control legislation 
(US– Indonesia clove cigarettes, Australia plain packaging) and 
restricting imports of tuna and shrimp because of concerns 
on by- catch (the US cases: tuna- dolphin and shrimp- turtle).
The key take- aways from these cases are that members can 
ban or restrict imports of certain products if there is a clear 
public interest and the measure is ‘necessary’ according to 
objective scientific evidence (plain packaged tobacco). In 
addition, the means by which the policy objective is achieved 
cannot be arbitrarily imposed by the importing country (tuna- 
dolphin and shrimp- turtle), which also cannot arbitrarily 
discriminate between products which are essentially the same 
(clove and menthol cigarettes). (See Howse and Levy, 2013, 
for a legal analysis of several key cases).
The current international trade rules thus make it difficult to 
provide trade preferences to certain developing countries that 
are not afforded to others, or to goods which are produced in 
‘fairer’ GVCs, with higher social and environmental standards 
and more equitable distribution of gains. Although the WTO 
is in a considerably weakened position due to the US blockage 
of its dispute settlement body, the EU remains committed to 
its multilateral rules (Hogan, 2020). It is therefore unlikely that 
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WTO incompatible measures would be instigated by the EU 
in order to favour fairer value chains.
The potential to increase WTO flexibilities to enable the 
favouring of socially responsible and fair trade goods has been 
discussed in the past. In 1995 the European Banana Action 
Network launched an intensive campaign calling on the EU 
to include a specific quota for Fairtrade labelled bananas 
within its import regime. They report that, in response, the 
European Agriculture Commissioner indicated that the EU 
could consider a trade policy that differentiated between like 
products (Fairtrade bananas and ordinary bananas) if civil 
society were to mobilise opinion in favour of such a move.2 
Thus, at the time, there was some willingness in the EU to 
try to push the boundaries of interpretation of Articles III 
and XX of the WTO. If there had been a favourable political 
environment among WTO members to do so, this might have 
resulted in increased flexibilities enabling the differentiation 
between certain ‘like products’. However, this proved not to be 
the case. In particular, the quashing of the US ‘Social Clause’ 
proposal at the WTO Ministerial Conference in Singapore in 
1996, due to concerns in the Global South about protectionist 
motivations, undermined the chances of the social aspects of 
trade being more effectively integrated into WTO.
In a sense, though, the EU already favours trade from 
countries which have imposed a minimum level of labour 
and environmental protection under its GSP+ programme. 
However, these preferences are provided at the level of 
the country, not the firm or value chain and civil society 
considers that the guarantees provided in terms of worker 
and environmental protection are insufficient. As the rules 
stand, tariff preferences for Fairtrade or other certified goods 
would be impossible, unless an argument could be made that 
this is ‘necessary’ ‘to protect public morals’. The EU won a 
recent WTO case on its ban on importing seal skin products 





Given this legal backdrop, the rest of this chapter will explore 
policy actions to favour more sustainably produced goods 
which could be instigated within WTO rules, in the relatively 
short timescale of the current Commission. As indicated we 
focus on two key policy areas which are particularly relevant to 
the EU’s trade with developing countries: free trade agreements 
(FTAs) and the preferential trading regime – GSP. In both there 
is increasing pressure for policy tools which enable the voice of 
labour and the environmental movements to be taken seriously 
and thus the potential to secure real advances.
bilateral agreement: FTAs
A key means by which the EU secures market access to 
other countries and provides access to its own market is 
through FTAs. Especially since the beginning of this century, 
these agreements have sought to address issues of sustainable 
development and trade, laterally through specific chapters on 
trade and sustainable development (TSD). Recent EU FTAs 
go further than previous ones in incorporating these issues 
into trade relations, yet concerns persist about FTAs enabling 
the development of trade without adequate guarantees that 
minimum labour and environmental standards are respected. 
In recent years, the Commission has begun to take concerns 
about non- respect of TSD commitments more seriously and 
business groups, conventionally hostile, have become more 
open to these ideas. The key proposals which emerge from 
recent inputs to the debate and their feasibility are discussed.
Making the entering into force of an agreement conditional on  
ratification and application of a list of conventions
The question of sequencing of commitments has been 
highlighted in several academic studies, as well as in inputs to 
EU consultations. The EU already uses a list of international 





include the requirement to ratify these agreements (or at least 
the key ones) in its FTAs. In this context, the EU has already 
indicated that ratification of future FTAs will be contingent on 
partners adhering to the Paris Climate Accord, with the EU– 
Japan FTA being the first to incorporate such a requirement. 
Extending such conditionality to other environmental and 
labour agreements, by making the launch or conclusion of 
negotiations conditional on a partner country having ratified 
and implemented a certain number of core conventions, 
is perfectly feasible. In fact, the EU– Japan FTA contains 
obligations for the parties to make sustained efforts to ratify 
fundamental ILO conventions.
An issue of concern in this context is that, even if such 
sequencing is secured, there is often a gap between the 
ratification of international conventions and their application. 
There would need, therefore, to be an effective monitoring 
system to ensure that the commitments on environmental 
protection and labour standards that are made prior to the 
signature of the FTA are actually implemented on the ground. 
NGOs are concerned that implementation will not be effective 
and that the EU does not have the mechanisms in place to hold 
partners who do not respect their commitments to account. 
Key to this issue is the question of enforcement, which we 
will discuss further.
Concerns about non- respect of international commitments 
will be particularly high profile in the upcoming discussions 
on the ratification of the EU– Mercosur FTA. Civil society has 
long expressed concerns that environmental protection has not 
been effectively integrated into FTAs. The EU has responded to 
these concerns by making membership of the Paris Agreement 
a prerequisite for signing an FTA with partner countries. Yet 
there are fears that Mercosur countries, especially Brazil, are not 
respecting their Paris commitments in practice. These concerns 
contributed to the decision by the French government to 
appoint an independent committee of experts to evaluate 
the effect of the agreement on sustainable development. 
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Their conclusions – that the FTA is likely to increase carbon 
emissions and deforestation – make the ratification of the 
accord extremely problematic (Ambec et al, 2020). This debate 
will be a key one in framing the Commission’s position on 
linking FTAs to environmental objectives.
Making the TSD chapters subject to the same dispute settlement  
as other parts of the agreement
Formal dispute settlement procedures exist within most FTAs 
to provide a mechanism for the parties to seek redress in case of 
non- respect of their engagements. In cases where agreements 
are not honoured such disputes can lead to the complainant 
party taking action against the other party. In the EU– Japan 
and EU– South Korea FTAs there are even specific expedited 
dispute settlement systems for the car sector, where the EU 
reserves the right to roll back trade liberalisation if the partner 
does not respect their commitments on non- tariff barriers.
Many NGOs consider that the credibility of the TSD chapters 
is undermined by the fact that they are not subject to the same 
formal dispute settlement system as the rest of the FTA. It is 
a consistent demand that non- respect of environmental and 
social commitments be similarly subject to dispute settlement 
and, ultimately, sanctions (for example, FoE, 2018). This is 
the approach in the US and there is evidence that their more 
‘muscular’ approach to linking FTAs and labour standards can 
result in progress on the ground, for example in Vietnam (Tran 
et al, 2017). However, after an extensive consultation on TSD 
in 2018, the Commission rejected a sanctions- based approach 
because of the lack of consensus across stakeholders. Instead 
they launched a 15- point action plan to improve the TSDs, 
which includes more assertive use of the existing mechanisms 
to address non- compliance, including dispute settlement 
(CEC, 2019).
Within this context, a mechanism is needed to ensure that 




be held to account in a meaningful way. The obvious way to 
do this would be formally integrating the TSD chapters into 
the dispute resolution procedures of the rest of the agreement. 
However, given that this option has so far been rejected by 
policy makers, a mechanism is needed to trigger ‘hard’ action, 
such as monetary fines or reversal of trade preferences for 
certain, affected products within the existing structures. The 
current TSD chapters do contain a dispute mechanism, but 
its utility has not been tested. The EU mobilised it for the 
first time against South Korea in December 2018 following 
longstanding concerns about labour rights in the country. 
A panel was requested in July 2019 (CEC, 2019). How this 
process pans out in South Korea will be a key test case for its 
effectiveness, so civil society needs to follow this action closely.
However the process of dispute settlement operates, 
increasing the role of civil society also seems both feasible 
and desirable. NGOs are often well placed to observe and 
report on the negative effects of non- respect for international 
standards, through their dense networks of activists and 
members. Better leveraging this resource, by giving civil 
society a more formal role in the FTA monitoring process, 
would address a key concern of its many critics and help 
to increase public confidence that monitoring is open and 
inclusive. The Commission has provided €3m to support 
civil society involvement in implementation, while a dialogue 
with Peru was instigated at the request of NGOs operating 
in the country.
Addressing enforcement
The proposals can only be effective if they are supported by 
a system that monitors the extent to which trade partners 
respect their FTA commitments. Concerns about non- respect 
have led to the publication of regular reports on the EU’s 





in the Commission – the Chief Trade Enforcement Officer 
(CTEO).3 In July 2019 the first appointee to the post was 
announced – Denis Redonnet, who is also a deputy Director 
General of the Directorate- General for Trade. Having a 
high level official responsible for enforcement is obviously a 
positive move. However, the appointee is also responsible for 
two Directorates, one of which is trade defence. This creates 
a risk that enforcement efforts are disproportionately oriented 
towards that area – particularly anti- dumping. As with any 
institutional innovation, how effective the CTEO turns out to 
be will depend on how much attention is paid to their activities 
and the extent to which the wider institution supports their 
operations. If civil society wants to improve the implementation 
of commitments across the EU’s FTAs, they should advocate 
for an effective and efficient CTEO.
Addressing the negative distributional effects of trade within FTAs
Meyer (2017) has proposed that the unequal distribution of 
gains through FTAs could be addressed through the inclusion 
of an ‘Economic Development Chapter’ in FTAs, such that 
redistribution of gains from FTAs are built into the agreement. 
This proposal would require developed countries to commit to 
taking action within their economies to mitigate the negative 
impacts of trade, in contrast to most efforts within FTAs, which 
tend to focus on requiring developing countries to commit to 
change. However, the methodological difficulties involved in 
identifying losses from trade have proved substantial. The EU 
already has a mechanism – the Globalisation Adjustment Fund 
(GAF) – to support regions hit by globalisation; however, it has 
never been fully used. The Commission has already proposed 
that the criteria for accessing support should be expanded 
in order to extend utilisation and active engagement of civil 
society in this debate in order to ensure that the outcome is a 





Preferential access: the Generalized System of Preferences regime
In the context of the EU’s unilateral trade policy, the 
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) is the main policy 
tool through which sustainable development (SD) can be 
encouraged in partner nations and, indeed, within this regime 
the EU has gone substantially further than in its bilateral 
agreements to incorporate SD concerns into market access 
arrangements. NGOs, as well as many Members of the 
European Parliament (MEPs), are sceptical as to whether the 
provision of generous EU market access, particularly under 
GSP+, is being accompanied by real progress on the ground 
in the beneficiary countries; while the Rana Plaza disaster 
served to further underscore the negative aspects of break- neck 
growth in supply chains.
There are calls for a more effective use of the existing EU 
tools to leverage market access to support SD. There is evidence 
from ILO programmes that market access linked to core labour 
standards can be an enabling condition to improve working 
conditions at factory level, as long as they are combined with 
monitoring and engagement at local level (Rossi, 2015). Others 
have noted that a combination of ‘carrots’ and ‘sticks’ is required 
to ensure effectiveness of conditionality (Tran et al, 2017).
A key challenge here is to make the monitoring mechanisms 
linked to GSP market access more robust and beneficiaries 
more accountable. There is a substantial literature on the 
effectiveness of making market access conditional on labour 
or environmental standards and especially on whether the 
removal or down- grading of access can stimulate positive 
policy change (Orbie and Tortell, 2009; Rossi, 2015; 
Smith et al, 2018). The EU’s GSP conditionality has had 
impacts, but these have been more related to ratification than 
implementation of conventions. In the latest evaluation of GSP, 
although some positive impacts of conditionality on certain 
countries were noted, the authors also concluded: ‘in several 




go hand- in- hand with adherence to fundamental labour and 
human rights’ (Development Solutions, 2018). As a country’s 
decision to change its labour or environmental policies is likely 
to be the result of many domestic and international factors, 
isolating the effect of trade measures, is, by definition, difficult, 
yet inaction in the face of clear infringements of commitments 
is increasingly difficult to justify politically.
There is already a process by which GSP market access can be 
removed. The 2012 GSP Regulation foresees that preferences 
can be suspended for ‘serious and systematic violation of 
principles laid down in the conventions listed in Part A of 
Annex VIII’. The 15 conventions in this annex cover a variety 
of rights, including labour standards. Thus, unlike in FTAs, 
the GSP already incorporates the legal tools for preference 
withdrawal (Vogt, 2015). Yet NGOs and the labour movement 
consistently report that the EU has failed to act in cases where 
they consider suspension to be merited.
The EU’s conditionality could be a particularly effective 
lever in the case of beneficiaries of GSP+ or Everything But 
Arms (EBA) for Least Developed Countries (LDCs). These 
countries enjoy substantial tariff preferences, which have had 
significant impacts on trade in certain goods. In 2007 trade 
unions in Costa Rica and Europe sought unsuccessfully to 
launch a case over GSP+ preferences granted to Costa Rica 
over systematic labour rights violations in the tropical fruit 
industry. At the time the Commission indicated that the ILO 
processes should be favoured. More recently, the removal 
of some preferences from Cambodia for human and labour 
rights violations is widely seen as a step in the right direction. 
Although the list of products covered is relatively modest, it 
comes with the threat of more widespread action if progress 
is not assured. It has even been welcomed by business groups 
like amfori, representing EU importers. Preferences for 
Bangladesh are also under threat due to perceived failures to 
respect workers’ rights and freedom to organise. Four civil 
society organisations have already complained to the European 
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Ombudsman that the Commission was failing to act in this case. 
The Ombudsman’s judgment makes clear that action is feasible, 
even if all other avenues will likely be exhausted beforehand 
(European Ombudsman, 2020). How the Commission deals 
with these criticisms in the coming years will be a key factor 
in mitigating the criticisms of the failure of its trade preference 
system to incorporate ‘fairness’.
Concluding remarks
In this short chapter we have sought to highlight the trade 
policy areas where more ‘progressive’ approaches that integrate 
greater labour and environmental protection can be better 
incorporated into policy implementation in the short term. 
In summary, the three debates which are most likely to move 
the dial on the EU’s position on these linkages within the 
timescale of this Commission are:
• The ratification (or not) of the EU’s FTAs with Mercosur and 
Vietnam and the effective incorporation of commitments 
on SD in case of ratification.
• Increased pressure on GSP+ and EBA recipients on securing 
real improvements on core labour standards.
• Mobilisation of the new post of CTEO to monitor the 
implementation of partner countries’ commitments on SD 
objectives in both FTAs and GSP.
Pressure could be stepped up on these issues in the EU 
context, through political action at the level of MEPs and the 
Commission, but also in member states. In this context, it needs 
to be borne in mind that the removal of tariff preferences from 
a trade partner will never be an entirely technocratic decision 
of the Commission services. It is inherently political and there 





In addition, although the EU can, to some extent, impose 
conditionality on unilateral preferences accorded to developing 
countries covered by the GSP, FTAs are negotiated with its 
trade partners. Large emerging powers are likely to strongly 
resist conditionality in their agreements. India, for example has 
a long history of resisting any efforts to link labour standards – 
including those of the ILO – to trade. Indeed, this is one 
of the stumbling blocks in the (now stalled) EU– India FTA 
negotiations. It seems likely that the EU will encounter similar 
resistance in Brazil to linking its FTA with key NGO priorities 
like reversing deforestation. In the face of such resistance 
the mobilisation of civil society will be vital to keeping SD 
priorities on the policy agenda both in Brussels and the national 
capitals and enabling the EU, if necessary, to put these long- 
term objectives ahead of short- term commercial gains.
Finally, WTO reform is being actively discussed. It is not 
impossible that the global rules which frame trade preferences 
could change, for example to create an exception for certain 
types of goods made in more sustainable ways. However, the 
Drug GSP case made it clear that discrimination between 
different developing countries must be based on clear 
international standards. In the case of fair trade, the lack of 
such an international or European public standard would be a 
major barrier to instituting such an exception. In any case, the 
engagement of academics and civil society with this discussion 
could provide opportunities to create an enabling environment 
to encourage more sustainable trade.
Notes
 1 Africa Caribbean Pacific Group (ACP) countries had duty- free access to 
the EU market, largely for historical reasons, while ‘third’ countries paid 
a tariff that was €250/ tonne in 1993. After repeated challenges in the 
WTO this has been reduced over time, finally culminating in the ‘Geneva 
Agreement’ of 2009 which secured a reduction in third country tariffs to 
€75/ tonne in 2020. In the meantime, most ACP countries continue to 







 2 Letter from European Commissioner Franz Fischler to the European Banana 
Action Network, November 1995.
 3 The New Commission has announced the creation of the post of Chief 
Trade Enforcement Officer in the Directorate- General for Trade to ensure 
that trade agreements are respected.
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Civil society action towards judiciary 




The chapter explores the approach adopted by CORE 
(renamed the Corporate Justice Coalition in April 2021), the 
civil society coalition on corporate accountability established 
in the UK in 1998, with regard to recently introduced and 
proposed laws which require (or would require) companies 
to identify, and take steps to manage and mitigate, the human 
rights risks and impacts in their corporate group and supply 
chains, and considers the prospects for this emerging trend. 
The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, 
endorsed by the Human Rights Council in 2011 introduced 
the concept of human rights due diligence (HRDD), a process 
by which businesses can assess and manage their impacts on 






to be included in legislative instruments in Europe, at both 
EU and domestic level.
The chapter addresses the early evolution of these 
requirements, from measures intended to improve corporate 
transparency (the EU Non- Financial Reporting Directive 
and the UK Modern Slavery Act) to laws and legislative 
proposals which create, or seek to create, specific legal duties 
for companies with associated civil or criminal sanctions for 
management failures that give rise to human rights abuses. 
This latter category of laws includes the ground- breaking 
2017 French ‘Devoir de Vigilance’ law. The chapter provides an 
overview of these instruments and the ways in which CORE 
is assessing the political and social dynamics behind their 
development and adoption, including the corporate response. 
It also considers the prospects for similar legislation in Europe 
and beyond, including the possibility of the inclusion of an 
HRDD requirement in a future EU directive.
CORE: a civil society coalition pushing for corporate responsibility
For several decades, UK NGOs and trade unions have raised 
concerns about abuses of human rights, workers’ rights 
and damage to the environment linked to the international 
operations and supply chains of UK multinational companies. 
High profile early campaigns focused on changing the practices 
of individual companies and sectors went alongside discussions 
about legal accountability for abusive and harmful practices. 
In the late 1990s, UK civil society groups came together to 
form the Corporate Responsibility Coalition (CORE) to work 
collectively to campaign for law reform. The chapter begins 
with an overview of CORE, then moves into a narrative 
account of campaigns for mandatory requirements intended to 
improve corporate transparency via company law and supply 
chain reporting, including an examination of the shortcomings 




discussion of recent developments and future prospects for 
corporate liability.
CORE is a UK network of human rights, development 
and environmental NGOs, trade unions, academics and 
lawyers. CORE advocates for government to set standards to 
improve UK- linked multinationals’ transparency about, and 
accountability for, human rights and environmental risks and 
impacts in their operations and supply chains, and to enable 
victims of corporate abuse to access justice. The network now 
numbers 56 organisations, from international NGOs with 
wide- ranging mandates, to micro- organisations working on 
issues in one country or business sector. Separately, they adopt 
diverse approaches to changing corporate behaviour, including 
using public campaigning to target companies directly, 
supporting communities who are taking legal action against 
firms and participating in MSIs. As a coalition, they work to 
influence public policy and law through policy development, 
parliamentary advocacy and research. Businesses cannot join 
the coalition; however, CORE does collaborate with groupings 
which include businesses, such as the Ethical Trading Initiative 
(ETI), and maintains a dialogue with business associations and 
individual companies.
Why do CORE’s partner groups choose to invest time 
and energy in a joint network? Firstly, they recognise that 
speaking with a single, united voice is likely to have impact, 
either in securing a meeting with a decision maker, influencing 
the outcome of a government policy consultation or raising 
awareness among parliamentarians. CORE provides a space 
for the discussion and development of joint advocacy strategies 
and policy positions, drawing upon the expertise of its partners. 
For smaller groups with few resources, CORE offers a means 
to participate in policy processes that they would otherwise 
struggle to follow and understand. Rather than attempting 
to reach consensual agreement of all members every time a 
public position is adopted, CORE works on an ‘opt- in’ basis, 
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with partners participating depending on their own mandates 
and priorities. This reduces time spent on the difficult and 
fruitless negotiations that can sometimes characterise NGO 
coalition work.
A creative approach to regulation in a neoliberal policy environment
Over the past 20 years, and particularly in response to the right- 
wing, deregulatory political context of the past decade, CORE 
has taken an opportunistic, pragmatic approach to advocacy, 
working to have draft legislation amended to secure the 
introduction of corporate reporting requirements on human 
rights and environmental risks and impacts. In early 2019, 
spurred on by developments in other European countries, the 
coalition began a proactive campaign for a new law to require 
companies to take steps to prevent human rights abuses and 
environmental harm, and to be held accountable in court if 
they fail to act. The development, outcomes and prospects of 
these approaches are discussed in turn.
CORE was founded in 1998 when the newly- elected Labour 
government announced its intention to review UK company 
law for the first time in 150 years and started consulting with 
various stakeholders. A group of NGO policy specialists met 
informally to discuss if and how company law could be used 
to improve corporate accountability. At the time, companies 
were developing and promoting their new CSR strategies and 
voluntary codes of conduct in response to NGO campaigning, 
although concerns were already emerging about the efficacy 
of an entirely voluntary approach.
In 2002, CORE instigated and promoted a Private Member’s 
Bill (a legislative initiative by an individual member of the 
UK Parliament) known as the Corporate Responsibility 
Bill, which identified new standards in the areas of corporate 
reporting, company directors’ duties and foreign direct liability 




by Linda Perham, a Labour Member of Parliament (MP). 
Although it did not benefit from a parliamentary debate, it 
enjoyed widespread cross- party support. More than 300 MPs 
signed motions supporting the Bill’s principles and calling on 
the government to act. As the company law review process 
gathered momentum, CORE identified three key policy 
demands: (1) large and medium- sized companies should have 
to report annually on their environmental and social impacts; 
(2) company directors should have a legal duty to minimise, 
manage and mitigate their environmental and social impacts; 
and (3) obstacles should be removed to ensure victims of 
corporate abuse linked to UK companies can access justice 
in the UK.
The government introduced the Company Law Reform Bill 
(which became the Companies Act 2006) in late 2005. As it 
made its passage through Parliament the following year, CORE 
produced a lobby pack for the general public and over 100,000 
people contacted their MP to express support for measures to 
improve corporate accountability. A parliamentary petition 
supporting CORE’s proposed amendments to the Bill was 
signed by 225 MPs. A pragmatic decision was taken to narrow 
down the original campaign demands to the introduction of 
directors’ duties and an associated reporting requirement. The 
end result of the campaign was the inclusion in what became 
the Companies Act 2006 of a duty for company directors to 
promote the success of their companies:
and in doing so have regard to: (a) the likely consequences 
of any decision in the long term; (b) the interests of the 
company’s employees; (c) the need to foster the company’s 
business relationships with suppliers, customers and 
others; (d) the impact of the company’s operations on the 
community and the environment; (e) the desirability of 





Directors of publicly quoted companies are required to report 
annually on how they have fulfilled this duty. In 2014, the 
Companies Act 2006 reporting requirements were elaborated 
via the transposition into UK law of the EU Non- Financial 
Reporting Directive (NFRD). This directive, introduced 
largely in response to pressure from civil society, created 
a requirement for large companies in the EU to provide 
information that enables an understanding of the impacts of 
their activity. This includes disclosure of anti- bribery and anti- 
corruption matters; a description of any due diligence processes 
implemented by the company in pursuing policies relating 
to non- financial matters, and the outcome of those policies; 
and a description of the principal risks arising in connection 
with the company’s operations including, where relevant and 
proportionate, a description of business relationships, products 
and services which are likely to cause adverse impacts in those 
areas of risk; and how the company manages those principal 
risks. Where a company does not pursue policies in relation 
to environmental, employee, social, respect for human rights, 
anti- corruption and anti- bribery matters, the directors must 
provide a clear and reasoned explanation for not doing so.
The Transparency in Supply Chains clause in the Modern Slavery 
Act 2015
A fresh opportunity to strengthen legal requirements for 
corporate transparency specifically in relation to supply chains 
came with the UK government’s 2013 Modern Slavery Bill. 
Taking inspiration from the California Transparency in Supply 
Chains Act (TISA), which requires companies with annual 
worldwide gross receipts exceeding $100 million doing business 
in California to disclose information regarding their efforts to 
eradicate human trafficking and slavery within their supply 
chains, CORE and its partner organisations worked with 




ETI to persuade government to introduce a similar, enhanced 
requirement for UK companies via an amendment to the Bill.
Prior to the Bill’s introduction, the then Home Secretary 
Theresa May MP commissioned a group of parliamentarians 
to conduct an evidence review to inform the content of 
the legislation. One of the review’s recommendations was 
the introduction of a similar set of requirements to TISA. 
Yet when the draft bill was published, the only reference to 
company supply chains was a brief mention in the foreword 
which stated: ‘We [the UK government] will continue to work 
with businesses on a voluntary basis so they can ensure their 
workforces and supply chains are not exploited.’
In response, CORE published a joint briefing with the 
ETI arguing for the Bill to be amended to include a supply 
chain reporting requirement. A meeting with a group of 
organisations was convened to discuss advocacy strategy for the 
parliamentary process, which included working to influence 
the committee of MPs charged with scrutinising the draft law, 
drafting amendments and identifying parliamentarians in the 
House of Lords to table them. The government was ultimately 
persuaded to amend the draft legislation following a joint letter 
from ETI and British Retail Consortium members, which 
argued that legal reform would drive efforts to end worker 
abuse in supply chains.
What became section 54 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 
requires commercial organisations with an annual turnover 
of more than £36 million operating in the UK to publish 
a retrospective annual statement setting out what they have 
done to ensure that slavery and human trafficking is not 
taking place in their own operations and supply chains. The 
term ‘commercial organisation’ encompasses public sector 
bodies supplying goods or services, including local authorities, 
universities and health service trusts. The law suggests – but 
does not require – that statements include information on: the 




policies in relation to slavery and human trafficking; its due 
diligence processes in relation to slavery and human trafficking 
in its business and supply chains; the parts of its business and 
supply chains where there is a risk of slavery and human 
trafficking taking place, and the steps it has taken to assess 
and manage that risk; its effectiveness in ensuring that slavery 
and human trafficking is not taking place in its business or 
supply chains, measured against such performance indicators 
as it considers appropriate; and the training about slavery 
and human trafficking available to its staff. Statements must 
be signed off by the organisation’s board and published on 
its website. The requirement covers an estimated 9,000 to 
11,000 companies.
Monitoring and enforcement: the missing pieces
The directors’ duties in the Companies Act 2006 and the 
Transparency in Supply Chains (TISC) requirement in the 
Modern Slavery Act 2015 were the first steps in UK law 
towards company accountability for human rights abuses 
and environmental damage, no matter where these impacts 
occur. They begin to expand directors’ responsibilities beyond 
maximising profit for shareholders, to taking into account 
employees, workers and others affected by business activities, 
be it in the companies’ own operations or its supply chains. Yet 
despite their significance, these pieces of legislation have major 
limitations. Analyses of company disclosures to date under the 
NFRD (including, by extension, the revised Companies Act 
2006) reveals that while most acknowledge the importance of 
environmental and social issues, they do not include detailed 
information on key issues and risks in their corporate reports.
Research published by the Alliance for Corporate 
Transparency (2018) shows that over 70 per cent of companies 
state a commitment to protecting human rights in their supply 
chains, but only 36 per cent describe their HRDD process, 




describe examples or indicators of effective management 
of those issues. Fifty- eight per cent of companies report 
information about human rights audits; however, disclosure 
of audit findings is much less common (25 per cent), as is 
information on actions taken in response (16 per cent). Just 
8 per cent of companies acknowledge the widely known 
limitations of audits, tragically demonstrated by the 2013 Rana 
Plaza collapse and many other accidents in audited factories. 
Twenty- five per cent give figures for the total number of 
outsourced workers, but less than 5 per cent include these 
workers in their reporting on equal opportunities, collective 
bargaining or salaries. Only 10 per cent of companies report 
on payment, or targets for paying a living wage and very few 
disclose country- by- country information on region- sensitive 
issues such as equal opportunities (6 per cent) and freedom of 
association (10 per cent).
A similar picture emerges with respect to TISC. A CORE 
and Business and Human Rights Resource Centre analysis of 
the first 75 company statements found that only nine included 
information on all of the six areas listed in the Act, while only 
19 were signed in accordance with the law. Further research by 
CORE published in 2017 showed that of 50 major companies 
sourcing products – including tea from Assam, cocoa from 
West Africa and mined gold, or operating in sectors known 
to carry a high risk of modern slavery – almost two- thirds 
had not included information in their statements on modern 
slavery risks.
The absence of effective monitoring and enforcement 
lies behind the poor quality of corporate disclosures. The 
responsibility for enforcing standards in corporate reports 
published in compliance with the Companies Act 2006 is 
delegated by the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and 
Industrial Strategy to the Financial Reporting Council (FRC), 
whose main mandate is to regulate auditors, accountants and 
actuaries. Complaints about company reports can be made 
directly to the FRC’s Corporate Reporting Review Team, but 
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NGO experience is that public findings of non- compliance 
with the law are highly unusual and the FRC is failing in its 
duty to regulate firms.
Legal action against directors for breach of their duties could 
be an option for shareholder activists seeking to hold a firm 
accountable for human rights abuses or environmental damage, 
but this is legally complex and financially risky, as in the event 
of a company winning the case, the directors could seek to 
recoup their legal costs from the other party. Shareholders in 
such a case would also have to demonstrate how they had been 
disadvantaged by the directors’ failure to fulfil their duties. 
Furthermore, unlike the US, there is no tradition of so- called 
‘derivative’ actions in the UK and, unsurprisingly, no such 
cases have been brought in relation to corporate abuses in 
supply chains.
The situation is similar with respect to company disclosures 
under TISC. The National Audit Office (responsible 
for scrutinising public spending for Parliament (2017)), 
Parliament’s Public Accounts’ Committee and three 
parliamentarians commissioned by the Home Office (2019) 
to review the Act have been highly critical of government’s 
hands- off approach to monitoring and enforcing the supply 
chain reporting requirement. All have highlighted the same 
issues: an inappropriate reliance on civil society, investors and 
consumers to monitor corporate compliance; the absence of 
a publicly available list of companies covered by the law; and 
that the only possible sanction, an injunction issued by the 
Secretary of State against a company for failing to publish a 
statement, has never been used.
From reporting to acting: mandatory HRDD and parent company liability
Current legislative reviews of the NFRD and TISC offer an 
opportunity to address some of the shortcomings described, 




reporting. A more ambitious approach is necessary to achieve 
corporate legal accountability for human rights abuses and 
damage to the environment in international operations and 
supply chains. This was the aim of the French NGO campaign 
started in 2014 which resulted in the adoption of the so- called 
Devoir de Vigilance law three years later. This law establishes 
a legally binding obligation for the largest French parent 
companies to identify and prevent adverse human rights and 
environmental impacts resulting from their own activities, 
from activities of companies they control, and from activities 
of their subcontractors and suppliers, with whom they have 
an established commercial relationship. These companies must 
publish an annual ‘Vigilance Plan’, to assess and address these 
impacts. Liability would apply when companies default on 
their obligations, including the absence of a plan or faults in 
its implementation.
Similar campaigns are now bearing fruit across Europe. 
Draft legal proposals are under consideration in Germany, 
Switzerland and Austria, and the Finnish government made 
a commitment in 2019 to bring forward HRDD legislation. 
In May 2020, the European Commission announced that it 
intends to introduce legislation on corporate due diligence 
and directors’ duties as part of its sustainable corporate 
governance agenda, and the German Presidency of the 
European Council indicated that due diligence is a key political 
priority for their Presidency. In December 2020, the Council 
of the EU approved conclusions which included a call for a 
proposal from the Commission for an EU legal framework on 
sustainable corporate governance, including cross-sector due 
diligence throughout global supply chains. Major international 
companies including Aldi, Unilever, Nestlé and Adidas have 
expressed their support for this initiative.
CORE’s campaign for legislation to require UK companies 
to take action was launched in 2019. General principles outline 




to prevent human rights abuses and environmental damage. 
Like the Devoir de Vigilance law, companies would have to put 
in place a plan to assess and address their risks, and could be 
penalised for not doing so. The new law would make access to 
remedy through civil litigation more straightforward for victims 
by requiring businesses to provide evidence of measures taken 
to prevent harms, rather than requiring claimants to provide 
evidence of a company’s negligence, as at present. In the most 
serious cases, company executives could be prosecuted.
The principles were elaborated through consultation with 
partner organisations and allies, informed by advice from 
a technical working group of practising lawyers and legal 
academics. The overall aim was to develop a proposal at once 
ambitious and legally feasible, that has the potential to garner 
support from politicians and businesses. Careful consideration 
of legal practicalities and political feasibility was required. 
Echoing the language of the Modern Slavery Act 2015, the 
principles refer throughout to obligations for ‘commercial 
organisations’, rather than for companies, meaning the new 
requirements would extend beyond the private sector to any 
organisation with a commercial arm, for instance universities 
and local authorities. No reference is made to the size of 
companies in scope, a deliberate decision which gives flexibility 
and leaves this to be defined at a later stage.
Perhaps the most challenging issue was whether and how to 
formulate a legal requirement for commercial organisations to 
respect human rights. As this would have represented a radical 
departure from UK legal tradition (in which private actors are 
not considered subject to human rights law, unless they are 
delivering services on behalf of the State), the decision was 
taken to propose a requirement for action to be taken to prevent 
human rights abuses, with liability and sanctions for failure 
to do so, inspired by section 7 of the UK Bribery Act 2010 
which requires firms to act to prevent bribery. The adoption of 
a ‘failure to prevent’ model for corporate human rights abuses 
had been recommended by Parliament’s Joint Committee on 
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Human Rights in 2017, indicating pre- existing, cross- party 
political support for the idea.
Careful consideration was given to whether companies 
should be required to publish a HRDD plan. French NGO 
research has found that compliance with this element of the 
Devoir de Vigilance law is relatively low, and that the quality of 
plans is generally poor, largely due to ineffective government 
monitoring and an absence of sanctions. Some organisations 
were concerned that including a similar requirement in the 
proposed UK law could result in other aspects of the proposal 
(on liability, for example) being de- prioritised, with the 
possibility that the final outcome of any legislative process 
would be little more than an additional reporting requirement. 
In the end, the decision was taken to include reference to a 
due diligence plan, as this was a standard demand of campaigns 
for HRDD across Europe.
In a significant development, in March 2019 the Global 
Resource Initiative Taskforce (2020), a business and NGO 
working group supported by three government departments, 
recommended the introduction of a mandatory human rights 
and environmental due diligence requirement for companies 
which place products linked to deforestation on the UK market. 
Shortly afterwards, the government launched a consultation 
on a much more limited proposal that would require firms to 
publish information to show where key commodities – for 
example, cocoa, rubber, soya and palm oil – come from and 
that they were produced in line with local laws protecting 
forests and other natural ecosystems. The proposal makes no 
mention of human rights and falls far short of the type of 
accountability mechanism needed to address abuses in supply 
chains. CORE responded by calling for the UK to be more 
ambitious in order not to fall behind other European nations. 
To date the UK government has rejected these calls and is 
pressing ahead with the introduction of what it describes as 
‘due diligence on forest risk commodities’, which in reality is 
a limited transparency requirement.
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Alignment across Europe, without Europe?
CORE’s pragmatic approach to advocacy has yielded results in 
the past two decades, contributing to persuading government 
to introduce mandatory corporate reporting requirements. 
While significant, to date the potential impact of these 
requirements has been hampered by poor enforcement. The 
laws are also fundamentally limited by a lack of obligations on 
firms to act, rather than merely report. In a more favourable 
political context, French campaigners pursued a more 
ambitious strategy and achieved the introduction of legislation 
which offers the prospect of corporate liability for human rights 
abuses and environmental damage. CORE, and other civil 
society organisations in Europe are now calling on national 
governments and the EU to follow suit.
While early signs from Brussels look positive, without a trade 
deal that includes a commitment to dynamic alignment, there 
is no guarantee that the UK will maintain or duplicate current 
or future standards on corporate reporting, due diligence or 
liability introduced by the EU. CORE may have to brace 
for a defence of current standards or risk the UK becoming 
entrenched as a European safe haven for irresponsible business.
Note
 1 Companies Act 2006, Chapter 46, p 79, www.legislation.gov.uk/ ukpga/ 
2006/ 46/ pdfs/ ukpga_ 20060046_ en.pdf
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Assessing the economic, social and 
environmental impacts of global value 
chains as a tool for change
Christophe Alliot
Introduction
Despite a growing consciousness of the social and environmental 
problems at an international scale, the creation of economic 
value and short- term profitability tend to remain the central 
objectives of private and public decision makers. Based on this 
initial observation, the social cooperative enterprise BASIC 
(Bureau d’Analyse Sociétale pour une Information Citoyenne) 
was created in the belief that a lever for change lied in greater 
awareness and understanding of the link between economic 
activities and social- environmental issues. BASIC was set up 
in 2013 as a shared platform to mutualise expertise between 
academic researchers, civil society organisations and public 
bodies in order to analyse and question the relevance of current 
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company, a territory or a project, and initiate changes at the 
level of the societal stakes faced today.
The chapter analyses how BASIC achieves such goals via 
the generation and dissemination of information, knowledge 
and tools to understand and measure the impacts of economic 
activities on society and the planet, so as to stimulate the public 
debate and foster policy decisions towards an ecological and 
social transition. BASIC has developed a specific methodological 
approach in collaboration with academic researchers to analyse 
value chains, assess their societal impacts and estimate related 
hidden costs at different scales, from international commodities 
to local products. So far, the framework has been applied 
to a number of food value chains (banana, cocoa, tea, rice, 
shrimps, dairy, beef, fruits and vegetables) as well as textiles 
(sport brands), publishing and mining products.1
The case of BASIC’s (2018) recent research on coffee 
and cocoa, and its subsequent diffusion and use in advocacy 
campaigning, will be analysed to illustrate the objectives 
pursued, the choices made, the added value as well as the limits 
of this approach, its potential effects and the challenges faced.
Information for citizen action: the background
The first reports alerting to the social and environmental risks 
linked to the globalisation of the consumer society date from 
the early 1970s (Meadows et al, 1972). Since then, despite 
the development of awareness on the interlinkages between 
environmental and social challenges faced at the global level 
and the growing number of initiatives driven by public decision 
makers and the private sector, the public is increasingly sceptical 
about the proposed solutions and their capacity to be up to the 
challenges. Scientific studies increasingly confirm the extent and 
the worsening of the environmental damage associated with the 
‘modern’ way of life being mainstreamed all around the world. 
Pessimistic forecasts of climate change, exposure to pollutants 





on a pattern of unlimited exploitation of natural resources and 
ecosystems, as well as increasing production of waste (PNUE, 
2011), our economic system, and more globally our model of 
society, is becoming more and more vulnerable.2 At the social 
level, human rights abuses persist, employment and working 
conditions are increasingly precarious (ILO, 2020), and income 
inequalities continue to increase in most countries (Clements 
et al, 2015). Despite these evolutions, alternative models of 
production and consumption most often remain marginalised 
by the imperatives of short- term economic profitability and 
the search for the lowest prices. Whatever the business sector, 
economic growth is the central objective of companies and 
states alike, which assume it is the only way to generate full 
employment and social progress, while environmental issues 
are subordinated to the ‘return to growth’, a situation which 
has been amplified by the economic crisis triggered by the 
COVID- 19 pandemic.
Based on this departure point, the ‘Bureau d’Analyse 
Sociétale pour une Information Citoyenne’3 (BASIC), a 
Paris- based research institute, was created in 2012 with the 
objective of questioning the relevance of established business 
models and value chains, as well as alternative ones, in view 
of their impacts on society. Its vision and mission are based 
on the belief that a lever for change lies in the production and 
dissemination of knowledge on these issues, so as to stimulate 
a better informed public debate, and, ultimately, to enable 
citizens, public authorities and private decision makers to make 
informed choices that are no longer guided solely by short- 
term, fragmented economic rationale. BASIC has been set up 
as a ‘cooperative of social interest’ by constitution, aiming at 
developing a shared platform of expertise and building bridges 
between academics and researchers, civil society organisations, 
journalists, supporters and its employees.
Operationally, BASIC conducts studies on behalf of  – and in 
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and inter- branch organisations which investigate the following 
research questions:
• How is value created and distributed from producers of raw 
materials to end consumers? What proportion of value is 
captured by each stage in the chain, with what profitability? 
How is it related to supply and demand dynamics, to 
governance structures of the chain (negotiation imbalances, 
power relations, monitoring tools, etc.), to the socioeconomic 
context of each territory and to institutional settings (public 
policies and regulations, standards and certifications, etc.)?
• What are the impacts generated by each stage in the chain 
on society: social, health, environmental, economic? What 
are the main causes, impact pathways and loops, as well 
as systemic relationships between impacts and lock- ins? 
Which indicators enable to quantify their current level 
and evolution?
• What are the related hidden costs shifted onto society 
(societal costs)? What is the order of magnitude of real 
expenses borne by public authorities and third parties as a 
result of these impacts (when possible/ relevant to assess)?
• Based on these elements, what comparisons can be drawn 
between models of production and consumption? Which 
ones can address the social and environmental issues at stake 
and those that should be regulated or replaced?
In order to investigate these research questions, BASIC has 
chosen to combine qualitative approaches with quantitative 
methodologies that articulate economic, social and 
environmental data related to all stages along value chains, from 
producers of raw materials to end consumers. Its objective is to 
leverage today’s wide availability of quantified data and see how 
to use them to better inform the public debate, at a moment 
when quantified information seems to be increasingly used 
out of context to reassert certain viewpoints and contradict 
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diverging ones. In doing so, BASIC has been confronted 
with the critical need to understand where data come from, 
by whom they are collected, with what intention and using 
which methodological framework, with what limits and biases. 
These questions are not only relevant to raw data, but also 
to the models which use them to generate knowledge and 
recommendations: how are they developed, by whom, and 
so on? The example of recent studies conducted on coffee 
(BASIC, 2018) and cocoa (BASIC, FAO and EuropeAid, 
2020) GVCs are a good illustration of the issues at stake when 
developing quantitative methodologies, and possible ways of 
addressing them.
Mining data or data minefields? The missing information on 
value chains
The first set of issues relates to the collection and processing 
of raw data. When doing so, one of the first lessons learnt 
is the fragmentation of available quantitative information, 
some important subjects being potentially ‘left in the dark’ by 
the lack of data. This can be due either to their complexity, the 
limited resources dedicated to investigating them, or simply 
the willingness of some actors not to disclose information. In the 
case of the coffee global value chain, this is typically the case of 
the ‘out of home’ market (for instance, cafes, restaurants, coffee 
shops like Starbucks) for which very limited data are available 
when compared to sales in supermarkets and hypermarkets. 
The main underlying reasons are the high number of business 
actors involved and the lack of resources – public and private – 
dedicated to consolidating quantitative information on the 
‘out of home’ sector. In addition, there is a degradation of the 
availability of public statistics on certain groups of actors and 
stages of the value chain. A good illustration is the decline in 
the precision of the economic surveys conducted annually 
among private companies by the French public statistics 
institute (INSEE). As a result, private fee- based databases are an 
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indispensable source of information to analyse specific business 
models of companies, estimate their market shares, and so on.
This situation can be further worsened by the decision of 
some leading actors not to publish any specific data on their 
activity, best exemplified by Nespresso which refuses to disclose 
information on sales in its stores, although its market share 
on single- serve coffee (capsules) can exceed 35 per cent in 
consuming countries such as France. This issue can be just as 
critical at the level of farmers operating at the beginning of 
the value chain, where key production systems can be under- 
documented. In coffee, this is for example the case of semi- 
forest coffee farming systems in Ethiopia, although they are 
the most common in the country and the way coffee has been 
produced there for centuries. This lack of information leads to 
a risk of oversimplifying the real situation of actors by relying 
on average estimates that do not account for specificities, and 
creates a critical difficulty when putting raw data in context.
This also hampers the capacity to make connections between 
the types of information available. For example, in coffee, 
one of the main difficulties encountered was to quantify the 
relationship between the price paid to farmers for coffee, 
and the annual income earned by their households, because 
of the lack of public information and studies assessing this 
relationship. Similar difficulties have been faced when trying to 
identify the proportion of total deforestation that is attributable 
to coffee farming in key regions (such as in Peru or Ethiopia). 
In such situations, the main way to overcome methodological 
obstacles is to conduct additional data collection or to liaise 
with ground actors who have done so, or are in the process 
of doing so.
Even when data is available, the other issue that often arises is 
the contradiction between results from different sources, with 
often wide discrepancies. In the case of the coffee global value 
chain, this problem was first and foremost salient regarding 
estimates of market shares of traders, processors, brands and 
retailers. Among the relatively scarce data available on this 
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topic – because of its sensitiveness in the business world – 
contradictions appear to be the norm rather than an exception. 
This can be explained essentially by differences in scope: even 
if the sales taken into account for a given actor are the same 
across estimates, it is the perimeter chosen to calculate the 
market share that most often differs (for instance, total market 
sales versus sales only in supermarkets). This problem is not 
limited to business actors and can be just as important when 
analysing the agricultural stage of the value chain. In the case of 
the coffee value chain study, diverging and even contradictory 
statistics emerged from different data sources claiming to assess 
the same research questions in the same country or region, with 
divergences of up to 100% regarding the number of farms, the 
number of hectares harvested, the yields, the income generated, 
and so on. As in the case of business actors, these contradictions 
could be most often explained by major differences in the scope 
of actors and regions covered by the statistics.
Such contradictions can also derive from the assumptions 
made to generate data, as illustrated by the results of lifecycle 
analyses regarding greenhouse gas emissions of different 
formats of coffee beverages. When comparing coffee made 
from aluminium capsules and brewed coffee, the emissions 
can be to the advantage of the former or the latter depending 
on the study, because of differences in the quantity of coffee 
considered necessary to make a cup. These findings show 
the need to collect as many data sources as possible when 
investigating value chains and their impacts, as assessing the 
potential contradictions between these sources is the main way 
of understanding their construct and biases.
Combining quantitative and qualitative approaches
Moreover, greater insights arise when confronting quantified 
data with qualitative information collected through interviews 
and literature review. This is why BASIC has chosen to 
systematically conduct in parallel quantitative and qualitative 
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investigations. When contradiction arise between the two, 
it either sheds light on new phenomenon/ trends thanks to 
quantitative data or questions the limits of these data thanks 
to qualitative insights. For example, in the case of the coffee 
value chain, the collection of quantified information on the 
additional costs involved in manufacturing capsules (whether 
made from aluminium or plastic) has shed light on the debate 
over value distribution in the sector. Indeed, these data have 
demonstrated that the much higher price paid by consumers 
for coffee capsules of the Nespresso type (on average five times 
more expensive per kilo than a usual 250g pack of ground 
coffee) could not be explained by their additional packaging 
costs: less than 25 per cent of the additional price to consumers 
could be related to such costs, whereas most actors thought that 
it would be closer to 100 per cent, according to the qualitative 
interviews conducted.
Conversely, qualitative analyses often bring indispensable 
insights which are not yet quantified, or very poorly, thereby 
shedding light on the limits and biases of existing data 
sources. Still in the coffee sector, this was best illustrated 
by the case of Ethiopian mid to large size plantations that 
are developing rapidly and competing with the almost 
2 million small farmers who are growing coffee on less 
than 0.5 hectares. Even though these modern specialised 
plantations are creating unfair competition for small holders 
and posing new challenges with regards to deforestation and 
precarious employment, they were not properly covered 
by national statistics at the time of the study. It is through 
interviews with actors in Ethiopia and the work of a PhD 
student from the French Agronomy School AgroParisTech 
that this important phenomenon could be identified. The 
phenomenon has yet to be comprehensively quantified in order 
to better understand its scale and speed of development. The 
following charts show some of the main quantified findings 
of the study on coffee value chains performed by BASIC in 
2018, notably the evolution of average prices and costs along 
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the chain in France, illustrating the results that can be obtained 
through the work on data detailed previously.
Figure 6.1 shows the evolution of:
• the total value of green coffee beans imported into 
France annually;
• the combined added value generated each year by roasters 
and retailers in France from their sales of coffee, all formats 
being included: packs of 250 grams, instant coffee, soft pods 
and capsules (in other words, it is the difference between the 
total value of consumer purchases of coffee in supermarkets 
and hypermarkets minus the total value of green coffee beans 
imported in France); and
• the total costs of roasting and grinding coffee as well as 
logistics costs and the costs to manufacture packaging, in 
particular coffee capsules whether in aluminium or plastic.
The results illustrate some of the key tendencies of the whole 
French market over the past 20 years:
• The total value of coffee beans imported into France has 
been in the same range in 1994– 98 and in 2013– 17, with 
important instabilities in between (reaching a low point of 
€184 million in 2003 and a peak of €617 million in 2011).
• The combined added value of roasters and retailers has 
undergone a steady increase over the period which 
resulted in its doubling from €1,222 million in 1994 to 
€2,598 million in 2017. This spectacular jump is essentially 
due to the increasing proportion of coffee capsules sold on 
the market at five times the price of regular 250g packs of 
coffee (in 2017, they accounted for 58 per cent of all French 
sales of coffee consumed at home).
• In comparison, the total processing costs induced in 
France by roasting and grinding coffee, manufacturing the 
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Figure 6.1: Evolution of the value distribution of coffee products consumed at home, 1994– 2017, € million
Note: The figures include all formats: 250g packs of coffee, instant coffee, soft pods and capsules of coffee
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final products to the supermarket stores has also increased 
markedly from 123 million euros in 1994 to 435 million 
euros in 2017, mainly because of the increasing proportion 
of capsules sold that cost more to manufacture. However, it 
is important to see that the increase of total processing costs 
(approximately €312 million between 1994 and 2017) is 
four times smaller than the increase accruing to combined 
added value of roasters and retailers (approximately 
€1,376 million between 1994 and 2017), which indicates 
a significant increase of net profitability for the actors at 
the end of the chain.
In contrast, the two charts in Figure 6.2 display the results 
obtained regarding the average real income earned by coffee 
farmers in three countries of origin which have been studied 
in more detail – Peru, Ethiopia and Colombia – and compared 
with two thresholds: the poverty line and the living income 
threshold. These findings demonstrate that the situation of 
conventional coffee farmers has worsened markedly in Peru 
and Ethiopia over the past 20 years, as they have lost almost 
20 per cent of their income from coffee when corrected for 
local inflation, thereby remaining well below the poverty line 
(except for 2011 when climatic events induced very significant 
losses of coffee production in Latin America, which translated 
into a price spike on world coffee markets, a one- off situation 
that has benefited bigger farms, but not small holders). The 
economic situation of coffee farmers in Colombia seems much 
more sustainable, thanks to the strict and comprehensive public 
regulation of the sector and heavy investments and subsidies 
by the state. However, even in this case, the coffee farmers 
remain globally below the living income threshold (even if 
they lie above the poverty line on average). Beyond these 
considerations regarding raw data and their processing, other 
critical issues concerning quantitative approaches relate to the 
analytical models that use these data.
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Figure 6.2: Evolution of income of coffee growers in Peru, Ethiopia 
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Figure 6.2: Evolution of income of coffee growers in Peru, Ethiopia 
and Colombia, and comparison with the poverty and living 
income thresholds (continued)
The interest of models, but which model?
This is best exemplified by BASIC’s (2020) recent study on 
cocoa value chains published in partnership with FAO and 
EuropeAid. Among the starting points of this study was the 
review of the limits of existing studies on price transmission 
along the cocoa chain, which have mainly analysed this 
phenomenon through econometric models. These models are 
first and foremost based on statistical analyses of price data at 
different stages in the chain, and the definition of mathematical 
relationships between them. In order to function, these 
models require the use of information sources offering a large 
enough array of data to conduct statistical and mathematical 
calculations. In practice, the econometric models of price 
transmission we have identified with regards to cocoa are often 
limited to analysing the dynamics between cocoa farmers and 
the world market price on the commodity exchange. This 
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is apparently due to the lack of data documenting the rest of 
the chain and the difficulty, if not impossibility, of relating 
mathematically the chocolate finished goods with the cocoa 
farmers producing the beans. Beyond economists and the 
academic field, most operational actors often consider these 
models – and the results they provide – as too theoretical.
In this context, BASIC has chosen a different route: the 
elaboration of a value chain systemic model based on qualitative 
rather than statistical analyses. This model has been founded 
on a qualitative understanding of:
• the functioning of end consumer markets, in particular 
the role played by key categories of finished goods which 
structure the consumers’ demand (because of market 
segmentation, brand reputation, market share, labels, etc.);
• the business functioning of operators at each stage of 
the chain (from cocoa farmers to end consumers), in 
particular regarding their internal costs and margins, and 
the potential variations depending on types of operators (for 
instance, small holder or plantation, small- scale or large- 
scale processors);
• the commercial relationships and price negotiation dynamics 
between the different operators along the chain, and the 
potential variations linked to the types of operators; and
• the links between finished goods and the different types 
of operators along the chain, in order to articulate the 
previously detailed results.
Based on these, relevant sources of information have been 
identified in order to feed the model with data. To achieve this, 
the different issues described earlier regarding raw data have 
been taken into account, such as collecting as many sources as 
possible for each data point, cross- checking them to identify 
contradictions, and confronting them with qualitative analyses 
to check their relevance. Connecting data to the model has 
highlighted an additional challenge: as data are most often 
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organised and structured for business purposes, it has required 
an extra level of understanding of their fundamentals in order 
to use them meaningfully, and to build some assumptions to 
compensate for missing information. At the end of the process, 
qualitative interviews have been conducted with operators 
from the whole chain so as to confront the results obtained, 
question the model, amend it and eventually validate it so that 
the end results are sufficiently sound to make sense for them. In 
order to keep the results easy to understand from a non- expert 
view, a didactic tool has been developed. It enables any user to 
navigate the results, entering gradually into details, and offers 
a great level of transparency on every estimate (assumptions, 
sources of raw data, calculations made and their limits), all 
critical elements to build trust in the results.
Going beyond value distribution
The results obtained through this approach provide first 
estimates for the distribution of value, internal costs, taxes paid 
to authorities and net margins along the whole value chain, 
as illustrated in Figure 6.3 for the case of plain dark chocolate 
tablets, from the farmers situated in four origin countries (Côte 
d’Ivoire, Ghana, Cameroon and Ecuador) to end consumers 
in France. These results demonstrate the clear asymmetry of 
value creation that exists along the cocoa/ chocolate chain: on 
average 70 per cent of the total value and 90 per cent of the 
total margins generated from cocoa farmers to end consumers 
accrue to the two last actors in the chain, brands and retailers. 
At the beginning of the chain, cocoa farmers only receive 
on average 11 per cent of the final price, whereas a high 
percentage of them are living under the poverty threshold, as 
the most recent World Bank (2018, 2019) estimates reveal in 
Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana. The model developed shows that 
the three main factors linked to ‘downstream’ actors in the 
chain (retailers and brands) have a very significant impact on 
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• the type of brand (national brand Vs private label);
• the marketing mix (basic, cooking, premium); and
• the products’ performance (best- selling products, as opposed 
to other products).
In contrast, all upstream factors analysed (country of origin, 
percentage of cocoa in the final product, country of first 
processing) have a quite limited impact, if any, on the 
distribution of value and costs from cocoa farmers to end 
consumers. These findings can be largely explained by the fact 
that the majority of value creation in the chain is linked to 
Figure 6.3: Distribution of value, costs and margins of plain dark 
chocolate tablets in 2018 (cocoa harvest 2017/ 18)
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Costs, tax & margin distribution, aggregated
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Taxes -0.02EUR/kg -0.3% Costs -0.42EUR/kg -4.5% 
Costs -0.16EUR/kg -1.7% 
Margin -0.13EUR/kg -1.4% 
Taxes -0.16EUR/kg -1.7% 
Costs -0.38EUR/kg -4.1% 




intangible levers (marketing segmentation, brand reputation) 
which are essentially controlled by brands and retailers, and 
largely prevail over the territory of origin and the work of 
farmers. Indeed, consumers appear to rarely value these 
elements, whereas the percentage of cocoa is seen to matter 
most and defines the quality of chocolate tablets, as a result 
of the successful marketing and advertisement campaigns of 
large brands and retailers. These results illustrate the relevance 
and interest in investigating the distribution of costs, tax and 
margins in addition to the split of value among the actors 
of the chain, as it provides indispensable insights into the 
functioning of value chains and the strategies of business 
and public actors.
Supporting transparency for more informed dialogue and negotiation
As presented in the introduction, the aim of this quantitative 
work performed by BASIC is to better inform the public debate 
via the creation of sets of data and models that can be ultimately 
shared among different actors of a given sector, leaving them 
the room to draw their own analyses and conclusions, but based 
on mutually agreed data. The long- term idea is to support the 
creation of a more in- depth dialogue among public, private 
and civil society organisations, not only on the distribution of 
value, costs and margin along the chain, but more importantly 
on the conditions that would enable everyone in the chain to 
make a living and that the sector as a whole becomes more 
sustainable, in particular regarding the fight against climate 
change and pollution, biodiversity protection, living income/ 
wages, or children’s and workers’ rights.
First discussions in this direction are being initiated by the 
European Commission, the FAO, private actors and civil 
society organisations in the cocoa, coffee and banana sectors. 
The objective of BASIC’s contribution is to continue the 
questioning and developing its approach and methodologies 
described in this chapter by:
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• discussing it with academic researchers and experts of the 
sectors analysed;
• extending the scope of products and countries covered, 
but also the sectors analysed, for example textiles, building 
on the case study of Zara that BASIC has conducted in 
partnership with Public Eye and Collectif Ethique sur 
Etiquette (BASIC, 2019);
• trying to enrich it with the work it has conducted recently 
on the distribution of value and profits within firms of the 
CAC 40,4 and the related corporate governance systems 
(BASIC, 2020); and
• articulating findings on value distribution with the analysis of 
social and environmental impacts, and question the business 
rationale, through the comparison between value created 
and hidden costs offset on society – as undertaken in the 
study of the coffee global value chain (BASIC, 2018).
Notes
 1 The results of this body of research are freely accessible at https:// lebasic.
com/ en/ our- publications/ 
 2 The ecological footprint of our production and consumption models has 
exceeded the regeneration capacities of our planet since the 1970s, and 
the situation continues to deteriorate (United Nations, 2020; WWF, 2020).
 3 In English: Bureau for the Analysis of Social Impacts for Citizen Information.
 4 The top 40 French publicly quoted companies.
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Worker- and small farmer- led 




This chapter draws on the 25 years of experience of a small 
UK- based NGO, Banana Link (BL), which has played a key 
role in facilitating and advocating South- led strategies to raise 
awareness of – and influence solutions to remediate – the 
negative social, economic and environmental impacts of the 
production and trade of the world’s most consumed fresh 
tropical product along the value chains from field to consumer 
(Banana Link, 2020). The approach is proposed as an original 
contribution to North– South civil society relationships and 
action along GVCs.
Starting from a world where those at the beginning of the 






at the consumer end of the chain, independent trade unions 
and small farmers’ organisations in banana exporting countries 
created strategic spaces alongside civil society allies in consumer 
countries that have enabled them not only to understand the 
complex landscape of economic and political stakeholders 
well beyond their immediate fruit company employers, but 
also to transform this understanding into practical advocacy 
and influencing strategies designed to change the behaviour 
of ‘lead firms’.
Who are the ‘lead firms’ in the case of bananas?
The ‘lead firms’ in banana value chains are no longer the iconic 
global brands like Chiquita, Del Monte, Dole or Fyffes – 
creators and perpetrators of the so- called ‘banana republics’ 
in Central and South America in the 20th century. Since 
the 1990s and early 2000s the lead firms referred to here are 
the major retailers that have accumulated bargaining power 
sufficient to set the terms of trade back along the chain from 
farms and plantations. In the 2010s, global retailers, especially 
those based in Northern Europe, have been increasingly using 
that buying power to influence the social and environmental 
conditions of production, packing, transport and ripening. In 
response to pressure from civil society, retailers are now also 
starting to use their direct influence through negotiations with 
suppliers, in a bid to convince consumers of the ‘sustainability’ 
or ‘responsibility’ of their offer.
It was estimated in 2015 that across the EU28 the retail 
companies took on average 40 per cent of the total value 
available along the chain (BASIC, 2015), generating in many 
cases very substantial profit margins on what for most is the 
single biggest selling food product on their shelves. By 2020, the 
top ten grocery retailers sell at least one in every two bananas 
consumed in the EU, the world’s single largest consumer 
market in volume imported and per capita consumption (even 
after UK withdrawal) (Table 7.1).
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A very short history of the process of empowerment of organised 
workers and farmers: consolidating a ‘slave- free triangle’1
Small farmer organisations that had emerged in the four Eastern 
Caribbean island states of Saint Vincent and The Grenadines, 
Saint Lucia, Dominica and Grenada as a result of processes 
of land reform following independence from Britain came 
together to form the Windward Islands Farmers’ Association 
(WINFA) in 1982.2 In the late 1980s some 25,000 farming 
families across the four countries – with less than two hectares 
each on average – exported their fruit to the UK under 
Table 7.1: Top ten European lead firms at the top of banana 
chains, 2020
Lidl/ Kaufland (Schwarz 
group), DE
Retail presence in all 27 EU member states, 
UK and US
Aldi Nord & Süd, DE Retail presence in 14 EU countries, UK, CH, 
US, China and Australia
Carrefour, FR Present in 6 EU member states, and in 24 
other countries on four continents
Tesco, UK Retail presence in UK and 4 EU member 
states, and has sold all Asian operations
Edeka Group, DE Retail presence in Germany (largest food 
retailer) and Denmark
Rewe Group, DE Retail presence in 14 EU member states and 
Ukraine
Metro, DE Mainly wholesale activities in 20 EU member 
states, UK, Morocco, Russia and Asia
E.Leclerc, FR Retail presence (largest food retailer in 
France) in 7 EU member states
Auchan, FR Retail presence in 8 EU member states, 
Russia, Ukraine, Asia and Africa
Intermarché (ITM 
Group), FR
Retail presence in 4 EU member states









preferential trading arrangements with the former colonial 
power, shipped by British company Geest, itself created by 
a 1950 act of Parliament after social unrest in the islands 
provoked by the collapse of world sugar prices threatened to 
disrupt British rule.
In the face of the pending harmonisation of trade regimes 
across the then EU- 12 in 1992, farmers’ leaders asked 
Farmers’ Link – the small East Anglian NGO that spawned 
BL – to provide policy information emanating from London 
and Brussels that would help farmers in the islands design 
strategies to deal with the ‘cold winds of free trade’ threatening 
to do away with the small farmer- based industry that had 
become the backbone of the Windward Island economies 
(Thomson, 1987).
The following year, in 1993, after two years of pioneering 
work by a Costa Rican banana trade union leader to contact 
his peers from Colombia in the South to Guatemala in the 
North (by bus), the Latin American Banana Workers’ Union 
Coordinating Body (COLSIBA) was born in San José, bringing 
the independent plantation- based unions together into a 
common platform, initially from six countries.
COLSIBA brought together organisations from different 
political traditions into one body that drew its initial cohesion 
from the same common concern that had been identified 
by their Eastern Caribbean small farmer colleagues, the 
creation of a single European market for bananas. From a 
plantation worker perspective, the issue was how to deal with 
the downward pressure on labour costs and therefore labour 
rights and working conditions driven by the multinational 
banana companies’ jockeying for position ahead of the highly 
contested EU banana import regime, put in place just weeks 
after COLSIBA was created.
In 1994, at the instigation of Farmers’ Link and the German 
and Swiss not- for- profit alternative banana trading organisations 
Banafair and Gebana, the European Banana Action Network 
(EUROBAN) was founded with NGOs initially from five 
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countries. The network soon grew to include trade unions 
and NGOs from a dozen countries.
From the outset, the network drew on the political agenda 
of WINFA and COLSIBA to design its own agenda around 
two major strategic goals: to build a common South– South– 
North advocacy presence to secure an EU import regime that 
was beneficial for both small farmers and plantation workers; 
and to explore the feasibility of a pan- European fair banana 
trading initiative.
From the outset, the challenge of aligning the potentially 
divergent interests of plantation workers and small farmers 
was key to the strategy of influencing public policymakers, 
multinational fruit brands and, in due course, the emerging lead 
firms. Articulating and amplifying the weakest voices in the chain 
as a single advocacy position, despite the differential impacts of 
private and public policies on each group, was achieved through 
systematic and very regular consultation and joint strategising.
In the mid- 1990s, an intensive series of quarterly meetings 
was organised around Europe, facilitated by Farmers’ Link 
then BL3 in its role as host to the EUROBAN Secretariat. 
COLSIBA, WINFA and Central American civil society 
representatives all participated systematically in these meetings 
(funding permitting), and in the whole process of sharing 
information, organising public campaigning4 and political 
advocacy proposals, feeding into the design of the criteria 
for the new Fairtrade mark, and engaging policy makers at 
national and EU level.
This intensive phase of alliance- building generated a common 
vision for the necessary transformation of the industry around 
the concept of sustainability in its three core dimensions: social, 
environmental and economic (Smith, 2010). The need then 
was to start the process of engagement with the key economic 
players in the global industry by the South– South– North civil 
society alliance of organised small farmers, plantation and 






To avoid our agenda being dominated or even determined 
by more resource- endowed North- based organisations, BL 
had to argue that the voices of our South- based allies should 
always be seen as determinant if we were to present a coherent 
and authentic common position to Northern policy makers 
on the trade policy issues in particular. The strategy was 
explicitly conceived to contrast with the divided governmental 
positions that were in conflict at the new WTO (with the fruit 
multinationals lobbying overtly to defend their interests: the 
US and Latin American governments on the one hand, and 
the Caribbean and African exporting countries on the other). 
Our policy proposals, such as creating an EU import quota for 
fair trade bananas, were designed to benefit both small farmers 
and plantation workers and cut across the geopolitical divide 
that marked the bitter dispute over the EU import regime.
In order to avoid any recuperation of our common 
‘sustainability’ agenda by private or public institutions, the 
triangular South– South– North alliance decided we needed 
to organise engagement ourselves, inviting people to discuss 
our agenda, on our terms.
Moving up a gear: 1998 to 2005
The civil society alliance – now joined by the global trade 
union federation International Union of Agriculture and 
Foodworkers’ (IUF),5 Ecuadorian and Filipino small farmers’ 
organisations and a US labour rights NGO – organised two 
International Banana Conferences on the themes of ‘Towards 
a Sustainable Banana Economy’ in 1998 and ‘Reversing the 
Race to the Bottom’ in 2005, both held in the European capital 
and preceded by a series of regional preparatory seminars. In 
both cases there was a conference organising secretariat in 
the North (staffed by BL) and one in the South (staffed by 
COLSIBA). These major events generated an unprecedented 
level of participation from a wide range of industry players, 
partly because of the media’s consistent interest in the so- called 
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‘banana wars’ at the WTO, partly because the allies invited as 
many key players as possible, with funding for Southern allies 
who could not otherwise have travelled to Brussels.
By the time of the second conference, the South– South– 
North alliance had managed to mobilise a number of food retail 
companies that had emerged as the lead firms in the banana 
economy (and most other sectors of grocery), accounting 
for the lion’s share of profits along the chain. Multinational 
companies like Tesco and Walmart, but also big national retailers 
like J. Sainsbury in the UK, Coop and Migros in Switzerland or 
Coop Italia in Italy that had developed enormous purchasing 
power in relation to their suppliers came to the table, more or 
less willingly. The banana split graphics produced by BL had 
become familiar exhibits in corporate boardrooms, increasingly 
embarrassed by the disproportionately large contribution that 
the margins from sales of one product made to the annual 
profit sheet.6
At this stage, the large- scale retail companies were just 
beginning the process of responding to emerging pressures 
from their own national civil societies over the negative social 
and environmental impacts in the product chains from which 
these ‘gatekeepers’ to consumers sourced what they sold in 
their stores. Without pressure – real and perceived – from 
‘customers’, usually articulated by civil society organisations, 
although rarely consumer organisations per se, the supermarket 
chains would not have started to design strategies to face up to 
the critiques coming at them over the hidden costs of some of 
their key product lines (for instance, imported fresh produce, 
clothing, meat, fish/ seafood, palm oil).
The major multiple retailers, largely supplied at the time by 
major multinational banana brands – Chiquita, Del Monte, 
Dole and Fyffes – had become ‘price setters’ rather than ‘price 
takers’. German discount retailer Aldi had even come to set an 
unofficial EU banana price to which other retailers referred 
in their own buying contracts with the multinational brands 




like Acon in Costa Rica, Reybanpac/ Wong in Ecuador or 
Agroamérica in Guatemala. The ‘Aldi price’ for an imported 
banana box became the weekly reference, but this price was 
under growing downward pressure as competition from other 
retailers – well beyond Europe’s biggest market in Germany – 
came to define the economic behaviour of grocers across the 
EU27 over the following years.
Confronting retailers with challenging messages
Banana Link had begun to seek to influence these retailers 
following its participation in a 1996 campaign led by British 
NGO Christian Aid that focused public attention on the 
violations of basic labour rights in international food supply 
chains. The success of this consumer awareness and action 
campaign had led to the creation in 1998 of the tripartite ETI 
by the major retail brands also targeted by a public campaign 
(Christian Aid, 2007), in collaboration with British and 
international trade unions and the biggest UK development 
NGOs. The ETI garnered the support of the UK’s Department 
for International Development who remained its main funder 
for 20 years.
Engagement by organised labour with this kind of multi- 
stakeholder process since the origins of ETI has broadened the 
vision and strategic visions of unions that have traditionally 
focused on industrial relations between their direct employers 
and their members. A critical mass of leaders have developed 
the skills required to seek transparency, establish dialogue and, 
ultimately, convince lead firms – in this case major retailers – 
to accept their responsibilities as corporate citizens and adapt 
their sourcing strategies.
In 1999, a BL postcard campaign targeting Tesco and Asda/ 
Walmart7 as members of the newly founded ETI focused on 
violations of trade union rights and, for the first time, on the 
environmental and health impacts of excessive agrochemical use 
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information supplied by plantation- based labour unions. BL’s 
key role in response to their request was to remind lead firms 
of their written commitment to the ETI Base Code on Labour 
Standards to ensuring a ‘living wage’ (ETI clause), to facilitate 
the space to open dialogue around a broad range of specific 
issues, and be at the table to advocate workers’ concerns when 
a multi- stakeholder player like ETI facilitated such a space.
In 2003, BL contributed key information gleaned over many 
years from UK importers on the distribution of value along 
the retailers’ supply chains to a seminal study by the NGO 
platform UK Food Group (2003) entitled Food Inc: Corporate 
Concentration from Farm to Consumer. This report laid out for 
the first time in detail the role of globalised supermarket buyers 
in squeezing prices paid to growers and thereby forcing – or 
maintaining – low workers’ wages (labour accounting for 30 
to 60 per cent of banana production costs).
A key moment in the rise of power of the new lead firms was 
the retail price war on bananas in the UK, initiated in 2002 by 
Asda/ Walmart on the back of an exclusive low- price deal with 
Fresh Del Monte. This move signalled the start of one of the 
most significant value- stripping processes in recent commodity 
history: over the following decade, retailers abandoned the 
lucrative margins that had prevailed in Europe’s second biggest 
banana market. The Walmart- inspired move drove a race to 
the bottom in prices to consumers that in turn accelerated a 
race to the bottom in working and contractual conditions for 
plantation workers and pushed investment in the sector to the 
lowest cost and least stringent regulatory environments in the 
producer countries of the Global South.
A permanent multi- stakeholder forum is born
Following the second international conference, the alliance 
decided to move into proactive mode in the absence of any 
space in which the common South– South– North agenda 




a regular basis. We proposed to members of FAO’s Inter- 
Governmental Group on Bananas and Tropical Fruit the 
creation of a permanent multi- stakeholder forum (Second 
International Banana Conference, 2005, 2006). BL organised a 
series of consultations and advocacy events with governments – 
hosted by the UN Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) – on our trade policy proposals, as well as with 
fruit and retail companies at Dutch trade union confederation 
FNV headquarters. Throughout this process, EUROBAN 
continued to provide the strategic space in which the civil 
society alliance met to analyse developments with the different 
industry stakeholders and plan our responses and activities.
Chiquita was the first banana company prepared to publicly 
accompany BL and EUROBAN in promoting the creation of 
a permanent forum on achieving sustainable production and 
trade, later to be joined by Dole following an international 
campaign focusing on labour rights in their plantations (Feral 
et al, 2006). So, when the FAO Trade and Markets Division 
approached BL and our allies to help establish a formal 
preparatory process to launch what became the World Banana 
Forum (WBF), our job of convincing the three leading global 
retailers – then Walmart, Carrefour and Tesco – to participate 
in a series of Preparatory Committee meetings was made 
much easier by the knowledge that the two biggest banana 
brands were supportive. FAO was able to mobilise several 
member governments to join UNCTAD and the ILO on the 
governmental and inter- governmental side of the tripartite 
committee charged with launching the permanent multi- 
stakeholder forum.
Two of the critical differences with other such fora or 
so- called ‘round tables’ set up in the 2000s are first that the 
WBF was co- founded with governments of banana-exporting 
countries that play a role in the ongoing work and second 
that it has, since its creation, ensured that the economic 
dimensions of production and trade – especially the links 
between the distribution of value and decent work on the one 
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hand, and fair prices and margins on the other – are given as 
much transparent attention as the social and environmental 
dimensions of sustainability. Other sectoral initiatives tend to 
exclude any discussion on wages, social benefits, prices, costs 
of sustainable production and externalities.
The banana sector, under the influence of a strong and 
coordinated workers’, farmers’ and critical consumers’ agenda, 
has positioned these issues at the heart of a process designed 
to transform a highly unsustainable industry into one that 
provides decent livelihoods, safe work and healthy products 
with no costs to current and future generations. Despite 
their historically weak voice and bargaining power, organised 
workers and family farmers have used the leverage of the lead 
firms’ biggest food line not only to secure a place at the table, 
but to help set the agenda discussed there.
When the WBF was launched in 2009 in Rome, 
multinational retailers Tesco and Walmart were protagonists 
in the lively debates that included, crucially, these sensitive 
economic issues around wages, prices and the distribution of 
value. The lead firm chairing the session on the distribution 
of value even initiated the debate by suggesting, albeit a touch 
provocatively: ‘why don’t we just agree to set a global minimum 
fair banana price?’
Navigating complexity as a prerequisite for influencing lead firms
A critical part of the mutual learning between the organisations 
at the beginning of the chains and those at the consumer end 
has been the building of critical knowledge and understanding 
of lead firm ‘sourcing’ strategies and the business context in 
which they make decisions affecting the lives of hundreds 
of millions. These strategies are part of the complex web of 
issues that organised workers and family farmers are currently 
seeking to influence, conscious that our messages about an 





The economic power of the lead firms to determine the terms 
of trade and therefore the framework in which negotiations 
back down the chain take place is a social construction at one 
level, rather than a ‘given’ that is too hard to challenge. The 
shifting ground at the beginning of the third decade of the 
21st century is calling many such assumptions into question, 
including those to do with seemingly structural inequalities 
and radical imbalances of power.
The strategic response of big retail to the shifting ground of 
the last two decades is in this sense a fertile source of learning 
as to how organised ‘weak’ voices can start to influence more 
and more directly the strategies of global businesses and the 
values with which they operate. The emergence of legal 
requirements to social and environmental reporting, of binding 
HRDD legislation initiatives actively supported by some big 
retailers, the post- COVID- 19 drive to bring together and 
address concerns over human rights at work and environmental 
sustainability management strands inside management systems 
in some of the lead firms, as well as to source deliberately from 
smaller family farmer organisations, are all significant indicators 
that workers and small farmer voices are being heard more and 
more clearly at senior management level of firms. While the 
emergence – in the framework of increasingly tangible climatic 
deregulation and a global zoonosis- induced pandemic – of a 
questioning of the very modes of production, such as disease- 
prone industrial monoculture in the case of bananas, opens 
the field for even more interesting innovations and value 
system changes.
A timely reminder that a ‘race to the top’ between lead firms 
is a pragmatic utopia worth aiming for comes from Oxfam 
International’s Behind the Barcodes campaign launched in 2018, 
with input from the South– South– North civil society banana 
alliance. Sixteen lead firms are being tracked by the NGO 
and ranked in an annual ‘Supermarket Scorecard’ designed 
to encourage the retailers to ameliorate their impacts in four 
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domains: transparency, labour rights, small farmer sourcing 
and women.
Innovative proposals from the ground up
Small farmers’ organisations that are still involved in the 
global trade, partly thanks to the opportunity provided by 
Fairtrade certification and therefore minimum prices well 
above conventional market prices, are breaking out of the 
monoculture model that even the best voluntary certification 
systems have tended to encourage. They have started exploring 
the possibility to sell directly to the lead firms, through their 
own farmer- controlled exporting companies, while continuing 
to transform livelihoods and diversify their production systems 
agroecologically, financed by the higher prices commanded 
by organic fairly traded bananas. BL is requested to help 
them present the case that fresh and processed produce from 
biodiverse systems could and should become a new selling 
point to increasingly conscious consumers.
Attempts since the early 2000s by trade unions to promote 
‘unionised bananas’ in Northern Europe were frustrated by 
fellow industry players who regarded the short- lived experiment 
in Norway, for example, as the ‘threat of a good example’. 
A few years on, although the idea of a trade union label never 
came to fruition, not least because the proliferation of labels 
and claims had already crowded out the marketplace, there are 
signals from some of the big German or British retailers that 
their firms might be prepared to purchase directly from family 
farmer- controlled exporters. In 2020, the first moves by big 
retail to shift sourcing from non- union workplaces to unionised 
ones are also potentially game- changing. Recent developments 
in the WBF to validate the role of labour unions in negotiating 
living wages for all plantation and packhouse workers is 
another important result of the South- based organisations’ 




and a fairer distribution of value is where consumer awareness 
is driving the lead firms.
Looking ahead, the first conversations between organised 
workers and lead firms about trade unions taking on a direct 
role in the verification of compliance with decent standards 
are starting to take place. Given the importance that lead firms 
have given to arms- length private certification processes, over 
the last two decades, this engagement and the questions it 
raises about the proactive role of workers at the beginning of 
long international production chains are also very significant.
Putting gender equity at the heart of common action to transform 
the sector
Another area of dialogue with the lead firms which is gaining 
ground fast is in the cross- cutting area of gender equity. Over 
25 years of work by Latin American women packhouse workers 
within their own unions, at regional level in COLSIBA, and 
since 2015 within the WBF is shifting the boundaries of 
discussion and now practice by lead firms, both in terms of 
non- discrimination, but also in terms of women’s employment 
and empowerment both within plantation workplaces and in 
the companies along the chain.
Women’s empowerment, at all levels of the industry, started 
with Honduran women working in Chiquita packhouses in the 
mid- 1990s (Frank, 2005). Their journey started by raising their 
own awareness of their rights and how to exercise them, then 
progressed to feminising plantation trade union leadership in 
their own country and across the continent through COLSIBA, 
advocating workplace improvements using a common platform 
of demands developed by women workers across Central and 
South America, sharing collective bargaining practices and 
clauses, challenging the companies that employ them to aim 
for zero sexual harassment and gender- based violence, raising 
the awareness of male colleagues, accepting the challenges of 
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the triple burden when taking leadership positions, often as 
the single head of a household.
In the last few years, this journey has begun to reach the 
eyes, ears and consciences of lead firm managers, often 
women themselves, but not always. Recent developments at 
UK- based Tesco (2020) demonstrate that it is possible for a 
lead firm to produce a serious global gender strategy across all 
agri- food chains supplying the company, based in particular 
on women’s experiences in the banana sector where they are a 
small majority – as low as 7 per cent of the total workforce in 
some countries (Cooper, 2015), and with resources allocated 
for rolling this strategy out. The role of BL and COLSIBA in 
developing this strategy has been directly acknowledged by 
the company.
In 2020, several years of unfruitful dialogue over labour 
and trade union rights with one of the leading global fruit 
brands reached a turning point when the company gave 
senior women managers the mandate to take the dialogue in 
hand and steer conflicts towards resolution. Meanwhile, one 
of its largest customers, a lead firm in retail in the Americas, 
the UK and Asia, is exploring the possibility of women’s 
empowerment training in an environment where hostility from 
the producing companies to any level of cooperation with trade 
unions is notorious, in the hope that this can provide a lever 
for change, for installing good faith dialogue and ultimately 
enshrining improvements through the route of bargaining for 
collective contracts.
Finally, leading producers in Africa and South America are 
now exploring how far they can go to remove obstacles to 
women’s employment, to what extent the evident positive 
socioeconomic development externalities of employing more 
women can be taken into account, especially when it comes to 
many of the field tasks. What do ‘women- friendly’ workplaces 
actually look like and how to invest the necessary resources in 
an environment where prices paid to producers barely cover 
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costs of production, let alone sustainable production based on 
genuinely decent work for women and men? What difference 
does employing more women managers make to the company’s 
economic performance?
When fruit companies start asking such questions and are 
prepared to accept the sometimes uncomfortable answers, 
it is not unreasonable to imagine a world where lead firms 
themselves could even lead a ‘race to the top’, raising the bar 
for all, starting with the most vulnerable and marginalised 
people employed in their hitherto de- humanised supply chains.
Conclusion
If BL were to try to schematise the modes that our team has 
used over the past 25 years to influence lead firms in support of 
a transformative agenda proposed by our workers’ and farmers’ 
organisation partners in the banana producing and exporting 
countries of the Global South, Table 7.2 is offered as a summary 
of how our modus operandi has evolved over time.
In the first years of BL’s life as an organisation the emphasis 
was on gathering and relaying information from sources 
on the ground, usually from the same partners in banana 
exporting territories with which we still work. When 
retailers first engaged with civil society as a result of public 
campaigns highlighting the responsibility they needed to 
accept, it was through the newly appointed ethical trade or 


























WORKER- AND SMALL FARMER-LED STRATEGIES
149
CSR managers of the lead firms recruited to represent them 
in the first phase of dialogue and company responses. As our 
knowledge of the chains increased, along with our capacity 
and credibility for dialogue, wherever possible with a partner 
in the room, so we were able to move to the co- construction 
of the agenda with lead firm managers, including those with 
commercial and technical responsibilities. At the same time, 
and with increasing intensity and scope, especially once the 
WBF and the permanent working groups started to function 
fully, the conversations, actions and reactions have started to 
open up to reflection – and potentially to action – that could 
see global retail’s biggest selling food product pioneering 
transformative pathways of significance well beyond the world 
of perishable fruit.
Notes
 1 Reference to the ‘slave triangle’, a triangular trading system that operated 
from the late 16th century to early 19th century, carrying slaves, cash 
crops, and manufactured goods between West Africa, Caribbean or 
American colonies and within the northern colonies of British North 
America. See for instance: https:// slavetrianglex.weebly.com/ what- is- the- 
slave- triangle.html.
 2 As indicated on the Facebook page of the association, www.facebook.com/ 
WindwardIslandsFarmersAssociation/ 
 3 Registered as a not- for- profit cooperative company limited by guarantee 
in January 1996.
 4 For example, a postcard campaign requesting support from the European 
Commission and EU member state governments for an EU fair trade banana 
quota mobilised 150,000 individual postcards in six countries.
 5 See www.iuf.org for the full name of the organisation and its membership.
 6 One lead firm CEO was even photographed for the media in front of an 
in- store banana display, where he had gone to announce record profits. 
Our own estimates in the early 2000s were that fresh bananas contributed 
up to 2 per cent of all historic profits to UK retailers (who sell tens of 
thousands of lines).
 7 US- based international retailer Walmart bought the UK’s second biggest 
retail chain in 1999. Walmart pulled out of Germany in 2006, leaving the 
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Empowering local communities in their 
struggle for land and rights
Eloïse Maulet
This chapter recounts the organising strategy developed by 
the French- based civil society initiative ReAct through the 
unfolding of a campaign led against the abuses by Socfin and 
Bolloré in and around their rubber and oil palm plantations. 
Land occupied, a lack of living space, rivers polluted, forests 
destroyed, a sacred place and indigenous cemeteries wiped 
out: the oil palm and rubber agro- industrial activities of 
Socfin Group have affected local communities for many 
decades. Yet, most of these issues are still unresolved or have 
not given rise to fair compensation. For almost ten years, 
the association ReAct has supported the local communities’ 
struggle against human rights violations and environmental 
destruction, in order to tackle corporate impunity step by 
step. ReAct’s strategy has involved:
• strengthening grassroots power;






• identifying leverage points and running campaigns at a 
global level.
Local communities organised at a local and global level have 
worked together to achieve important victories in this David 
versus Goliath fight, even if the challenges in the years ahead 
remain significant.
Palm oil and rubber: value unfairly distributed along the  
product chains
Oil palm and rubber monocultures can have significant 
negative impacts on local communities and the environment. 
These adverse effects are sometimes very poorly compensated 
despite the fact that the company generates significant profits. 
The Socfin Group was created in 1909. Specialising in the 
development and management of agro- industrial plantations, 
it operates in ten African and Asian countries where it has 15 
industrial- scale palm and rubber tree plantations. The Group’s 
different subsidiaries run various activities ranging from 
plantation management to marketing and scientific research. 
Its holdings and operating companies in Europe are based in 
Belgium, Switzerland, France and Luxembourg.1 The Group’s 
main shareholder is the Belgian businessman Hubert Fabri with 
a 54 per cent stake2 followed by the Bolloré Group with 39.4 
per cent.3 Socfin’s profits (EBITDA) for 2019 amounted to 
€152 million. Between 2009 and 2018, the Group’s planted area 
increased from 129,658 to 194,000 hectares4 (+49.6 per cent). 
This sharp ten- year growth in areas occupied by monocultures 
has heightened tensions with local communities over land 
issues, and conflicts were exacerbated by a lack of transparency 
regarding plantation boundaries, inefficient retrocessions of 
land, and expansion into wetlands.
The Socfin Group holds 387,939 hectares of concessions for 
its plantations. This affects 42 villages in Cameroon, 13 villages 











villages in Sierra Leone and 81 villages in Liberia: a total of 
nearly 200 villages with thousands of people impacted in these 
five countries alone. The people who formerly occupied this 
land earned their livelihood mainly from growing food crops 
and using natural resources from forests and rivers. As a result, 
they have been deprived of most of their means of survival. 
In some cases, the villagers agreed to give up their land to the 
plantations in exchange for promises of jobs and development 
made some ten years ago by Socfin Group. However, in the 
long run, the infrastructure and jobs that actually materialised 
have failed to make up for the loss of their land. The local 
community representatives denounced these unkept promises, 
especially the obligations contracted under the sales agreement 
with Socfin, namely the continuity of the public service 
mission (education, healthcare, housing), road maintenance, 
and so on. Moreover, according to Socfin’s own figures, 
19,368 of its plantation workers are precarious workers.5 As 
Guillaume Nyobe, a resident of Koungue Somse in Cameroon 
underlines, ‘the only jobs offered to local residents are those 
of casual worker, labourer and tractor driver’.
The establishment of these plantations and their subsequent 
expansion have caused substantial deforestation, thus depleting 
a resource that is crucial for the local and indigenous 
communities, such as the Pygmies in Cameroon or the 
Bunong in Cambodia. In Cameroon, Liberia, Sierra Leone, 
Côte d’Ivoire and Cambodia, hundreds of people had their 
access to drinking water impaired due to the activities of 
Socfin plantations. In Cameroon, for example, at the Mbongo, 
Eseka and Kienké plantations, the lagoons used by the palm 
oil mills to treat their wastewater were clearly dysfunctional 
as the wastewater flowed directly into nearby rivers used by 
residents. This was also the case for wastewater from the 
SoGB rubber factory in Côte d’Ivoire, which emptied into 
a nearby backwater. In the vicinity of the Safacam plantation 
in Cameroon, in the Dizangue district, community members 







sources. In Cambodia, Bunong farmers were concerned about 
growing health problems (stomach ache, in particular) which 
they believed were water- related. In their view, the chemicals 
such as herbicides and fertilisers used on the plantations went 
directly into their water sources. The same is true in Liberia, 
where many inhabitants from villages near the plantations and 
who used the chemically polluted water complained of stomach 
ache and diarrhoea.
In Sierra Leone’s Malen Chiefdom, the impact of the use 
of chemicals, fertilisers, pesticides and herbicides was also 
criticised by local communities. In 2013, chemical pollution of 
the Malen River was confirmed by the national Environment 
Protection Agency in response to a complaint made by the 
communities following reports of large numbers of dead fish. 
In addition to deforestation and water pollution, neighbouring 
local communities were concerned about air pollution from 
particles (SO
2
, Nox, CO) emitted by rubber processing plants 
and palm oil mills. They had no access to comprehensive data 
guaranteeing them that these activities pose no health risk for 
those who breathe the air in the vicinity of the plants. For the 
most part, environmental impact studies are scarce and difficult 
to access. In conflict situations, or in contexts permitting the 
abuse of power, women are particularly vulnerable. Women from 
villages near the plantations in Sierra Leone, Cameroon and 
Liberia have testified to numerous cases of assault and violence, 
whether they work on the plantation or not. Many women who 
have to cross the plantation to reach their own fields or produce 
their own artisanal palm oil are threatened and some have been 
physically harmed. “If you’re unlucky, you only get your salary 
if you let the supervisor do his thing,” explains a woman who 
works as a daily worker on the SRC plantation in Liberia.
In the face of powerlessness and isolation, collective organisation
Given the deprivation of resources, the lack of job opportunities, 




became increasingly aware that they were victims of injustice. 
To cope with the anger triggered by this feeling of injustice 
and to change the status quo, the locals resorted to different 
kinds of actions throughout the conflict. Yet, these often lead 
to two different kinds of impasse.
The impasse created by illusions
One strategy is to call on the benevolence and goodwill of the 
other party in the conflict. It involves appealing to the other 
party’s willingness to sacrifice some of their interests for the 
wellbeing of those impacted by their activities. However, the 
adversary’s economic rationale and administrative constraints 
often make it unresponsive to the language of charity and 
morals. This method is frequently advocated by some 
traditional headmen. It generates a long list of letters and 
meetings with plantation management or with government 
representatives, but these never achieve any tangible outcome 
except vague promises and a token monetary remuneration for 
the meeting attendees. In the district of Kienké, Cameroon, 
the traditional headman showed the 18 letters he had written 
to the plantation’s general manager and the prefect of the 
region requesting meetings. He also showed the letters 
written by the Mabi Headmen’s association, comprising seven 
headmen of villages near the plantation. Most of these letters 
remained unanswered and nothing significant has ever come 
of the few meetings that took place as a result. Moreover, 
such meetings were looked on with distaste by locals, who 
saw them as a sign that the headmen had been bought off by 
Socfin’s subsidiary, Socapalm. When the balance of power is 
so unequal, appealing to the decision makers is tantamount 
to begging, which is unlikely to result in a conflict resolution 





The impasse created by blind anger
Driven by the failure of the first strategy, the exasperation 
and fatigue of the dominated most often find expression in 
sporadic eruptions of violence, for instance in the form of 
riots. This path often results in an impasse due not only to 
the strategic weakness of the blows received, but most of all 
to a lack of awareness of negotiating logic. The absence of a 
reliable representative or spokesperson, the sporadic nature of 
protests and the effectiveness of repressive measures are some 
of the many factors that lead the adversary to not prioritise 
the avenue of negotiation. On almost every plantation, we 
observed regular cases of the population rising up against 
the company: in November 2010 in Kienké, Cameroon, 
Socapalm employees who had come to take measurements 
for the plantation’s extension were attacked by residents with 
machetes; a bulldozer and its driver were shot by arrows in 
Bikondo on the same plantation; a bulldozer was burnt in Bu 
Sra, Cambodia in 2008; in Cameroon, the residents attacked 
Socfin company offices, vandalising and burning company 
houses, after residents had been abused by the security firm, 
Africa Security; in Liberia in 2007, Socfin employees were 
attacked with machetes during the burning of villages for the 
expansion of the Liberian Agricultural Company (LAC).
In most cases, the intervention of law enforcement officials 
eventually brought the situation under control. Sometimes, 
these incidents were followed by a visit from the local 
authorities (with or without the plantation director) to 
listen to the local communities’ grievances and, sometimes, 
the company promised to maintain ‘neighbourly relations’. 
Yet, most often, these initiatives for dialogue in the wake of 
local uprisings quickly petered out once stability had been 
restored. To help find a way out of these impasses, in some 





by Socfin’s activities by introducing methods to help the 
communities self- organise so that they could climb the four 
steps to empowerment:
• Organise collectively
• Express concrete demands
• Take non- violent action
• Negotiate
The four- step staircase tool (Figure 8.1) was developed over the 
process of the Bolloré/ Socfin campaign to offer a third path as a 
method of conflict resolution in an asymmetrical socioeconomic 
conflict. Building on the activists’ ongoing experience and 
diverse analytical sources which inspired our work, it aims 
to compensate for the limits of the impasse situations. The 
impasses hold two key messages: ‘No negotiation without 
power’, and ‘No action without the prospect of negotiation’. 
The tool describes a process enabling a reconciliation of the 
parties’ interests in order to ease conflict. Developed in a specific 
context, the tool can be used in all conflict situations in which 
a dominant, homogeneous actor opposes a disorganised group 
of people whose interests are being trampled. The staircase 
concept relies on two main theoretical foundations: the theory 
of negotiation and the sociology of collective action. Under 
what circumstances could negotiation lead to a fair compromise 
in a situation of asymmetrical power?
The feeling of injustice as a cement for the foundations of the process
The first element of conflict, in its most basic form, that this 
process seeks to transform is individual anger. This is sometimes 
described as a feeling of frustration or deprivation born from 
the perceived gap between the good which people feel entitled 
to – value expectations – and the good which they think they 
can obtain – value capabilities (Gurr, 1970). This anger can 





considers oneself a victim (Gamson et al, 1982). The term 
‘anger’ is used to translate these sociological concepts into 
simple language. It involves recognising that anger is a positive 
emotion and that we are right to be angry in unjust situations. 
In the case studied, the feeling of injustice and the anger of 
local communities affected by Socfin’s activities came from:
• non- compliance with standards and commitments: sometimes 
contractual/ written promises had raised expectations 
regarding compensation, jobs, or social infrastructure for 
instance, but had not been fulfilled;
• the communities’ realisation that treatment was unequal: for 
example, the situation in some areas of Cameroon worsened 
when the plantations were privatised or cultivated areas were 
expanded. This made people aware of the gap between 
‘before’ and ‘now’. They were also able to compare the 
situation in other plantations either run by other companies 
or located in other countries, which highlighted a gap 
between ‘elsewhere’ and ‘here’.
Figure 8.1: The four- step staircase




Given this ‘shared anger’, the first step in the staircase is to 
work on collective organisation.
The path to collective organisation
This first step draws on classical theories of collective action, 
particularly those of Anthony Oberschall (1973), who sets 
out the necessary conditions for progressing to action. The 
minimum conditions for collective organisation are shared 
objectives and the identification of those responsible for 
the injustices perpetrated. However, these basic conditions 
will only lead to weak forms of protest. To establish robust 
collective action that can be repeated, Oberschall identifies 
two structural factors: an organisational base and a continuity 
of the established movement. For each of these two factors, 
Oberschall highlights the need to use existing resources, such 
as villages, families and communities. Traditional community 
solidarity is an important resource for structuring strong 
collective organisations that produce recognised leaders and 
goals. For Oberschall, weak organisational capacity is the main 
cause of short- lived, violent and ill- thought- out revolts, such 
as the peasant revolts described by historian George Rudé, 
which occurred in France before the 1789 Revolution, or 
even the contemporary urban riots in the American ghettos 
and French suburbs.
In early 2010, thanks to different online platforms and websites 
actively monitoring corporate-generated social conflicts and 
abuses by multinational companies, the founding members of 
ReAct identified conflicts between Socfin and the communities 
living on Socfin plantations in Cameroon through several research 
projects and testimonies. For example, Bolloré Group, one of 
the Group’s shareholders, was suing Radio France Inter reporter 
Benoit Collombat for defamation on account of his report 
‘Cameroon, the Black Empire of Vincent Bolloré’. During the 
trial, David N., a resident in one of the affected villages in the 








came to testify on behalf of the journalist. Brandishing a storm 
lamp, he tried to describe the difficult conditions in which the 
local communities were still living, without electricity, while at 
the same time the company’s power supply line was just nearby. 
This event led to initial contacts between ReAct members and 
the people directly concerned, first, in several villages bordering 
the Socapalm Kienké plantation in the south of the country, 
then around the Dimbombari plantation, west of Douala. From 
village to village, the same anger was expressed, the same issues 
described and listed.
ReAct then engaged with the local communities in their 
struggle to defend their rights. ReAct’s goal was to help the 
people impacted by this multinational find a way out of the 
impasses, starting with first step of the four- step staircase 
tool. The association supported the collective organisation of 
these villages, first, by helping to link up people from affected 
villages located around a given plantation. For example, the 
Kienké plantation in Cameroon is surrounded by 11 villages, 
the SoGB plantation in Côte d’Ivoire by 13 villages that claim 
to have been displaced, and the LAC in Liberia by more than 
20 villages. Next, linkages were established between different 
plantations within the same country – Sofcin owns seven oil 
palm and rubber plantations in Cameroon, two in Liberia – 
and, finally, between plantations in different countries – Socfin 
is present in ten countries in Africa and Asia.
An initial information- sharing effort helped to better identify 
the shared feelings of anger and injustice uniting the villages. 
The first meetings were organised between village leaders of 
the Dimbobari and Kienké plantations in Cameroon, where 
the people present were able to tell their stories and identify 
shared interests. Later on, the residents of villages in Cameroon, 
Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia shared photos and videos, as well as 
documents such as letters sent, local agreements, or newspaper 
articles. Information on the Socfin and Bolloré Groups in 
the form of activity reports, key figures or press releases was 









Gradually, the different elements of collective organisation 
were set up and strengthened in the different countries – first 
in Cameroon, then in Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, Cambodia 
and Sierra Leone. Local communities around some of the 
plantations were already trying to organise themselves into 
associations, despite local repressive actions. This was the case 
in Sierra Leone with the Malen Affected Land Owners and 
Land Users Association (MALOA). ReAct was thus able to 
support the collective dynamic by deploying methodological 
tools. Elsewhere, organisations were built from scratch by 
bringing together the first leaders and forming a collective, as 
in Cameroon with the Dynari association – later to become 
Synaparcam. In some regions, those directly concerned were 
trying to organise collectively but faced challenges from 
non- democratic and non- representative organisations that 
were sometimes backed by the company to ensure that any 
opposition was not too disruptive. In these circumstances, 
setting up new democratic membership organisations often 
proved more difficult than in cases where there was no pre- 
existing organisation. The company’s local managers, at times 
supported by the local authorities, were applying the ‘divide 
and rule’ strategy by delegitimising the actors involved, slowing 
down administrative procedures, or repressing and arresting 
key community leaders.
During the second step – after the first step of networking 
and organising collectively – the local communities worked 
on formulating their demands, mainly during their local 
assemblies. Village by village, they identified the problems 
caused by the Socfin plantation’s operations – problems that 
had persisted or were even worsening. To produce concrete 
demands, they mainly drew on the oral or written promises 
that had been made by the company in the past. For example, 
in Liberia, senior management at the LAC plantation had 
signed an agreement in 2007 with the local community 
delegates and government representatives, listing the company’s 




educational and health facilities and so on. In Cameroon, a sales 
agreement framing the privatisation of the Socapalm plantation 
in 2000 defined the purchaser’s obligations notably with respect 
to the continuation of the public service mission in the fields 
of health, education or housing. On the basis of clearly listed 
problems linked to the activities of the Socfin plantations, 
they drew up their demands together with proposed solutions. 
Thereafter, the communities arranged the demands in order 
of priority so as to build a campaign strategy. As will be seen 
later, thanks to the collective organisation, the demands were 
structured on a local scale, first for the villages, then shared 
more widely to scale up from the local to global level.
Developing a repertoire of actions
The third step in the staircase model is inspired by the 
sociology of social movements and derived from the ‘social- 
movement repertoire’ developed by Charles Tilly. In fact, this 
step requires that the actors use the organisational foundations 
put in place to develop a repertoire of possible actions. It 
involves drawing on knowledge of the field, mobilising 
symbols that resonate with people’s lives and incentivise 
their mobilisation, and possibly promoting visibility to the 
outside world via the media. Although this notion of a 
social- movement repertoire is different from that used by 
Tilly, who attempted to trace it over the long- term history 
of European social movements, or from the work of Gene 
Sharp, who researched and catalogued 198 methods of non- 
violent action (Sharp, 1973), it allowed us to put together 
a toolbox of actions that could be used as leverage during 
negotiations. The diversity and variable impacts of actions 
from the repertoire will strengthen the position of the people 
involved in negotiations by multiplying the possible BATNAs 
(Best Alternative To Negotiated Agreement) at each stage. 
It is important to identify the actions that can be mobilised 




Those affected need to develop their capacity to act in order 
to limit the concentrations of power that can lead to violations 
of human and environmental rights. Non- violent direct action 
is thus at the centre of the approach. Non- violent direct 
action is action by people, for themselves, against those whose 
interests oppose their emancipation. It places the individual 
in a position of being active. ‘It is a remedy against the feeling 
of powerlessness. It teaches self- confidence. To act oneself!’ 
(Pouget, 2008 [1904]: 2) It is also valuable as a form of civic 
and political education. Direct action is the power of those who 
have nothing but their capacity to act. Direct action makes it 
possible to avoid the first impasse created by illusions, while 
non- violence enables the second impasse to be avoided and 
helps to open up a negotiating and conflict resolution process.
We are not alone: building a transnational alliance
The local communities affected, with support from ReAct, 
ensured coordination between different countries – initially, 
to share information and compare situations, then to join 
forces and build common demands and, finally, to carry out 
synchronised collective actions. On 5 June 2013, the local 
organisations of the communities neighbouring the Socfin 
and Bolloré Group plantations in five countries (Liberia, 
Sierra Leone, Cameroon, Cambodia and Côte d’Ivoire), 
expressed their common demands in a letter addressed to the 
Bolloré Group CEO. To deliver it to Vincent Bolloré, they 
decided to organise a global day of action on the day that the 
Group’s annual shareholder meeting was to be held in Paris. 
The communities all took action simultaneously in each of 
their countries. In Sierra Leone, several hundred villagers 
occupied the land of the SAC plantation. In Côte d’Ivoire, 
a peaceful march of residents was blocked by police forces 
as they approached the main factory and the administrative 
offices to deliver their message to the management of the 








and traditional leaders walked to the Socapalm plantation 
headquarters in their traditional mourning dress to symbolise 
the loss they were suffering. In Paris, people from Cameroon, 
Côte d’Ivoire and other affected countries occupied the 
Bolloré Group’s headquarters. They carried watering cans, 
hand shovels and rakes, and set about tending the lawn outside 
the headquarters. “We don’t have any more land in our 
country, so we have to plant cassava in your yard!” exclaimed 
a man from a village in Cameroon who was directly affected 
by the plantation’s activities. This first synchronised action 
embodied the creation of the Transnational Alliance of Local 
Communities Affected by Socfin Bolloré Plantations, and was 
the final scale- up from local to international level.
In response to ongoing pressure from the Alliance’s members, 
Bolloré agreed to meet with representatives from the villagers’ 
organisations. The first transnational negotiation took place in 
Paris on 24 October 2014. The Bolloré Group agreed to an 
independent land assessment that would shed light on the land 
conflicts, and to a meeting the following year in order to track 
the progress made. It was also specifically agreed that Socfin 
representatives would attend the follow- up meeting as they 
had ignored the Alliance’s request that they appear at the first 
meeting. However, the negotiation timeline was not respected 
as Bolloré did not involve Socfin in the dialogue and Socfin 
continued to refuse to take part. This first encouraging opening 
of the dialogue thus came to a halt. Thereafter, the Socfin and 
Bolloré Groups handed over negotiating responsibility to local 
management and attempted to publicise the few positive steps 
taken. However, these were far from meeting the demands of 
local residents affected by their operations.
Relocating the fight
Faced with the refusal of decision makers to negotiate at 
the international level, the communities were compelled 











actions between April and June 2015: peaceful protests in 
the plantations of Djbombari and Mbongo in Cameroon, a 
march to the LAC plantation management offices in Liberia, 
a sit- in in Cambodia, and a large people’s assembly in Côte 
d’Ivoire. These actions led to renewed local negotiations 
in Cameroon, Liberia, and Cambodia. Tripartite platforms 
were set up for negotiations to take place in Cameroon 
and Cambodia between the company, the local authorities 
and the communities. The same year, several transnational 
solidarity actions were organised to protest against the arrest 
of organisation leaders in Liberia and Sierra Leone, which 
resulted in their release. However, the charges against some 
leaders were maintained as a pressure and other criminal 
lawsuits were later filed by Socfin in Sierra Leone.
Strengthening grassroots power: community organisation in 
remote areas
Given the stance of the Socfin and Bolloré Groups, which 
both refused to manage the conflict at international level, 
the local dimension had to be strengthened. To facilitate 
the mobilisations in the different countries and different 
plantations, the local organisations were compelled to organise 
and structure themselves more effectively.
After the first phase of supporting collective organisation by 
linking up those directly affected had successfully led to the 
creation of the Transnational Alliance of Local Communities 
Affected by Socfin Bolloré Plantations, ReAct then focused 
on helping to strengthen several local organisations. Given 
the lengthy struggle for their rights and the multinational’s 
power, the local communities were obliged to organise 
themselves more sustainably and develop a long- term strategy. 
Drawing on community- organising methods developed 
by Saul Alinsky (1971) and on the model designed by the 
Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now 







and skills required for effective local community organisation. 
This enabled ReAct to provide more robust support to local 
organisations, particularly in Cameroon and Liberia. Alinsky 
(1971) adapted the tactics for trade union organisation, action 
and negotiation in a factory environment to apply them 
to defending citizens’ rights. Moreover, he formalised the 
organisational function by making the mission of recruitment 
and organisation- building into a real profession. The ACORN 
community- organising model defines in detail the role of an 
organiser and sets out the different steps for constructing a 
community organisation: ‘the organising drive’. Strategic and 
tactical elements are also described in detail to enable members 
of an organisation to conduct campaigns. ReAct’s community 
organisers thus provided support for organising the residents 
of the villages surrounding the plantations. According to this 
approach, there are five ingredients for effective organisation:
• A group of people who coordinate themselves: a vast number of 
people became members of the supported organisation, 
thanks to recruitment efforts by the organisers, particularly 
in Liberia and Cameroon.
• A collective identity: this was built on a shared feeling of 
injustice, with each organisation having a name specific to 
each country, and sometimes to each plantation.
• Clearly defined objectives and methods: collective demands were 
defined by each village assembly, then at the level of each 
plantation, each country and finally at the international 
scale; very quickly, collective actions became pivotal to the 
strategy and methods implemented by the organisations, 
including at a very local level.
• Collective rules: as leaders became empowered and the 
organisations became structured, collective and democratic 
ways of working were defined, which sustained the elected 
leaders’ representativeness, accountability and collectively 
supported decision making. The tasks and responsibilities 
were shared out and roles defined. Group facilitation tools 
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taken from popular education methods helped to facilitate 
the members’ participation and emancipation.
• Resources: each member paid dues to ensure the organisation’s 
autonomy and means of action.
This community- organising model is also based on an 
incremental strategy that first targets small victories to 
strengthen the members’ involvement and vision. Some local 
organisations were thus able to identify initial achievable 
victories (have an out- of- order borehole repaired by the 
company, develop a market place, or maintain the village’s 
access routes), which helped to keep the residents involved 
over time, without discouragement, while at the same time 
seeking to gradually obtain more rights.
Concrete progress that shows it is possible
Increasing efforts enabled the local communities to win 
substantial victories. These included compensation totalling 
US$54,800 to 133 peasant families for crops destroyed by 
the LAC, the construction and repair of boreholes in some 
ten villages, the delivery of drinking water cisterns when the 
river used by Lendi village was polluted, the setting- up of a 
health centre, the extension of the power line in Mbambou 
and Dikola in Cameroon, recognition of the 142 hectares of 
sacred forest and community land in Cambodia along with a 
financial contribution for the ceremonies to appease the spirits, 
the integration of village children into plantation schools and 
the launch of the construction of a new school in Liberia.
These and other victories showed that the balance of power 
was gradually changing. In addition to the admittedly fragile 
dialogues set up, the media coverage of land grabbing by the 
Socfin and Bolloré Groups was an important victory for the 
local communities mobilised. Certainly, although the situation 
was still little known to the general public until a few years 





multiplied since 2015, which has gradually given visibility to 
the land conflicts and the multinational’s abuses. In 2015, the 
World Bank’s International Financial Corporation cancelled 
a loan under study for the Socfin Group apparently due to 
the existing and now visible conflicts. In December 2016, 
Socfin made a series of unilateral commitments under its CSR 
policy and, in early 2017, produced an action plan with a road 
map and complaints management process. To help set up its 
action plan, the Group hired The Forest Trust organisation 
(now EarthWorm). The verdicts of the libel lawsuits brought 
against the journalists and NGOs that published material on 
the subject reinforced the legitimacy of the struggle, and the 
Bolloré Group was even condemned several times in early 
2019 for malicious prosecutions.
While Socfin’s commitments are highly inadequate and the 
unilateral process unsatisfactory, the Transnational Alliance of 
Local Communities Affected by Socfin Bolloré Plantations 
has managed to gradually shift what once appeared to be 
immovable fronts, with support from a coalition of NGOs 
(Fian Belgium, Bread for All, Confédération Paysanne – Via 
Campesina France, GRAIN, ReAct, aGter, World Rainforest 
Movement, SOS Faim, Sherpa, and others). The building of a 
coalition of allies is another tool to strengthen the campaigns 
and makes it possible to pool a variety of skills and expertise 
in the form of surveys, media contacts, legal knowledge, 
capacity building and so on. The challenges of rebalancing 
power relations among the different actors in the value chains 
were huge. Strengths and skills have to be combined. As a 
Cameroonian proverb says, ‘a single hand cannot fasten a 
bundle of wood’.
Increasing leverage to exert pressure
To reinforce the Transnational Alliance of villages defending 
their rights, the coalition of allies is now trying to activate 







particularly in Europe where the Socfin and Bolloré Groups are 
headquartered. Some of the avenues to be followed or further 
explored in order to rebalance the power relations among the 
different actors in this production chain and ensure a fairer 
value distribution throughout the chain include informing and 
calling for action from customers of the plantations’ output, 
such as Michelin for rubber or Nestlé for palm oil, and from 
financiers like the ING bank. ReAct is keeping watch on the 
implementation the 2017 French law on the duty of care of 
parent companies and subcontractors, and investigating the 
financial arrangements and the Group’s governance.
Conclusion
This experience thus gives hope that change is possible and 
will lead to an economy enabling workers, farmers and local 
communities to access the social, economic and environmental 
resources required for a decent standard of living. Although 
the progress made is minimal when compared to the violation 
of rights and environmental degradation experienced by these 
communities, this ongoing process can continue on its path 
and be further developed. Moreover, these experiences and the 
mistakes that may have been made have allowed a replicable 
model to be defined more precisely. One of the key lessons 
learnt is the importance of having robust, well- structured and 
democratic collective organisations. If campaigns are to succeed 
on a global scale, the local level must be extremely robust – 
effective coordination is impossible without well- structured 
local forces. The ‘community- organising’ tools developed 
within the different models bring a rigorous methodology to 
take this dimension further.
As a result of this experience, it seems crucial to develop the 
organisers’ network worldwide in order to give professional 
support to mobilising citizens and workers so that value of 
production chains can be more fairly distributed. Experiences 






of issues have grown in number and strengthened this model, 
while greater resources will bring about the scale change 
needed to shift the global economy towards one based on the 
principles of solidarity and justice in the struggle against the 
impunity of multinationals.
Notes
 1 www.socfin.com/ sites/ default/ files/ 2020- 04/ 2019%2012%2031%20
Organigramme%20Socfin_ 0.pdf
 2 www.socfin.com/ en/ investors/ socfin
 3 Registration Document 2018, Bolloré, www.bollore.com/ bollo- content/ 
uploads/ 2019/ 05/ bollore_ ddr_ 2018_ gb_ mel.pdf
 4 2018 Sustainability Report, Socfin, www.socfin.com/ dashboard/ download/ 
socfin- sustainability- report- 2018/ 
 5 2018 Sustainability Report, Socfin, www.socfin.com/ dashboard/ download/ 
socfin- sustainability- report- 2018/ 
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Conclusion: Pondering the future 
of global value chains
Florence Palpacuer and Alistair Smith
As the final touches are being put to this book, entire 
populations are submitted to compulsory confinement and 
curfew, a situation not experienced in many countries since 
the Second World War. The centralisation of governmental 
decisions is reaching new thresholds, together with the 
rarefaction of public spaces where pluralist views may be 
formed and expressed on our social, economic and political 
futures. Are we entering the ‘new normal’ of a digital age fed 
by GVCs and enforced through state repression? How can 
value chains be reshaped by social and political forces for a 
more sustainable ‘world after’?
The research and activist perspectives collected in this book 
date from the ‘world before’, but they contain signals and 
analytical insights which can usefully inform such questions. 
Indeed, the rise of state authoritarianism and the mechanics of 
inequalities that GVCs have engendered or continue to build 
upon are becoming increasingly visible, while sustainability 
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discourses are increasingly captured by lead players. While 
the citadels of political, financial and economic power which 
govern the GVCs may seem impregnable, a mosaic of bottom- 
up initiatives are stirring empowerment and emancipation, 
holding potential to reshape the social, economic and political 
forms of value chains.
Much has been said on the disruptions that the COVID- 19 
crisis would induce in our ways of operating in – and thinking 
about – the world economy. Some argue that the crisis is 
leading to greater awareness of the unsustainability of global 
growth, and that there is now an urgent need to revitalise local 
economies so as to meet the basic needs of their population in 
more reliable ways. A preceding wave of ideas had predicted 
massive changes based on the potential offered by so- called 
4.0 (‘fourth generation’) technologies to provoke a relocation 
of manufacturing to the Global North. The two perspectives 
have at times been combined in ongoing speculation about the 
future of GVCs (see for instance, Fortunato, 2020).
As pointed out by several observers, however, to ‘relocalise’ – 
or ‘reterritorialise’ – value chains would involve sacrificing 
some substantial benefits derived from global scale economies 
and efficiencies (Miroudot, 2020), with unavoidable impacts 
on the capacity of dominant players to maintain above 
average returns on invested capital and, as such, to deliver 
the shareholder value that sustains their tight relationship to 
financial markets (Froud et al, 2006).
What is at stake therefore is nothing less than the core 
features of the business model developed by global lead firms 
and their large transnational suppliers, not to mention the 
intricate interdependencies that GVCs have established across 
countries, as analysed for instance by Gereffi (2020) in the case 
of medical supplies (also see Pananond et al, 2020).
GVCs have built up economic power of unprecedented reach 
on a global scale, operating through complex and diffuse layers 
of intermediaries that make both voluntary transformation and 
political regulation extremely difficult, all the more so when 
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political powers are themselves tightly linked to the global 
hegemony, as emphasised by Martin Hess in the first chapter 
of this volume. To acknowledge the rise of state violence 
and authoritarianism in contemporary capitalism runs against 
some of our deepest premises in thinking about the global 
market economy, where democracy and emancipation have 
long been seen as concomitant with the economic opening 
of a growing number of countries throughout the world. Yet 
in the age of GVCs, as the social and ecological tensions that 
such an economic model generates continue to build up, 
coercion is increasingly used as a last- resort mechanism to 
ensure operational continuity, and calls for a re- assessment of 
the state’s role in shaping society and the economy.
The multiplicity of ways in which the financial sphere 
is imbricated into these global productive formations and 
extracts the wealth they generate is only beginning to be 
uncovered, as Liam Campling and Clair Quentin do in their 
chapter on Global inequality chains. The speed, complexity, 
and opacity afforded by legal and technological advances in 
financial transactions have generated immaterial networks at a 
transnational scale, captured in the concept of the global wealth 
chain (Seabrooke and Wigan, 2014, 2017). These transactions 
have remained largely off the radars of GVC analysis despite the 
fact that these networks are an integral part of the value capture 
organised throughout global production systems. Hence, by 
making these patterns visible and understandable, the work of 
Campling and Quentin calls for reassessing the very nature of 
productive activities, the type of ‘value’ that workers generate 
through their contribution to GVCs, and how such value 
should be acknowledged, allocated and redistributed.
The dynamic nature of GVCs and the various ways in 
which they may be shaped and regulated in favour of greater 
sustainability are highlighted by Stefano Ponte, echoing 
the reflections of Martin Hess on the diversity of state roles 
in GVCs. The intricacies of economic and political forms 
of power in GVC formations, together with their state of 
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continuous evolution, often lead to unexpected outcomes in 
the self- sustaining dynamics of global production, whereby 
sustainability initiatives are being ‘reabsorbed’ to fuel economic 
growth in ways that remain favourable to established powers. 
In the light of such characteristics, Ponte calls for new modes 
of ‘orchestrating’ GVCs that require a fine-tuned assessment 
of their power dynamics and a combination of diverse modes 
of regulatory intervention.
Taken together, and seen from a Gramscian perspective 
already deployed by Martin Hess in his  chapter – albeit to 
discuss Gramsci’s (1980) notion of the ‘integral state’ – these 
three chapters shed light on the ‘historical bloc’ formed of 
economic, political and ideological powers by which the 
hegemony of GVCs has been established and is being sustained, 
hence underscoring the challenges involved in developing 
counter- hegemonic initiatives that aim to reshape the forms 
of organisation of the global economy and their social/ 
environmental outcomes.
A Gramscian prism also serves to highlight the unstable and 
incomplete nature of the hegemony, however, which always 
leaves spaces open for alternative approaches to form and grow, 
in an evolving struggle between competing ways of organising, 
regulating and thinking about the economy. Levy and Egan 
(2003) have acknowledged elsewhere the ‘cascading effect’ 
by which counter- hegemonic forces may induce broader 
social and political transformation: ‘small perturbations can 
often be absorbed and accommodated with little impact on 
the overall structure. Periods of relative stability, however, 
are punctuated by discontinuity and change, as fissures split 
open and cascading reactions lead to major system- wide 
reconfiguration’ (2003: 811).
In their contribution to this volume, Louise Curran and 
Jappe Eckhardt take stock of such moving, unstable features 
in the regulation of international trade to highlight a number 
of political opportunities that civil society groups might 
seize at the European level of trade policy, as the dominant 
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economic rationale is being increasingly curbed by the need 
to consider social and political issues related to sustainability. 
Their informed discussion of the political opportunities 
offered by bilateral FTAs demonstrates the prominent role 
of civil society in shaping the normative foundations of the 
state regulatory apparatus, and the ongoing struggle between 
established interests on the one hand and more marginalised 
interests which could tip the Gramscian ‘relations of force’ in 
favour of more sustainable arrangements on the other.
Such a demonstration is extended in the first practitioner- 
authored chapter by Marilyn Croser who tackles the question 
of governmental regulation from the perspective of the UK- 
based activist coalition CORE. The coalition was among the 
first GVC- based civil society movements to voice the need 
for binding governmental regulation in the face of the lack of 
transformative capacity of voluntary firm- led ‘corporate social 
responsibility’ initiatives. From the Companies Act 2006 to the 
Modern Slavery Act 2015 and more recent legislative initiatives 
in France, Switzerland and the UK, her chapter uncovers the 
longstanding battles by which civil society promotes new laws, 
sees its demands circumvented in governmental responses, 
and adjusts its collective strategies to progressively scale up 
the regulatory framework from the national to the European 
level, in defence of enabling rights for vulnerable or deprived 
stakeholders in GVCs.
Christophe Alliot’s description of BASIC’s approach 
to objectivising societal costs reveals another of the key 
transformative strategies to rebalance asymmetries of power 
and therefore of negotiating capability in global economic 
chains: the internalisation of ‘externalised’ social and 
environmental costs. A deeper understanding of real- world 
data – and the context and choices made by those who produce 
and publish these data – enables this cooperative think- tank to 
arm citizens and consumers with a powerful tool to articulate, 
and indeed accelerate, societal demands for better distribution 
of gains within GVCs. In turn, the dialogues and negotiations, 
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both societal and commercial, that the approach is designed to 
encourage and support are posited as the means through which 
processes of redistributing value more equitably between the 
asymmetrically positioned economic stakeholders along chains 
can take place, be they either transnationalised tropical product 
GVCs (cocoa/ chocolate or coffee) or more local/ territorial 
and regional value chains (such as dairy products in France, or 
staple food crops within West Africa).
Beyond the discussions generated directly by this chapter lie 
other related processes towards societal cost internalisation that 
are gaining considerable momentum, such as the movement for 
living wages and incomes for those employed at the beginning 
of GVCs. Albeit primarily North- driven at its origin, this 
movement is gearing up and coordinating its advocacy 
strategies, targeting – and promoting engagement with – lead 
firms and large- scale intermediaries that produce profit margins 
sufficient to share back down supply chains with those actors 
in fields, factories, mines or call centres whose voices have not 
been heard until the past two or three decades.
The pricing strategies and the precise mechanisms for 
achieving a more equitable distribution of value along the 
chains, using the concept of societal cost internalisation, are 
still in the process of discussion and definition, but Alistair 
Smith’s description of nearly three decades of work in the 
fresh banana industry sheds light on some of the ingredients 
that such industry- specific strategies require, arguably as a sine 
qua non for their success. Smith’s chapter shows how, despite 
their historically weak voice and bargaining power, organised 
workers in industrial- scale plantations and packhouses in 
Central and South America and Africa, in alliance with 
organised small- scale family farmers from the Philippines to 
the Caribbean to South America, have used the leverage of 
the lead firms’ biggest selling food line not only to secure a 
place at the table, but to help set the agenda discussed there.
Critically, such an agenda covers the whole range 
of ‘sustainability’ topics discussed in the permanent 
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multi- stakeholder WBF: social, economic and environmental. 
Separating these dimensions of sustainability into distinct 
‘boxes’, with parallel and at times disconnected processes 
of debate, advocacy and collaborative action, as can be 
observed in many multi- stakeholder processes, is not only 
intellectually problematic, but appears highly unlikely to lead 
to transformative results for workers and producers, even less 
so if these crucial wealth generators are unorganised, unaware 
of the dynamics and the players downstream in the rest of the 
chain to consumers, and unprepared for direct engagements 
with lead firms over alternative emancipatory strategies.
Such a ‘bottom- up’ organising approach is adopted and 
emphasised by the activist initiative ReAct in support of the 
communities affected by various GVC- linked agro- industrial 
operations in Africa. The chapter by Eloïse Maulet describes 
the prerequisites for community organising and illustrates the 
concrete unfolding of the empowerment strategies that this 
French- based civil society group has developed. Their work 
draws inspiration from various forms of community organising 
initially adopted and conceptualised in a Northern context 
by radicals such as Saul Alinsky in the US or Emile Pouget 
in France.
Although gains may often be modest, and slow to have been 
obtained – and sometimes at high cost – for the mobilised 
stakeholders in these counter- hegemonic struggles, the diverse 
approaches highlighted in this book are paving the way for 
more radical changes that the succession of social, financial 
and ecological crises already experienced and still foreseeable 
will most undoubtedly trigger in coming years.
While the capacity for voluntary self- transformation 
of GVCs’ ‘historical bloc’ is inevitably hampered by the 
intricacies of vested interests and the unprecedented scale at 
which they have been deployed in the world economy, as 
most clearly demonstrated in the first part of this volume, 
the second part of the book highlighted several facets of the 
transformative potential of civil society which may prove to 
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become increasingly pervasive throughout the political and 
economic spheres, in a future which may come quicker than 
we are trained to envision.
The book itself can actually be seen as an outcome of one 
such ‘fissure’ in the global neoliberal hegemony insofar as it 
mobilised academic and activist resources in an emancipatory 
initiative vis- à- vis the processes of ‘corporatisation’ at work in 
both academic and NGO spheres. To divert academic time 
from delivering financially- rewarded, standardised academic 
production that productivity constraints have rendered 
increasingly incompatible with the generation of genuine 
knowledge is indeed a form of academic resistance. The 
emerging criteria for ‘university social responsibility’ that 
seek to account for the societal usefulness and outreach of 
academic work are only weakly rewarded in an environment 
of continuous assessment and competitive pressures to which 
academic institutions are now being submitted (Slaughter and 
Leslie, 1997; Engwall, 2008; Butler et al, 2017).
Likewise, pressures to build up economies of scale, raise 
funding and deliver accountability are increasingly pushing the 
most prominent civil society organisations to mimic the GVC 
lead firms’ management systems and rationales (Alexander and 
Weiner, 1998; Dauvergne and LeBaron, 2014), while concerns 
have been voiced regarding the North- driven agenda of 
GVC- based activism (Palpacuer, 2019). In a counter- current 
to such trends, examples are provided in this book of activist 
initiatives that sustain counter- hegemonic capacity through 
‘bottom- up’ GVC- based strategies to empower workers and 
small producers by promoting enabling rights, emancipatory 
analytics, and organising and bargaining capacities in favour 
of these previously invisible yet prominent contributors to 
economic ‘value’ and activity.
In developing this publication, we followed the lead of earlier 
initiatives (Appelbaum and Robinson, 2005; Hale and Wills, 
2005) to combine academic and activist voices in a hybrid space 




as to foster the rethinking and reshaping of value chains. Fifteen 
years after these seminal joint calls for GVC transformation, the 
need is ever more pressing to regain our capacity to shape the 
territorial, ecological and social embeddedness of value chains 
in truly sustainable ways. Through our contribution, we wish 
to stir momentum for a broader engagement of stakeholders in 
and around value chains towards such a transformative project.
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Today, production processes have 
become fragmented with a range 
of activities divided among firms 
and workers across borders. 
These global value chains are 
being strongly promoted by 
international organisations, such 
as the World Bank and the World 
Trade Organization, but social and 
political backlash is mounting in a 
growing variety of forms.
This ambitious volume brings 
together academics and activists 
from Europe to address the social 
and environmental imbalances 
of global production. Thinking 
creatively about how to reform 
the current economic system, this 
book will be essential reading 
for those interested in building 
sustainable alternatives at local, 





P O L I C Y  P R E S S P O L I C Y  &  P R A C T I C E
